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 This dissertation provides a historically informed examination of the emergent politics of 
agro-ecological sustainability in the Malwa region, the cotton-belt of Indian Punjab. I revisit 
the period of agro-chemical agricultural intensification, known as the “Green Revolution’ 
since the 1960s, through subjective histories of the transformation of agrarian work that are 
inflected through the lived experiences of the present. Punjabi farmers, once perceived as the 
favoured beneficiaries of state-led development practices are now in the midst of a social and 
ecological crisis with falling incomes, high levels of indebtedness, frequent crop failures, 
polluted environment and increasing incidence of diseases. Using qualitative methods, I 
examine how this experience of precariousness and downward mobility among capitalist 
farmers has fostered an alternative imaginary that seeks to revalue agrarian work and enact 
sustainable agroecological farming, as well as the constraints on the realisation of this 
imaginary. For Punjabi farmers, the struggle is not one of preservation but of forging new 
practices of food production and consumption in a degraded material and social landscape. 
While sustainable agroecological farming is incipient and much less vibrant than in many 
other regions of India, it is precisely its emergence in Punjab that is instructive for 
understanding the exclusions structured through postcolonial developmental politics. The 
Green Revolution exemplifies the spatial, temporal and social displacement of ecological 
costs through regional division of labour, and through in-situ capitalist transformation of 
agrarian work. I argue that this historically situated prefigurative mobilisation, its ongoing 
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internal negotiations and structural limitations, is a critical vantage point for understanding 
the political implications of the unevenness of postcolonial development practices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
        The Malwa region of the Indian state of Punjab has become the site of an endemic 
agrarian crisis since the 1990s. Stories of rural economic distress, farmers’ committing 
suicides, rising incidence of cancer in rural households, and the opioid epidemic among youth 
abound in the local and regional media. The physical landscape of the countryside though at 
first glance belies this narrative of crisis. Large swathes of green farmland are visible with 
wheat in the winter (Rabi season), and cotton, which is increasingly being replaced by paddy 
in the summer (Kharif season). Farmers on motorcycles and tractors dot the landscape along 
with some workers spraying agrochemicals using small tanks on their backs, or standing in 
flooded fields during paddy transplanting season. The large bungalow styled houses that are 
built on farm land, often with creative water tanks on their roofs shaped like a pair of 
bullocks, an aero plane, a tractor, a military tank with a Punjabi soldier, among others, stand 
apart from the much more modest houses clustered together inside villages. Unlike, many 
other parts of rural India, a dense network of concrete roads connects farm land with villages, 
nearby towns and cities. This imagery of prosperity has been associated with rural Punjab 
since the 1960s when it became one of the epicentres of the so-called ‘Green Revolution', a 
government-led program of agricultural intensification for achieving national sufficiency in 
food grain production.  
 
This rapid transformation of production was enacted through the commodification of farming 
inputs – adoption of HYV seeds, agrochemicals, and the institution of irrigation 
infrastructure, inputs subsidies, state procurement of crops at minimum support prices and 
aggressive persuasion through extension agencies. Within three decades (the 1960s - 1980s) 
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the mixed cropping farming system in Punjab was transformed into a mono-cropped 
landscape, with the majority of farmers practising wheat-rice, or wheat-cotton rotation. 
Monetization of everyday consumption practices and deepening of the credit economy 
accompanied the institution of monocultural cropping. The chronic indebtedness that is 
pervasive now can be traced to the mid-1970s and 1980s when farmers began to buy farm 
machinery, particularly tractors, and invest in private tube wells for groundwater extraction.1  
 
The state-supported Punjabi yeoman-farmers occupied an anomalous position within the 
postcolonial development narrative. Their economic gains, occupational pride and status were 
associated with land ownership and capital-intensive agriculture. Increasing food productivity 
through regionally concentrated intesnfication was critical to the realisation of the Nehruvian 
socialist project of industrial expansion. The Nehruvian socialist project though was also 
underpinned by the assumption of an agrarian transition – the promise of urban, non-farm 
secure jobs in the future that also became the normative definition of upward mobility. In 
Punjab, wheat and rice yields however increased dramatically only until the 1970s-1980s. 
Since the 1980s and 1990s, symptoms of social and ecological degradation began to surface 
visibly puncturing this imagery of Punjabi agrarian prosperity.  On a closer look at the 
physical landscape, it is difficult to not notice the conspicuous absence of trees, with the 
exception of patches of poplars and eucalyptus grown for commercial purposes, or few native 
tree species lining the sides of railway tracks. During spraying season, the stench of 
agrochemicals pervades the fields and occasionally there are dead birds on roadsides. 
Suffocating smog completely engulfs the fields and villages for days after the post-harvest 
																																								 																				
1 Punjab has highest rates of productivity in wheat and rice and almost 100% irrigation of 
arable land, most of which is through pumping out ground water through tube wells. The net 
irrigated area as the proportion of net sown area was 99.6% in Punjab as compared to the 
national average of 45.7 percent, out of which majority was tube wells (75.53%) followed by 
canals 24% (Agricultural Census 2010-2011, Government of India).	 
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burning of crop residue. The invisible toxins in the environment, food and groundwater are 
becoming manifest through growing intensity and incidence of diseases.2  
 
Critical scholarship on the Green Revolution highlighted the marginalisation of small and 
marginal farmers, and increasing precariousness among landless workers, through the early 
decades (Griffin 1974; Shiva 1989; Patnaik and Bernstein, 1990). In this dissertation, I 
explore the extension of experiences of precarity to medium farmers in the last three decades, 
once perceived as ‘beneficiaries’ of the Green Revolution. And how their experiences of 
precariousness have created the conditions for emergent politics for sustainable 
agroecological farming. As further agricultural intensification has become unfeasible with 
rising costs of cultivation, chronic indebtedness and frequent crop failures, an embryonic 
local counter-movement has begun to develop over the past 10 years (Singh 2004; Jodhka 
2006; Brown 2013). The movement, Kheti Virasat Mission (henceforth KVM) that roughly 
translates as ‘a mission for reviving farming heritage’, precipitated by a sense of crisis and 
disillusionment with statist interventions, employs a politics of restructuring everyday 
practices of production and consumption, specifically enacting a shift toward agro-
ecologically sustainable farming.  
 
																																								 																				
2 Punjab has about 4.2 million hectares of cultivable area, which is 3% of the net area sown in 
the country. It produces about 19% of India's wheat and 11% of rice from 12.4% and 6.7% of 
the total area under wheat and rice, respectively. It has contributed 25-50% of rice and 38-
75% of wheat to the central pool of food grains over the last four decades. Cotton is another 
important crop of the state, which is grown over 5.2 lakh hectares (2011-12), which 
constitutes about 5% of the total cotton area, and 9% of the total cotton production in the 
country (State Agricultural Report 2013). This indicates the level of agricultural 
intensification over the five decades since the Green revolution in the 1960s. It is now widely 
accepted in policy and the wider public domain that monocultures of rice and wheat with 
excessive cropping intensity have drained natural resources such as soil and water. The 
productivity level of wheat and rice has reached a plateau, and farmers have to use higher 
quantities of inputs to maintain current levels of yields. 
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In this dissertation, I examine the conditions which have made possible the politicisation of 
socio-ecological relations, and how this political discourse is being deployed to prefigure an 
alternative food system in Punjab. To do so, I focus on how men and women from rural 
households, both participants and non-participants in the movement, experience the 
transformation of work and social reproduction practices geared towards extractive 
agriculture. The prefigurative form of political mobilisation emergent at the present 
conjuncture provides an opportunity to understand the relationship between socio-ecological 
change enacted through everyday practices and political agency.  
 
Technopolitical statist interventions, that were critical to the institution of Green Revolution 
farming, have been shaped by the logic of compartmentalization, which conceives of the 
‘social' and the ‘ecological' as well as production and social reproduction as separate realms.  
 An exclusive emphasis on increasing productivity of cereal crops, particularly within the 
North-Western belt of Punjab, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh exemplifies this logic.   Surplus 
production only of wheat and rice concentrated in this region was intended to fix the severe 
crisis of social reproduction nationally at the end of the colonial period while enabling the 
development project of industrial expansion that required cheap food grain for the working 
classes. Extractive agriculture to produce food grain surpluses was critical to the process of 
postcolonial state formation and legitimization. Punjab, in particular, and the Northwestern 
region more broadly, became sites of such extractive agriculture and were produced as 
‘breadbaskets’ in the national division of labour.  The spatial and social displacement of 
ecological costs has been fundamental to postcolonial development practices. Such 
displacement has been constitutive of rural struggles in Punjab since post-independence that 
identify singular primary conflicts while bracketing other modes of exploitation.  
Mobilisations for land redistribution, highlighting class conflict in the 1960s and 1970s were 
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followed by formation of farmers’ unions led by middle and large farmers that identified 
urban-rural inequality as the primary axis of conflict, demanding greater input subsidies and 
prices from the state in the 1980s. 
 
While scholarly critiques have pointed to increasing ecological poverty as a consequence of 
deepening capital-intensive agriculture since the early decades (Shiva 1989), ecological 
degradation has emerged on the political landscape relatively recently in the last two decades. 
KVM’s advocacy for a sustainable food system in the Malwa belt explains the current crisis 
as a rupture of socio-ecological relations and seeks to repair these relations through 
prefiguration, that is the transformation of everyday practices of production and consumption. 
Thus, rising social inequality and ecological degradation are not conceived as parallel 
processes but as mutually constitutive of each other. 
 
Prefigurative politics and the concurrent analytic of the transformation of everyday practices 
and lived experiences resist compartmentalization inscribed through Green Revolution 
techno-politics. This resistance is premised on the recognition of temporal and social 
displacement of ecological costs within Punjab as the material effects of such 
compartmentalization. Over the past six decades, these effects are becoming visible in health 
outcomes, crop failures and economic unprofitability of farming making further 
intensification as well as the in-situ displacement of costs impossible. The constructive 
program of shifting toward bio-diverse natural farming, and self-sufficiency in local healthy 
food consumption principally eschews class and statist politics. However, the regional moral 
ecology is replete with contradictions: the memory of agrarian prosperity facilitated by statist 
interventions, failure to realise the promises of development –that is a transition to secure 
white-collar jobs for the majority, and the current experiences of socioeconomic and 
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ecological precariousness rooted in farming. I ask how these contradictions constrain and are 
reshaping the agenda of agro-ecological sustainability. 
 
I. The historical geography of Malwa’s cotton-belt 
 
Known as the cotton belt, the South-Western Malwa region is the largest region in terms of 
area, with the largest number of farm households and the lowest levels of education in Punjab 
(Ghuman, Singh and Singh 2007; Bajwa et al 2015). Lying south of river Sutlej, it is a semi-
arid region with a mix of sandy and alkaline desert soils (Figure 1 and 2 in the Appendix). 
People within and outside the region routinely talk about its ‘backwardness’ compared to 
Doaba and Majha regions of Punjab. This is despite or perhaps because of relatively larger 
average operational landholdings which is said to explain the ‘feudal mentality’ and lack of 
sufficient occupational diversification among rural households. Emigration has been 
significantly more common in the other regions through the colonial and postcolonial period, 
which in turn has changed the makeup of villages in Doaba and Majha. The agrarian crisis, 
particularly the growing health crisis attributed to chemical contamination of soils and 
groundwater, is known to be most severe in Malwa, because of cotton cultivation.3 State 
agencies do not procure cotton, the third prominent crop in Punjab after wheat and rice. 
While cotton is more labour-intensive, and better suited to the regional ecosystem, many 
farmers in recent years have started shifting toward rice cultivation in the region. Growing 
paddy comparatively secure as it is procured by the state at a minimum support price along 
with wheat. 
 
																																								 																				
3 Studies have shown a high level of uranium concentration in drinking water samples in the 
southwestern districts of Punjab (Bajwa et al 2015). 
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The price of cotton, in the open market, has been falling consistently over the last few years, 
even as the input prices are going up with rising pest attacks and higher prices of genetically 
modified cotton seeds (Bacillus thuringiensis popularly referred to as Bt cotton). Bt cotton, 
India’s first, and so far, the only allowed genetically modified crop was introduced in 2005, 
and now occupies a majority of the cotton acreage in Punjab. Farmers adopted Bt cotton after 
the consistent failure of American hybrids in the 1990s because of attacks by boll-weevil (cf. 
Stone 2011). After high yields in the initial few years, uncontrollable attacks by pests’ other 
than the boll-weevil have surfaced. Farmers who can afford to invest in additional motors for 
pumping out groundwater are shifting to paddy, often taking loans to make the shift. An 
assured state supported minimum price and procurement infrastructure for rice makes it less 
risky, but increasing acreage under rice is creating further pressure on already critical 
groundwater level. This shift away from cotton, which has deeper historical roots as opposed 
to rice, is an unequivocal expression of the desire for the increasingly elusive security and 
stability.4 Even though the increase in support prices for wheat and rice has been minimal, 
and incommensurate with the rise in cultivation costs and inflation (National Commission for 
Farmers 2006), they are reliable and the only form of assured basic income.  Wheat, a staple 
in the local diets provides food security and income for medium farmers who produce a 
surplus, the other crop, whether rice or cotton, is the primary source of cash income for 
consumption expenditure including health, and education. 
 
Rural Malwa is an apt vantage point to unravel the trajectory of temporal, social and spatial 
displacement of ecological costs within Punjab and the saturation of this process. As the 
predominantly agrarian and relatively dry and semi-arid region, it is anomalous in relation to 
																																								 																				
4 Rice is perceived as an alien crop that is not a part of the local diet even in areas where it 
has been grown for decades now, and until recently required the knowledge of migrant labour 
from Eastern states specifically for transplantation. 
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the imagery of prosperity. The specific materiality of cotton cultivation and its exclusion 
from the state-supported procurement system has produced conditions for rethinking extant 
agrarian practices. The emergence of the agro-ecological sustainability movement here 
reflects the manifestation of socio-ecological degradation in stark forms, produced through 
the intensification of the technological treadmill. The history of the cotton-belt denaturalises 
the imaginary of Punjab as a ‘core’ region and the implied valourisation of a development 
trajectory structured through capital-intensive farming in this imaginary. 
 
The salience of region-centric analysis has been highlighted in recent South Asian 
historiography. Accounts of regions as produced ecologies and not as bounded geographical 
entities pose a challenge to methodological nationalism and draw attention to ongoing 
dynamics of postcolonial nation state formation (Rangan 2000; Ludden 1999, Agarwal and 
Sivaramakrishnan 2000; Goswami 2004). As Haripriya Rangan (2000) argues ‘regionalism’ 
allows for an analytical focus on processes of governance and the attendant conflicts rather 
than presuming the inherent and immutable character of pre-colonial, colonial or post-
colonial states. Others have argued that ‘regionalism’ has been a historically distinct 
characteristic of the South Asia on account of the diversity of its agrarian environments (cf. 
Ludden 1999, Agarwal & Sivaramakrishnan 2000). Regions draw attention to the unevenness 
constitutive of nation state-formation on the one hand and disrupt the First World/Third 
World dichotomy on the other hand as sites where local and global processes articulate 
(Walker 2003; Galt 2013; Neumann 2010; Makki 2012).  
 
As a site of extractive agriculture and because of its geopolitical location Punjab was critical 
to both colonial and postcolonial state formation. While ‘Green Revolution’ in the 1960s is 
often characterised as a moment of rupture, the roots of techno-political statist interventions 
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can be traced to the colonial period. Going beyond the commercialization of agriculture 
through restructuring revenue collection, intensification was promoted for export of wheat 
and cotton, and for domestic consumption to quell the growing unrest in British India. The 
colonial state built an extensive canal infrastructure, enacted measures for land consolidation, 
and incentivised Sikh Jat peasants from central Punjab through recruitment in large numbers 
in British India army and land grants in the canal colonies. The canal colonies built around 
canals in previously pastoral territories were supposed to be the ‘embodiment of science, 
modernity and progress’ where pastoral populations were ‘civilised’ through scientific 
agrarian practices (Bhattacharya 2012:5). Disciplining of the population through 
classification, the institution of new labour practices and recognition of private property went 
hand in hand with disciplining of the material landscape (Gilmartin 1994). The straight-lined 
square plots, perennial canals and institution of crop uniformity were aimed at producing a 
regime of control and precision to displace uncertainties of farming practised in sync with 
seasonal rhythms.   
 
As David Ludden (2000) argues, Punjab can be thought of as a frontier region. The lowlands 
in Punjab were barely cultivated in the sixteenth century and in 1800 large tracts of the land 
were still open for grazing.  However, after 1850 the colonial state built 20 canals, extending 
886 miles, which by 1945 irrigated 15,688,000 acres, much of it bearing more than one crop. 
The increasing frequency of agrarian unrest after 1850 reflected the competition over land, 
rights to resources, water, farm-incomes amid the final closure of farming frontiers (Ludden 
2000: 261-262).  Subsistence farming in North-West Provinces transformed into an export 
sector to stabilize British grain prices and provisions during years of poor harvests. Punjab 
became an important shock absorber for Britain and, to a lesser extent, continental Europe in 
face of poor harvests and higher prices in the US wheat belt. The coincidence of drought in 
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North America and South Asia was particularly dangerous for Punjabi cultivators (Davis 
2001:123). The general instability and volatility of prices generated by virtue of being ‘shock 
absorber’ region, entrapped cultivators in debt and generated tremendous political conflict 
within the region (Fox 1985; Mukherjee 2005; Mooney 2013).  
 
While beyond the scope of this dissertation, this long history makes visible the transformation 
of Punjab from being a frontier region inhabited by pastoralists and self-sufficient peasantry 
to a ‘breadbasket’ produced through aggressive intensification. It also disrupts its 
ecologically determinist representation as a ‘core’ developed region by virtue of its natural 
endowments often invoked in Green Revolution narratives through the phrase ‘land of five 
rivers’. The specific ecologies of the pastoral highlands, the intensely cultivated and densely 
populated Central Punjab and the arid desert-like South West region were entangled in the 
colonial modernist project in different ways, which produced conflict between social classes 
within and between these regions.  The reconfiguration of the material landscape has been in 
conjunction with the production of the class of ‘yeoman’/ progressive Sikh Jat farmer-owners 
in conflict with pastoral communities in the first instance, and subsequently with the state. 
Indebtedness rose phenomenally among Punjabi cultivators, the so-called ‘favoured subjects’ 
of the British Raj by the first few decades of the twentieth century (Thorner et al 1996; 
Darling 1977), leading to the periodic eruption of protests and communal tensions (Fox 
1985).  
 
As Javeed Alam (1985) argues the key dilemma in Punjab has been explaining the discontent 
among classes, which supposedly benefitted from the development of capitalist agriculture, 
manifest in radical political movements.  The militant Sikh secessionist movement of the 
1980s brutally suppressed by the Indian state has been attributed to the disruption of the 
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social fabric with rising inequality, an influx of migrant agricultural labour from other parts 
of the country and the emerging ecological crisis (Pettigrew 1995; Shiva 1989). According to 
Joyce Pettigrew the secessionist guerrilla movement which begins to take shape as early as 
1978 was in part triggered by the suffering of small farmers and already rising unemployment 
in rural Punjab. The immediate sparks that unleashed the violent mobilisation included the 
suspension of the policy of disproportionately greater recruitment for the Indian army from 
Punjab instituted by the colonial state, and diversion of canal water to other states by the 
federal government which forced Punjabi cultivators to rely more on groundwater extraction 
through tube wells (1995: 55-58). The dispute on river water sharing between Punjab and the 
neighbouring state of Haryana is ongoing and has been central to the narrative of regional 
exploitation by the federal state. It is noteworthy that these issues have largely been excluded 
from both celebratory and critical scholarship on the Green Revolution. Richard Fox’s (1985) 
account of the colonial period in Punjab also shows the relationship between the volatility 
created by agricultural intensification and incorporation of Punjabi farmers into the global 
food economy and the rise of communal political movements. The dynamics set in motion in 
the colonial period laid the foundations for the spatial displacement of ecological costs with 
Punjab at the receiving end of the national division of labour enacted through Green 
Revolution interventions.  
 
The radicalism of the agroecological movement in Malwa lies in the fact that farmers who 
practised chemical intensification and enjoyed short-lived monetary gains are at the forefront 
of the struggle. They are employing an indigenist discourse to resist further advances by 
global capital mediated via the national state. Indigenist politics, associated with Adivasi and 
peasant communities marginalised by the ‘development project’ (McMichael 2017), is being 
enacted by capitalist farmers from the regionally dominant caste of landowning Sikh-jats. 
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Invocation of indigenist discourse led by a dominant community from a ‘core’ region is not 
based on an assessment of where they stand ‘on a scale of accomplishment naturalised by the 
development state’ (Cederlof and Sivaramakrishnan 2006: 5). Rather, it is based on the 
rejection of such a scale and the recognition of its limits. The discontent expressed by 
agrarian households in Malwa including landowning cultivators and landless workers, 
however, does not completely align with an indigenist discourse of autonomy and 
sustainability. They continue to make demands for a livable income through adequate support 
prices and secure jobs in the non-farm economy that were promised by the development state 
and remain unfulfilled (cf. Rangan 2000). 
 
II. The Agrarian Question of Labour (Practices) 
 
Small holder farming is far from disappearing in India. There is no visible trend yet toward 
concentration of agricultural land ownership. Nearly 60% of the population continues to 
depend on agriculture for social reproduction in conjunction with work in the informal rural 
and urban economy. Jobless growth of the non-farm sectors has been the persistent trend 
since the onset of neoliberal reforms in the 1990s. The widespread crisis among farming 
households also began in the 1990s and has continuously deepened since then. Therefore, it 
has been argued that the agrarian question of capital has been bypassed in neoliberal India 
and replaced by the agrarian question of labour, or more aptly a crisis of social reproduction 
for the majority of the population (cf. Bernstein 2010; Lerche 2011; Shah and Harriss-White 
2011). The political implications of such a framing of the agrarian question of labour, where 
labour refers to fragmented dispossessed classes, as a crisis of social reproduction for the 
soon-to-be surplus populations dispensable to capitalist accumulation are bleak (Bernstein 
2006; Li 2010). The assumed inevitability of such a transition implies either an acceleration 
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of job creation in the non-farm economy and/or expansion of state-led provisioning. On the 
other hand, the varied and proliferating forms of rural struggles in India in the last decade are 
challenging the structural constraints on agrarian liveihoods, which continue to be 
preponderant in the form of petty commodity production. Paying attention to the agendas of 
these struggles becomes even more pertinent given that the large-scale corporate take-over of 
agriculture through enclosure of land, has not yet taken off in India preserving the possibility 
of a future with viable smallholder farming.5  
 
Instead, the process of ‘depeasantisation without proletarianisation’ (Araghi 2009) has played 
out through the transformation of the labour process with capital-intensive inputs and squeeze 
on farm incomes through dwindling or volatile prices leading to chronic indebtedness. Most 
affected are small and marginal farmers, but it is also becoming difficult for medium farmers 
to generate a livable income from farming. Thus, it is principally agrochemical and seed 
companies, and large-scale traders of agricultural commodities that are accumulating in the 
agricultural sector.6 The transformation of farming practices through mono-cropping and 
chemical intensification has proceeded unevenly and is highly differentiated regionally. 
While productivity is stagnating in Green Revolution regions where such intensification has 
been ongoing since the 1960s, regions in Central and Eastern India are becoming new sites of 
investment and productivity growth spurts. While there have been several insightful studies 
of regionally situated histories of agrarian transformation in India the political implications of 
																																								 																				
5 Acquisition of agricultural land for industry, with the mediation of the state, however, is a 
looming threat. It is worth noting that the geography of land grabbing for industry has 
expanded beyond tribal areas where agro-forestry is practiced to include core agricultural 
areas.  And, India is actively involved in land grabbing via multinational companies to 
procure food for domestic consumption (Landy 2017; Makki 2012). 
6 According to the most recent survey of National Sample Survey organisation (2012-2013) 
over half of the 58% of agricultural households in the country are in debt, with	the average 
loan amount outstanding for a farm household being Rs. 47,000. The average farm household 
income is a paltry Rs 6,426 per month (about $99), out of which only 47.9% comes from 
cultivation (Rukmini 2014). 
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this unevenness remain unexplored.7 Farmers unions across the country have been demanding 
loan waivers, compensation for families where farmers have committed suicides, and most 
critically increase in minimum support prices of crops and expansion of the state procurement 
system that would stabilise prices. Land conflicts have also been proliferating in different 
parts of the country in significant numbers since the 2000s. These include farmers’ agitations 
against the acquisition of agricultural land and/or demands for adequate compensation. As 
Michael Levien (2013) argues dispossession of land poses an immediate and irreversible 
threat to people’s means of production and subsistence and often involves violence, and 
therefore is likely to generate disruptive and overt resistance. Levien (2013: 366) also 
contends that land dispossession is likely to produce ‘local, ad-hoc, single-issue forms of 
organisation’ that target the state. 
 
In contrast, it is difficult to neatly delineate forms of political agency produced through 
gradual and uneven dispossession in the form of loss of control over the labour process for 
landowning farmers.8 Arguably, such a process is likely to create conditions for quiescence 
and/or fragmentation of agrarian interests. It is now widely acknowledged that farmer 
suicides stemming from agrarian distress have been concentrated among small and medium 
farmers from politically dominant castes and groups and in regions that embraced Green 
																																								 																				
7 Ethnographies of regionally situated transformations of agrarian work in India show how 
sociocultural and material processes produce subjectivities and forms of political agency (Gidwani 
2008, Chari 2004; Harriss 1982).  Byres (1981) hinted at the political implications of regional 
unevenness but as a comparison based on predefined attributes instead of mutually constitutive 
relational process.  
8 In the Grundrisse, Marx describes the real subsumption of labour as 'the accumulation of 
knowledge and of skill, of the general productive forces of the social brain, is thus absorbed 
into capital as opposed to labour and hence appears as an attribute of capital' (Marx, 1975: 
694). Signaling the political implications, Marx argues that this process leads workers to 
attribute their exploitation to machinery and technology, that is means of extraction, as 
opposed to its employment by capital (Marx, 1976: 554-55). Yet, Marx conceives of politics 
primarily in terms of constructing alternative social relations, and not alternative forms of 
knowledge production and labour practices.  
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Revolution practices (Muenster 2015; Shah 2012; Kennedy and King 2014). Landowning 
farmers in the Green revolution belt had significant political clout in the 1970s and 1980s and 
put forward demands for greater inputs subsidies and prices from the state. These demands 
accelerated intensification, which ironically is in part responsible for the weakening of their 
political leverage. With abundant availability of food, strengthening of the Indian state and 
corporate capital, and distress in the agrarian economy since the 1990s, the political leverage 
of farmers’ unions is weakened significantly. 
 
The experiences of Punjabi farmers and the history of agrarian struggles in the region leading 
up to the nascent movement for agro-ecologically sustainable farming is instructive for 
understanding the political implications of the crisis generated by deepening technological 
treadmill. Punjabi farmers today have negligible control over the labour process. Everything, 
from cropping choices and methods to inputs that were instituted through statist 
interventions, is now a part of a self-sustaining technological treadmill. Their experiences 
speak to the contemporary agrarian question of labour, framings of which have paid scant 
attention to labour practices and consequently ecological dynamics (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 
2010). Attention to agrarian practices and how they articulate with socio-ecological 
reproduction in a 'core region' in the Global South can shift the political problematic by 
foregrounding the failure of modernist paradigm (cf. Van der Ploeg 2010; McMichael 2006).  
More critically, it can provide insights on whether such a failure can produce a place-based 
politics that privileges both social justice and ecological sustainability.  
The family farm and the peasant farmer were considered anomalous in the classic agrarian 
debate because of incomplete realisation of real subsumption of labour, or capitalist 
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transformation of the labour process (Nadkarni 1991, Alavi 1975).9 Subsequent scholarship 
attributed agrarian exceptionalism to constraints imposed by the biological conditions of 
work (Goodman and Redclift 1994). This notion of exceptionalism informed the debates on 
agrarian politics as well. Overdetermined by the assumption of class polarization, the middle 
peasant was at the centre of the political agrarian question. While orthodox Marxist scholars 
characterised the ‘middle peasant’ as conservative and reactionary, agrarian scholars drawing 
on experiences of postcolonial nations saw the middle peasant as the revolutionary class 
given its relative autonomy (Alavi 1973; Wolf 1971). However, as John Harriss (1979; 1982) 
convincingly argued based on his rich ethnography in Northern Tamil Nadu, the ‘middle 
peasantry’ was an inherently unstable group with caste and kinship ties to other classes of 
farmers, and dependent on traders and merchants for loans to buy agrochemical inputs and 
sell produce with the adoption of Green revolution practices. The question of political class 
formation was thus not straightforward in the context of changing agrarian practices mediated 
by extensive statist interventions. Regardless, of whether the farmers’ mobilisations in the 
Green revolution belt in India were considered conservative and reactionary or progressive, 
their demand for agro-input subsidies drew attention to transformation of the labour process, 
expanding the political discourse beyond localised land and labour conflict.  
The small number of Punjabi farmers leading the sustainability movement by shifting toward 
natural farming can indeed be categorised as ‘middle-class’. However, the ‘middle-class’ 
status is not by virtue of land ownership alone but a conjunction of other factors. Within the 
national context, the majority of Punjabi farmers growing wheat and rice have had relatively 
																																								 																				
9 The issue of capitalist transformation of agriculture was germane to the mode of production 
debates in postcolonial India as well, although the focus was largely on relations of 
production, not agrarian practices. Very few studies of agrarian transformation in India have 
paid substantive attention to analysis of technology in the transformation of labour process 
and ecological dynamics (cf. Amin 1982; Pandian 1987; Gupta 1998; Stone 2007; Stone 
2011; Stone & Flachs 2017).  
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stable incomes because of access to state procurement infrastructure. While minimum support 
prices declared by the government for certain crops formally apply to all farmers, less than 
six percent farmers nationally are able to sell at these prices to state procurement agencies 
(Kumar 2015; cf. Landy 2017). The extensive networks of market yards for such 
procurement are limited to northwest Green Revolution regions including Punjab. In terms of 
production though Punjabi farmers are the most exploited with the highest usage of 
fertilizers, pesticides, insecticides and groundwater. The easy access to these inputs is 
increasingly being viewed as a bane with deepening social and ecological crisis. Within the 
medium landowning class of farmers, the small subset who are shifting to sustainable farming 
practices are mostly elderly farmers who have some knowledge of farming prior to the 
diffusion of Green Revolution practices, some form of stable non-farm income coming into 
their households and an experience of cognitive disillusionment with scientific agriculture in 
its existing form.  
I argue that labour practices, as an analytical departure point for understanding political 
agency, are significant for three reasons. First, they reveal the epistemic rupture underlying 
techno-politics of the Green Revolution that makes the interactions with the material 
environment in the process of social reproduction politically invisible (Ekers and Loftus 
2013). The co-constitution of the social and material landscape through human and non-
human agency is made invisible, as the notion of ‘expertise' drives techno-political 
development practices that are characterised by this process of obfuscation (Mitchell 2002).  
As Timothy Mitchell writes: 
 
“Techno-politics is always a technical body, an alloy that must emerge from a process of 
manufacture whose ingredients are both human and non-human, both intentional and not, and 
in which the intentional or the human is always somewhat overrun by the unintended. But is a 
particular form of manufacturing, a certain way of organising the amalgam of human and 
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non-human, things and ideas, so that the human, the intellectual, the realm of intentions and 
ideas seems to come first and to control and organize the non-human” (pp. 43). 
 
Moreover, as Schneider and McMichael (2010) argue the “epistemic rift” is also replicated in 
social theory, which has focused predominantly on social relations of production, neglecting 
the restructuring of labour practices. Emergent agrarian resistance in the form of prefigurative 
agro-ecological politics poses a fundamental critique of the rationalisation of the labour 
process and highlights its consequences for both social and ecological reproduction. 
 
Second, memories of how agrarian work was transformed through the Green Revolution 
decades are also an account of how production is embedded in, and disembedded from, the 
total system of reproduction (Watts 1983). They highlight the experience of deepening 
commodification not just in the realm of production but also of consumption practices, the 
reconfiguration of sociality, gendered socio-cultural practices as well as notions of well-being 
and upward mobility. In other words, I argue that these memories are critical for reclaiming 
conceptions of ‘living abour’ in a seemingly homogenised agrarian landscape (Chakrabarty 
2008; Gidwani 2008). As Chakrabarty argues in his reading of Marx, the ‘living’ quality of 
labour resists disciplinary measures enacted in the process of abstraction of labour by capital. 
This process of abstraction is, therefore, never complete, which in turn leads to the 
production of more ‘dead labour’ or technology, creating the conditions for emancipation of 
labour and the dissolution of capital (2008: 61). Memories of transformation of agrarian work 
foreground the ‘living’ quality of labour as they map the relation of workers with soils, crops, 
agro-chemicals and machinery, and with each other. 
 
And finally, the collective shared memories that recall past practices point towards exclusions 
structured through techno-political interventions that are invisible on the material landscape. 
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Some of these exclusions have been not recognized by the organized agrarian mobilisations 
in the postcolonial period as well. Most notably, in Punjab, these include tasks performed by 
women, which were marginalised with their eviction from the fields, as well as the form and 
role of the commons in sustaining agrarian production and everyday consumption. The 
history of the eliminated commons, which included not just material resources but also 
collective work practices, makes visible social groups that have been eliminated from the 
history of the Green Revolution. Struggles for land redistribution by landless Dalit 
communities in the early 1960s and 1970s were driven by the emancipatory momentum of 
the anti-colonial nationalist movement but were co-opted and suppressed through the statist 
developmental politics. These struggles though continue to be recounted in the history of 
agrarian politics in the postcolonial period (Singh 1994; Judge 1992). The experiences of 
pastoral communities, however, germane to the regional ecology prior to agricultural 
intensification are absent in official and resistance narratives. 
 
III. A Political Agroecology 
 
The movement for agro-ecological sustainability in Malwa is distinct from other 
‘environmental’ political movements spurred by ‘development induced displacement’ 
(Fairbairn et al 2014; Baviskar 1995). The latter have included struggles against large-scale 
infrastructure projects and extractive industries that threatened people’s immediate 
livelihoods and the environment they inhabit. Much of political ecology scholarship has 
focused on struggles over resources and livelihoods from the standpoint of such marginalised 
subjects of development (Rangan 2000; Martinez-Alier 2014). While the movement led by 
KVM has predominantly middle-class farmers as participants, it shares the vocabulary of 
other development induced struggles in the global South – that of enacting material and 
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cultural autonomy, revaluing indigenous knowledge and practices, and enacting nurturing 
socio-ecological relations (cf. Escobar 2008).  
 
For Punjabi farmers, the struggle is not one of preservation but for forging new practices of 
production and consumption in a degraded material and social landscape. While sustainable 
agroecological farming is incipient and much less vibrant than in many other regions of India, 
it is precisely its emergence in Punjab that is instructive for understanding the exclusions 
structured through developmental politics, as well as the possibilities for inversion through 
the standpoint of socially and ecologically embedded producers situated within the 
constraints of global political ecology, mediated via the nation-state (cf. Mitchell 2013; 
McMichael 2013). The agroecology movement is working against the extant moral economy 
shaped by dependence on public infrastructure designed for agrochemical intensification. As 
this public infrastructure of input subsidies and support prices for wheat and rice that 
incentivises mono-cropping is being dismantled, cultivators trapped in intensification 
treadmill are left to bear the costs of increasing productivity on their own. Therefore, the 
parallel struggle led by farmers’ unions is to preserve this state support that enabled the 
Punjabi farmers' position of relative privilege.   
 
In this context, I employ the tools of political ecology in three ways. First, I argue that 
focusing on the experiences of farmers in the cotton-belt of Malwa perceived as an internal 
‘backward’ sub-region foreground the marginal standpoint that challenges the imaginary of 
Punjab as the wheat-rice breadbasket and a success story of the postcolonial development 
project. It also draws attention to how the materiality of specific crops is constitutive of social 
relations and political agency. The history of agrochemical intensification specific to cotton 
and its exclusion from the state procurement system has produced a relatively deeper 
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economic and ecological crisis. The crisis is experienced not simply as deprivation but in the 
form of heightened risk and volatility, loss of status, and the inability to realise imagined 
futures. This, in turn, has created the conditions for the emergence of a movement for agro-
ecological sustainability.  
 
Second, I situate the movement for agro-ecological sustainability by mapping the lived 
experiences of the present crisis of both movement participants and non-participants 
including landless cultivators and farm workers. While the political economy of agrifood 
system has tended to look inward, political ecologists have situated food and agrarian politics 
within broader contexts that shape people’ lived experiences (Galt 2013; Carney and Watts 
1990). Narratives articulated by men and women from agrarian households with different 
social and economic standing are nonlinear accounts of the transformation of both production 
and social reproduction practices through the Green Revolution decades. Their evaluations of 
lost agrarian practices and the Green Revolution practices that replaced them, complicate the 
mobilisation discourse of the movement which reconstructs a valorised indigenous ‘past’. 
These narratives are therefore useful as repositories of alternative ways farming and modes of 
dwelling that now exist only in the shared collective memory, as well as to trace the 
exclusions enacted through Green Revolution practices that are being reinforced either 
strategically or inadvertently by the agro-ecological sustainability movement. The collective 
social memory filtered through the present sense of crisis illustrates how experiences 
constitute subjectivities, which in turn is critical for understanding both the possibilities and 
constraints of agroecological politics. This dissertation is animated by the question of how 
alterations in everyday practices that are experienced as qualitative ruptures inform notions of 
well-being, which in turn shape the possibilities for collective struggles. 
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Finally, I suggest that the prefigurative mode of organising adopted by KVM is salient for 
understanding how socio-ecological relations shape political agency. KVM’s mobilisation is 
centred on producing critical consciousness in and through the process of transforming 
everyday practices of food production and consumption. Both place-making and temporality 
are critical to such prefiguration. The enactment of practices as a mode of forging community 
and solidarity with the ecosystem is in principle different from the defence of the closed 
predefined community that breeds reactionary politics. Prefigurative politics also 
reconfigures the relationship between the past, present and the future in ways that challenge 
the linear conception of progress germane to state-led development practices and the 
discourse of development more broadly. KVM challenges the discursive and material de-
valourisation of agrarian work and the naturalisation of agrochemical intensive agriculture as 
a progressive form of farming. I examine how such mobilisation is unfolding in practice. 
 
The mobilising discourse of cultural autonomy along with a practical agenda of 
transformation that is invoked by agroecological politics in Punjab offers a fundamental 
critique of techno-political practices. The idiom of cultural autonomy challenges the 
productivist logic of development practices, as well as critical accounts of the ensuing crisis 
that separate economic distress from ecological degradation. While the assertion of cultural 
autonomy mirrors techno-political practices through inversion, that is, by emphasising the 
‘non-economic’ as a strategic essentialism, focus on practical transformation in organising 
has constituted social reproduction as a site of struggle.  
 
As Wolford and Keene (2015) point out there has been a limited engagement with organised 
resistance movements among political ecologists, and that this engagement has been deeply 
influenced by the work of E.P. Thompson and Antonio Gramsci in emphasising how norms 
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and customs shape struggles over material resources. The emphasis on norms and customs, 
foreground not just conflicts over access to material resources and the environment, but 
struggles over different ways of organising production and social reproduction practices. 
What is particularly interesting is that the protagonists of the agroecology movement also 
view themselves as being implicated in the process of socio-ecological degradation. This 
suggestion of complicity however also provokes resentment from those situated at the bottom 
of the gender, caste and class hierarchy that the movement is trying to mobilise, feeding into 
the fissures within the movement. I argue that these fissures are allowing for the forging of a 
more inclusive agenda that goes beyond technical framing of agroecology and parochial 
notions of localised autonomy.   
 
Movements for agro-ecological sustainability, including organic farming, have been criticised 
for being implicated in cultural conservatism and for their failure to challenge local power 
relations (Guthman 2004; Brown 2013; Khadse et al 2017). Or, as resistance to and delinking 
from state and corporate capital becomes the primary focus, caste, class and gendered 
relations are analytically deprioritized and the notion of traditional farming knowledge is 
employed uncritically. Traditional farming knowledge is often a reference to technics such as 
mixed cropping, use of native seed varieties, irrigation suitable to local ecosystems, 
cultivation of coarse grains and foods that were a part of local diets, but without an 
elaboration of how these technics are or were embedded within historically produced social 
relations and enacted as labour practices (cf. Gregory et al 2017).  
 
The individual oral histories are suggestive of different ways of knowing based on lived 
experiences differentiated by generation, class gender and caste as well as the points of 
convergence that form the shared collective social memory. Through these recollections, I 
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outline the different moral economies that coexist, which are also critical for understanding 
the competing discourses emerging within KVM (cf. Wolford 2010). The divergent 
understandings of agro-ecological sustainability within the movement show the potential for 
addressing intersectional forms of exploitation through prefigurative politics (Bezner Kerr 
2014). This specific form of organising reflects a Gandhian legacy of constructive resistance 
that is shared by several environmental struggles in post-colonial India and cannot be 
understood through framings of class and/or identity politics. The deployment of deliberative 
practices as a mode of organising privileged over ideological framings recognises that subject 
formation is an ongoing, dynamic process. As Arun Agrawal (2005: 166) argues 
subjectivities are not durable sites where consciousness resides. Rather there is an iterative 
relationship between practices and perceptions, and it is the recognition of this contingency 
that makes it possible to introduce the register of the ‘political’. While Agrawal (2005) 
focuses on how environmental subjectivities are constituted by governmental regulations and 
practices, KVM’s mobilisation employs practices to produce critical consciousness among 
those who work on the land across social classes. Emplaced practices thus become a form of 
struggle to imagine and transition to an alternative food system (cf. Moore 2005). 
 
By focusing on the internal negotiations within the movement, and the change in KVM 
strategies over the last decade, I show that practice-based mobilisation has reshaped the 
agenda of the movement. From being centred on advocacy of a purist form of bio-diverse 
natural farming which within the existing institutional infrastructure was only possible for a 
very small set of largely elderly landowning farmers, there is now a wide range of forms of 
participation. These include reducing chemical inputs with every season, continued use of 
fertilizers with natural management of pest and insects, producing organic food for household 
consumption or experimenting on a small part of the farm land. This reconfiguration has 
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enabled the inclusion of social groups other than medium landowning farmers to a limited 
extent. As Edelman et al (2014) suggest the ‘tolerance for pluralism’ and fostering 
transitional efforts towards agroecology is one of the biggest challenges for the food 
sovereignty movement (Holt-Giménez and Shattuck 2011). KVM’s experiences illustrate 
how these challenges are constantly negotiated within movements, of enacting new practices 
within the constraints imposed by the particular historical trajectories of regional ecologies, 
while keeping alive more radical emancipatory possibilities on the horizon (Kloppenburg 
2014).  
 
IV. Methods 
 
In this dissertation, my aim is to focus on the subjective experiences of the Green revolution 
in the cotton belt of Punjab from the standpoint of men and women located differently and 
relationally in the social hierarchy. I argue that subjective experiences and perceptions of 
change in agrarian work, labour practices and social reproduction practices through the Green 
Revolution period are critical for understanding the emergence of and the constraints on the 
movement for transition to agro-ecological sustainability. While there has been a strong 
tradition of ethnographic research in studying rural India, studies of the Green Revolution 
have largely been devoid of subjective accounts of transformation, with a few exceptions (eg. 
Kumar 2016). Moreover, even as environmental decline is part of the recent work on agrarian 
crisis, little attention has been paid to how such environmental decline is interpreted and 
experienced by rural cultivators and its political implications (Vasavi 2012; Arora and 
Deshpande 2013). 
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Therefore, this study is based on qualitative methods, predominantly semi-structured and 
unstructured interviews in the form of oral histories, extended observation and sustained 
interactions with people in 4 villages as well as the nearby town of Jaitu, in Faridkot and 
Bathinda districts of Punjab. I also travelled to a few other villages in these districts to 
interview natural and organic farmers associated with KVM. I rely predominantly on 
observations, in-depth interviews and oral histories to examine perceptions, experiences, and 
interactions with the material and social environment, as a way of understanding how 
subjectivities are formed through everyday practices (Scott 1991). Oral histories with elderly 
men and women were particularly informative in understanding the processes of resistance, 
adoption and naturalisation of Green revolution practices since the early decades. These 
retrospective accounts evaluate the present crisis through this long-term perspective. I employ 
life histories to understand self-presentations of well-being and changing notions of what 
constitutes dignified work, as well as how memory constitutes identity and sense of 
entitlement (Chari 2004; Moore 2005). The process of memory-making in these narratives 
connects the past with the present, constituting certain events as significant and moments of 
rupture (Lamont and Swidler 2014). The memories of elderly farmers also make visible lost 
or eroding practices and ways of farming, reconstructing material landscape that no longer 
exists (cf. Gold and Gujar 2002). They reflect not only what happened but also what people 
wanted, therefore outlining alternative imaginaries of which there are no visible material 
traces (Portelli 1991). It also becomes possible to uncover marginalised perspectives that are 
not reflected in collective, organised expressions of resistance (Jeffery and Jeffery 1996). 
Most significantly, these oral histories interweave the ‘public’ and ‘private’ domain, showing 
how the domestic, familial domain intersects with production and labour, as well as political 
and institutional apparatus in individual lives as feminist scholarship has illustrated (cf. 
Laslett and Thorne 1997; Abu-Lughod 1993). 
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All of the interviews were with men and women were from small and medium landowning 
households, with landholdings between less than an acre to 20 acres, and tenant cultivators. 
The majority of the interviewees had land less than 7 acres.10 A small number of farmers 
associated with KVM were practising natural/ organic farming and others were in the process 
of reducing their usage of agrochemicals and adopting non-pesticide management practices 
incrementally with support from KVM. Research participants also included landless 
households, who employ diversified livelihood strategies seasonal wage labour on farms, in 
brick kilns, construction and transport within and outside the villages. All of them though 
lived in the village, while commuting to nearby towns and cities for work. Some were also 
tenant cultivators leasing in land through an annual or short-term contract. Landless 
households were primarily lower-caste Dalits households, known locally as Mazhbi Sikhs, 
and landowning households were Sikh Jats, the dominant agrarian caste in Punjab. In some 
instances when Sikh Jat households had lost their land due to debt, they continue to be 
referred to as zamindars (landowning castes) but without land. I purposively excluded large 
farmers, with landholdings above 30 acres and those who were largely absentee landlords.11 
While most of the men and women that I engaged with during this research were not 
movement members or associated with KVM, they did reside in villages where KVM had a 
significant presence. Interviews with men farmers were mostly conducted in the fields while 
they were at work, and with women in their homes. Extended discussions within homes often 
																																								 																				
10 According to government classification landholdings of fewer than 5 acres are categorised 
as small and marginal, and between 5-25 acres as medium. Small and marginal operational 
landholdings have been consistently increasing in Punjab. The proportion of marginal and 
smallholdings, which was 13.36 and 18.25 per cent in 2005-06, increased to 15.50 and 18.53 
per cent, respectively. On the other hand, the proportion of holdings in all other categories 
viz. semi-medium, medium and large has declined during this period (Singh et al 2012). 
11 Large farmers (those with more than 10 hectares of land) constitute about 8% of all farmers 
in Punjab, as opposed to only 1 per cent of the total nationally (Singh 2013: 164). 
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included several members of the family from different generations. To map the broader 
workings of the regional agrarian economy, I conducted structured interviews with 
agricultural scientists, agronomists and extension officials in Punjab Agricultural University, 
Ludhiana as well as the regional extension centre in Bathinda. I also interviewed commission 
agents who buy grain from farmers, and provide loans as well as agrochemical dealers and 
shopkeepers in the town of Jaitu, and in Bathinda city. These towns are the prominent 
regional nodes for marketing with market yards where farmers from the nearby villages come 
to buy inputs and sell produce. 
 
Activists from Kheti Virasat Mission (KVM) were instrumental in conducting this research. 
The 4 villages where I conducted research were chosen because of their proximity to the 
town of Jaitu where KVM’s central office is located, and where I resided for a part of the 
fieldwork. The remainder of the time I was living in these villages in the homes of natural 
farmers associated with the movement. Therefore, contact with farming households not 
associated with the movement was initially established largely through KVM activists and 
their network of friends and family. KVM activists who are mostly residents of villages in 
this area, and natural farmers working with the movement were my primary interlocutors 
while interacting with people. As key informants, they have played a critical role in shaping 
my research agenda and have informed my methodological decisions. Thus, this study is not 
representative but illustrative of the meanings small, marginal and medium rural cultivators 
attach to agrarian work, how they evaluate the transformations enacted through Green 
Revolution decades and interpret the present crisis, located in an environment where KVM’s 
activities have politicised existing socio-ecological relations. KVM’s critique of the Green 
Revolution, state-led development interventions, and understanding of the crisis contest the 
epistemology that ruptures socio-ecological relations, and production from social 
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reproduction. Influenced by their epistemic intervention, I have tried to mirror this relational 
understanding in my analysis by emphasising practices and formation of subjectivities.   
 
My analysis of the KVM’s organising practices is based on in-depth interviews with activists, 
observations of their daily activities in the villages, and internal meetings of the organisation 
over this period. I accompanied activists on their visits to villages, attended village meetings, 
training sessions on agroecological methods, participated in their interactions with individual 
farmers on the farms and in people’s homes. I also conducted interviews with farmers who 
were transitioning toward agroecological practices, participating in movement’s activities, 
and non-participants who attend the introductory village meetings, and those who were 
associated with KVM but have grown disillusioned or distant to understand motivations and 
constraints on participations and non-participation. All the interviews were conducted in 
Hindi and Punjabi and translated into English. I coded the interviews to identify common 
themes in two ways. The first set of themes are concerned with the changes through the 
Green Revolution decades in everyday agrarian work practices and the corresponding 
transformations in social reproduction practices; the ways in which the articulations of the 
present crisis interpret social and ecological dimensions of the crisis, and factors that the 
crisis was attributed to. The second set of themes were to do with KVM's organising 
practices, evaluations of the feasibility of agroecological practices in counteracting the crisis, 
and constraints in enacting such practices. 
 
When I began this research in 2013, I intended to explore the systematic devaluation of 
agrarian work through the lens of intergenerational relations, focusing on how post-colonial 
developmental practices produced aspirations for non-agrarian livelihoods and moving out of 
the village. I sought to understand how these aspirations and the inability of the majority 
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among the younger generation to actualize them is shaping political subjectivities within rural 
spaces.  Interactions with KVM activists, and observations and conversation with people 
outside the movement in the initial phase, though, put the notion of crisis at the forefront. 
More broadly, in the last few years, the narrative of a deepening agrarian crisis has also 
gained momentum in the national public discourse. Farmers across the country, including in 
Punjab, are increasingly expressing their discontent through protests over increasing debt, 
crop failures and inadequate prices. Precariousness and downward mobility seemed to be the 
defining experience of landowning farmers. Everyday conversations in villages were 
dominated by health concerns and the lack of cash to meet everyday expenditures. 
Subsequently, my research goals shifted to understanding the specific forms in which this 
‘crisis,’ defined by precariousness, is being experienced, what preceded this sense of 
downward mobility, and the process of construction of collective imaginary of emancipatory 
possibilities. Within this framework of understanding historically produced subjectivities and 
political agency, the experiences and recollections of elderly and middle generation of 
farmers became more significant. The former by virtue of having lived through the early 
Green Revolution life transition period, and the latter by virtue of being entrenched in and 
enacting the rapid agrochemical agricultural intensification.  
 
My research has been thin on youth, particularly men, from both landowning and landless 
households as they are largely outside the ambit of process of changes in agrarian work that I 
sought to understand. Older generations talked about them in interviews as being preoccupied 
with carving livelihoods outside the village, disinterested in farm work and often as being 
idle and disillusioned from being unable to obtain the jobs that they desire.12 While young 
																																								 																				
12 The proportion of rural students in higher education is extremely low. Ghuman (2008) 
suggests that only 4.07% of the students in the four major universities were from rural areas 
in 2005-2006. The collapse of rural education started in the 1980s in Punjab with declining 
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men from landowning households were occasionally present during interviews with farmers 
in their fields, I had little engagement with young men from Dalit landless households, 
majority of whom work outside the villages or in grain markets, or occasionally as hired 
labour driving tractors or spraying agrochemicals in the fields. My interactions with young 
men were also limited as a woman given the regional gendered norms and since young 
women activists accompanied me most of the time. After a few initial interactions mediated 
by KVM activists, I was able to independently talk to women and families in their homes. 
However, given the restrictions on mobility of women in the region, particularly on going to 
the fields that are located outside the village, I was able to observe labour practices and 
conduct interviews with male farmers in their fields, only when I was accompanied by male 
activists or natural farmers from KVM. My association with KVM thus provided a partial 
picture of the lived experiences of rural households. But I was able to gain significant in-
depth insights into the processes of mobilisation and negotiations over what constitutes agro-
ecological sustainability. Moreover, since KVM activists come from a wide range of 
socioeconomic backgrounds, I was able to gain access and establish rapport across social 
classes in the villages. This would have perhaps not been possible if I had become associated 
with people or households from particular class and caste in the villages.  
 
I have centred my analysis in this dissertation around oral histories of the Green Revolution 
and KVM’s organising practices in order to map both marginalised and eliminated practices 
as well as emergent possibilities. As Henri Lefebvre writes, ‘‘the category (or concept) of the 
‘real’ should not be permitted to obscure that of the possible. Rather, it is the possible that 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
share for education in the state budget. The dropout rate is extremely high in rural primary 
government schools, and as many as 69% of rural households do not have a single member 
who has completed class 10. Unlike other regions, the proportion is relatively better for 
labour households (90%) than landowning farming households (Ghuman 2008: 14). 
32	
	
should serve as the theoretical instrument for exploring the real.’’ (quoted in Smith 2016: 
237). In the following section, I briefly outline the arguments in this dissertation. 
 
V. Chapter Outline 
 
Chapter 1: Prefiguring Sustainability examines the mobilisation efforts of Kheti Virasat 
Mission (KVM), working in the Malwa region since 2005 to enact practices of sustainable 
food production and consumption. KVM aims to convince farmers to farm with organic 
inputs, rejuvenate biodiversity, and enable consumption of organically grown food among 
rural and urban Punjabi households. Eschewing the politics of making demands on the state 
for resources, KVM advocates for a constructive prefigurative form of politics that is centred 
on repairing the disconnect with nature and reviving cultural autonomy. The prefigurative 
mode of organising by enacting practices is precipitated by an oppositional discourse. The 
oppositional discourse stresses regionalist exploitation – the degradation of Punjabi soils, 
water and labour, and dismantling of cultural and material autonomy through colonisation by 
Western agricultural scientific practices mediated via the postcolonial state. Their 
mobilisation discourse is also critical of the dominant narrative of ‘agrarian crisis’ in India 
that is centered exclusively on unprofitability of farming and increasing chronic debt among 
farmers. Instead, they argue that experiences of ‘progressive’ farmers in Punjab who have 
followed the state-led ‘modernisation script’ reveal socio-ecological degradation that is not 
captured by narrow economistic framings of the crisis. Along with material degradation, 
widespread health crisis, excessive consumerism, and commodification of socio-ritualistic 
practices indicate a moral and cultural decline or what KVM calls a ‘civilizational crisis’.  
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I discuss how KVM is reframing the crisis in Punjab through its mobilising discourse, and 
why their discourse of a ‘civilisational crisis’ translates into a prefigurative form of politics.  I 
situate this prefigurative form of politics in relation to the ways in which other more 
dominant actors on the regional agrarian political landscape associated with the Green 
revolution, namely, the farmers’ unions - Bhartiya Kisan Union (BKU), and the public 
research and extension system led by the Punjab Agricultural University (PAU) are 
addressing the agrarian crisis.  
 
Based on extended observations and interviews with activists and farmers associated with the 
movement in varied ways, I examine how prefiguration is conceptualized within KVM. I 
discuss the constraints and challenges activists confront, and the internal contestations over 
modes of organising within KVM that have led to a transformation in strategies. The 
unfolding trajectory of this emergent movement is displaying two contradictory tendencies. 
On the one hand, there has been a ‘dilution of the agenda’ as some internal critiques suggest, 
with a narrowing focus on disseminating organic farming techniques mostly to medium and 
large landowners and the creation of niche elite organic food consumption networks. On the 
other hand, there is a marginal trend of landless households, particularly women, engaging 
with the movement by cultivating healthy food for household consumption.  
 
Chapter 2: Revisiting the ‘Green Revolution’ through the lens of labour practices 
historicizes the emergence of the politics of sustainability, through oral histories of changes 
in agrarian labour practices and attendant life-worlds since the 1960s. These collective 
memories reveal what has been eliminated from the material landscape as well as the 
subaltern voices excluded from landscape of organised resistance. I employ the standpoint of 
labour practices to traverse across procrustean class categories of landed and landless 
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agrarian households. Methodologically, this is significant to capture the experiences of 
households who have moved in and out these categories, of individuals whose access to land 
and control over decisions about farming practices is shaped by social norms or tenancy and 
rent. Labour practices are a critical lens for understanding how materiality of production and 
social relations are constitutive of each other, and therefore, experiences of degradation that 
shape conceptions of sustainability. 
 
In particular, I focus on how elderly men and women recall the early Green Revolution 
period – the attempts of government workers to enact radical transformations in cultivation 
practices and how they were received. Stories of changes in cultivation practices highlight 
how the processes of adoption and normalization of fertilizers and other agrochemicals, 
mechanization of farm operations and creation of state procurement infrastructure, 
transformed the material landscape (cropping choices, irrigation practices, physical 
landscape-native tree species and animals); labour relations as well as political relations 
within the village. Articulated from the situated standpoint of caste, class and gender, and 
filtered through the prism of the present agrarian crisis, these experiential narratives suggest 
nonlinear and ambiguous trajectories of mobility and changing notions of well-being and 
status. These subjective histories challenge the existing compartmentalised bureaucratic, 
economic, agronomic, and social science accounts of the Green Revolution decades, which 
inadvertently replicate the techno-politics of state practices. And, they illustrate how such 
cognitive compartmentalization is an effect of the process of disembedding production from 
socio-ecological reproduction. Memories of embodied experiences and practices reveal that 
such a process is always partial and ongoing, even as technopolitical practices and knowledge 
production aspire to naturalise the separation of socioeconomic, cultural and ecological 
domains.  
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In Chapter 3: The Unmaking of the ‘progressive’ Punjabi Farmer: Precariousness and 
Downward Mobility I examine the lived crisis for the dominant agrarian castes of Sikh Jats, 
who were seen as the primary beneficiaries of Green Revolution practices, and have been a 
the centre of agrarian resistance in the post-independence period. The narratives of crisis 
articulated by ‘bullock capitalists’ go beyond the realm of production practices and broadly 
centre on three themes: first, the insecurities generated by insurmountable debt, lack of 
disposable cash, increasing incidence of diseases and a dysfunctional public health care 
system, and the heightened economic risk entailed by cultivation, which is resulting in the 
trend toward leasing out land to generate secure incomes in the form of rent; the second set of 
themes revolve around aspirations for the future particularly for the younger generation; and 
lastly, the tension between growing individuation ethic and social obligations and 
consumption practices that are essential to the maintenance of status associated with 
dominant landowning agrarian castes. I argue that the Punjabi ‘bullock capitalists’ who 
occupy an exceptional position in the rural/agrarian South by virtue of being firmly 
embedded in statist development practices provide a unique standpoint for reflecting on the 
politics generated by an experience of precariousness that follows stability, a sense of 
downward mobility and break-down of social ties. Individualised strategies of coping with 
this crisis entail undertaking further risks such as leasing land for cultivation by landless 
households or taking loans for further intensification by landowning households. The present 
landscape of resistance in Punjab is significant for examining the question that underpins the 
debates on precarity, which Isabell Lorey (2015) succinctly frames as whether the crisis of 
the collective, that is the disillusionment with state-led development politics, will pave the 
way for the emergence of the commons? 
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To explore this question, in Chapter 4: The Politics of Precarity and Survival I return to 
the prefigurative politics of sustainability spearheaded by KVM. Through observations and 
interviews with farming households in villages, I show how they are engaging with and 
responding to KVM’s organising practices. Entrenched in the ethos of commercial 
cultivation, the process of shifting toward sustainable agroecological farming and 
consumption seems radical, risky and almost impossible to majority of farming households in 
the current institutional and policy environment. In this context, understanding the 
motivations and trajectories of the few farmers who are adopting sustainable agroecological 
practices reveals the possibilities for change. The predominance of elderly farmers in this 
group who are not necessarily large landowners but have other stable sources of non-agrarian 
income in their households is suggestive of two things. One, that the memory of the early 
Green Revolution period is a critical resource for imagining a different way of farming. 
These memories and embodied knowledge enable them to translate the cognition of the 
failure of agrochemical agriculture witnessed in the form of declining health and the on-going 
cotton crop failure over two decades, into transformative agro-ecological practices. Two, 
precariousness combined with lack of material resources, can shape an oppositional 
consciousness but impose severe constraints on people’s ability to engage in transformative 
practices. Women from both landowning and landless households, particularly the latter, 
however, who have not been immersed in commodification of farming by virtue of their 
active exclusion through the Green revolution decades from the fields are now engaging in 
agroecological food production for self-consumption. The elimination of cotton, particularly 
indigenous varieties which were labour-intensive, and the increasing shift toward paddy 
cultivation (almost complete mechanisation of wheat-paddy monocropping rotation) limited 
participation of women from landed households in farm operations and the amount of work 
available for landless farm workers. Like other regions in India, excluded from the state-led 
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agricultural modernization program, that is now active sites for sustainable agriculture 
initiatives of various hues, the subjectivities of women and landless households in Punjab 
have not been produced through developmental practices of commodification. The diffusion 
of equitable socio-ecological reproduction practices is therefore contingent on the substantive 
engagement of these marginalised groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38	
	
CHAPTER ONE 
PREFIGURING SUSTAINABILITY 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Critical scholarship on Green Revolution practices has highlighted ecological degradation 
along with deepening social inequalities since the 1970s and the 1980s (Shiva 1989; Griffin 
1974; Patnaik & Bernstein 1990). On the political landscape, however, ecological 
degradation emerges as an issue only in the late 1990s and early 2000s in Punjab. In this 
chapter, I examine the conditions that have enabled the politicisation of ecological 
degradation and ‘sustainability' and the specific forms in which this politics is being 
articulated. I focus on the mobilisation discourse, strategies and experiences of Kheti Virasat 
Mission (KVM), a local group that has been working in the Malwa region of Punjab since 
2005, to transform food production and consumption practices among rural households. More 
recently, KVM activists have begun to form urban consumer networks in Punjabi cities to 
buy organic produce directly from farmers. While KVM has had limited influence over the 
past decade in terms of the number of farmers who are associated with the movement, it is 
arguably the most prominent voice in the state articulating a vision and an agenda for 
sustainable farming. 
 
The group emerged in 2005, as a loose coalition of mostly medium scale farmers, and a 
disparate set of local actors including journalists, urban citizens, village schoolteachers and 
academics from the region. The founder of the organisation was a local journalist initially 
motivated by concerns over pesticide contamination and rising health concerns in the region.  
He was affiliated with the Swadeshi Jagran Manch, an anti-globalisation movement that 
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became active in the early 1990s, and is a part of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh the 
family of culturally nationalist Hindutva organisations. While the founder is no longer 
affiliated with the organisation and claims that the agenda of ecological sustainability 
transcends the left/right ideological divides, the discourse of indigeneity is central to KVM's 
organising practices. Indigeneity within KVM's discourse, however, is disjointed from 
Hinduism, which would have very little resonance in rural Punjab inhabited predominantly 
by Sikhs, a minority community in the national context with a history of conflict with the 
federal post-colonial state.13  
 
The small core staff of paid workers are rural inhabitants from the region from both 
landowning and landless households, who do the bulk of the organising work in the villages 
and conduct training sessions on organic farming practices. As part of the national network of 
farmers' organisations that work under the banner of Alliance for Sustainable and Holistic 
Agriculture (ASHA), KVM engages in seed and knowledge exchanges and participates in 
national level campaigns advocating farmers' rights.  KVM first gained attention through 
their involvement with the campaign against the introduction of genetically modified cotton 
seeds (known as Bt cotton), in alliance with Greenpeace, when it was introduced in 2005. Bt 
cotton is the first and so far the only genetically modified crop allowed in India. They also 
began to be recognised in the public discourse after the founding member highlighted the 
health crisis in the regional and national media by talking about the ‘cancer train', which has 
now become a widely known symbol of the agrarian crisis in Punjab. The Bathinda Express 
																																								 																				
13 See Trent Brown (2014) for a detailed biography of the founder of KVM. As Brown 
suggests, the founder of KVM has renounced his formal affiliations with Hindu nationalist 
organisations but continues to draw on his personal connections with them along with people 
from all sides of the political spectrum including the Left to further the agenda of 
ecologically sustainable farming. Moreover, as I will show in what follows that KVM's 
everyday organising practices reflect a broad-based movement, where Hindutva ideology has 
no visible influence.   
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is now known as the ‘cancer train' because a majority of its passengers are travelling from the 
Malwa region in Punjab to Rajasthan for treatment at a state-run cancer hospital. 
 
The farmers who became associated with KVM initially had been experimenting with a 
variety of agroecological methods, after being disillusioned with chemical farming. For many 
of these farmers, this disillusionment stemmed from the failure of cotton crop due to 
persistent pest attacks, particularly by the boll weevil (locally known as the American 
bollworm), and the failure of pesticides in controlling them year after year in the 1990s.  
Along with the economic distress propelled by the failure of the cotton crop, farmers were 
also motivated by their observations of rising incidence of cancer and other diseases within 
their villages and often their own families. KVM became a forum for facilitating interactions 
among them, for sharing agroecological knowledge, seeds and other resources and 
campaigning for the widespread adoption of sustainable agroecological production practices. 
The small but growing urban affiliates are primarily mobilised through consciousness raising 
campaigns about the adverse impact of agrochemicals on human health. 
 
KVM self-identifies as a broad-based people's movement for the environment, and it is 
formally registered as a not for profit trust that runs largely on individual donations from 
urban Punjabi supporters and occasionally grants from donor organisations such as Action 
Aid. Workers and affiliates of KVM though vociferously distance themselves from 
development NGOs with donor driven agendas, which they argue is part of the broader trend 
of the pervasive commodification of social relations.  They also distance themselves from 
party-politics and established dominant ideologies of the left and the right, and claim that a 
broad-based movement that cuts across social classes is necessary for repairing socio-
ecological relations. 
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In contrast to extant forms of agrarian political mobilisations, specifically by farmers' unions 
in Punjab that make claims on the government, KVM has adopted a mode of organising that 
focuses on the practical transformation of food production and consumption practices enacted 
by and simultaneously forging place-based autonomous communities. Underpinning this 
agenda of practical transformation is the discourse of what the founding member of the group 
calls a ‘civilisational crisis'. The narrative of a ‘civilisational crisis' formulates a historically 
informed critique of state-led Green Revolution practices, and the attendant transformation in 
the social ecology of the region since the 1960s, which is reflective of continuing material 
and cultural colonisation in the post-colonial period. Such a critique is more holistic than the 
economistic narrative of the agrarian crisis that attributes the current distress among farmers 
to neoliberal restructuring by the Indian state since the 1990s (cf. Walker 2008; McKinney 
2013; Banerjee 2015; Peschard 2014).  
 
KVM activists argue that a narrow economistic framing of the crisis focused on the decline in 
incomes of farmers is inadequate. Such a framing either excludes ecological degradation or 
frames it as a problem that is disconnected from the socio-economic crisis, thereby 
reproducing the technocratic logic that shaped the Green Revolution in the first place. By 
employing the frame of a ‘civilisational crisis' activists point to the continuities between the 
practices of state led developmental decades from the 1960s to the 1980s, which in Punjab 
were synonymous with the Green Revolution, and neoliberal restructuring of agriculture 
since the 1990s that is also legitimised as a development strategy (Connell and Dados 2014). 
It is not simply the withdrawal of state resources from agricultural sector and dismantling of 
trade barriers since the 1990s, but the long history of techno-politics that engendered capital-
intensive agriculture and commodification of social reproduction that has generated the 
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current crisis (Patel 2013). The federal government heavily incentivized the adoption of 
monocultures, and use of agrochemicals by providing subsidies and procuring selected food 
grains - wheat and rice - at minimum support prices. Investment in rural infrastructure was 
limited to the building of roads necessary for transporting grains, and electrification for 
ensuring irrigation through groundwater extraction. No concomitant investments were made 
in health or education in rural areas during the developmental decades, even as the new 
production system dismantled local interlinked ecosystems. With gradual withdrawal of state 
support in the domain of production, farming households continue to sustain capital-intensive 
production on their own while bearing the risks and consequences of rapid intensification 
over the past five decades. The crisis is thus precipitated by the state led development 
trajectory that eliminated other localised agro-ecologically and socially sustainable options 
for rural households. 
 
Given this expansive framing of a civilisational crisis by KVM, the prospective agenda of 
shifting toward natural farming practices is contingent on the transformation of the value 
system of Punjabi farming households. Activists conceive of political agency as 
consciousness raising for revaluing pre-colonial indigenous practices as well as creating the 
material conditions for transformation of socio-ecological practices. Going beyond 
articulating resistance against government interventions or making demands on the state, their 
politics is prefigurative in enacting practically the values that are desired in a future world 
and engendering place-based material autonomy by drawing on a constructed past (cf. 
Escobar 2008).   
 
Organising practices of KVM in recent years have focused on convincing farmers to 
gradually reduce the use of fertilizer and chemical pesticides in wheat and rice crops, setting 
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aside the objective of reviving biodiversity. In addition, farming households are encouraged 
to carve out a small plot in their fields or homestead land to grow vegetables and grain for 
household consumption through natural farming practices. While farmers are reluctant to 
adopt natural farming on their entire land and risk yields and cash incomes, growing healthy 
food for household consumption is more easily accepted. In the last two years, KVM is also 
facilitating informal consumer networks for marketing organic produce in urban centres of 
Punjab and urban gardening. Both these activities are confined to upper middle-class 
households. 
 
The modified strategies have been more effective in enrolling more farmers with the 
movement. These strategies though are also shaped by economistic reasoning, and privilege 
the dissemination of formulaic organic techniques instead of experimental production of 
farming knowledge through communal practices and collaborations among farmers. While 
there has been a dilution of their pre-conceived agenda over the past decade in an attempt to 
involve more people, organising by KVM has been able to change the political narrative by 
configuring social reproduction as a terrain of struggle. The transformation of the political 
narrative is visible in the increasing discussion of the relationship between health and 
chemical-intensive agriculture in mainstream public discourse, and deliberative engagement 
with food practices even as it evokes varying levels of participation. Participation varies at 
the village level in terms of numbers but more significantly forms of participation vary as 
well and often changes for individuals and households over subsequent cropping seasons. 
There are farmers who practice completely organic agriculture that is without any synthetic 
inputs but continue with the wheat-paddy or wheat-cotton monocultures. A small number of 
farmers are practising natural farming moving beyond eliminating agrochemicals to bio-
diverse and multifunctional farming. The majority of farmers who get involved with KVM 
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only reduce the agrochemicals used in wheat and rice, or sometimes only in wheat since it is 
consumed at home as well. They also adopt some ecological management practices such as 
modifying cropping density, timing and forms of application. In villages were KVM has been 
working for several years now, there are between 50-100 households where women have 
started growing kitchen gardens with organically grown vegetables primarily for household 
consumption, and a few sell the surplus as well. 
 
I begin by discussing how KVM is reframing the crisis in Punjab through its mobilising 
discourse, and why their discourse of a ‘civilisational crisis' translates into a prefigurative 
form of politics.  I then situate this prefigurative form of politics in relation to the ways in 
which other more dominant actors on the regional agrarian political landscape associated with 
the Green revolution, namely, the farmers' unions - Bhartiya Kisan Union (BKU), and the 
public research and extension system led by the Punjab Agricultural University (PAU) are 
addressing the agrarian crisis. Finally, I discuss the constraints and challenges activists 
confront, and the internal contestations over modes of organising within KVM that has led to 
a transformation in strategies. 
 
I argue that KVM's organising practices are expanding the political discourse by reframing 
the agrarian crisis from an economic crisis to one of socio-ecological degradation. In doing 
so, they propose an alternative imaginary that necessitates reconnecting food production and 
consumption.  Significantly, such prefigurative politics is partly premised on the recognition 
that landowning farmers co-produced the crisis. The agenda of practical transformation, 
however, is constrained by a degraded landscape. In addition to depleted, contaminated soils 
and groundwater, elimination of native seeds and tree species, activists have to contend with 
the moral economy of rural households, particularly landowning farmers, which is shaped by 
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commercial agriculture, and a culture of dependence on the government instituted through a 
subsidy and price support regime. Internal contestations within KVM and the challenges in 
everyday organising faced by activists, also reveal the limits of the homogenising discourse 
of cultural autonomy that excludes landless and tenant cultivators, and papers over gender 
and caste conflicts. The transformation of agrarian practices through the Green Revolution 
period produced impersonal relations of production and consumption, and the separated work 
from social reproduction in everyday life.14  In this context, while KVM activists conceive of 
sustainable agroecology as being embedded in collective work, inter-generational learning 
and farmer-to-farmer knowledge exchange, in practice they are unable to generate a 
collective work ethic. Instead, increasingly they are interacting with individual farmers or 
households to disseminate knowledge of organic methods of production. Thus, they are 
struggling to produce new deliberative forms of sociality that are not structured through caste 
and kinship relations but produced through and enable agro-ecological farming.  
 
II. Reframing the Crisis 
 
“Everyone goes to the Gurudwara in the morning and chants -Pavan guru paani pita, maata 
dhart mahat (air is our teacher, water our father, and the great earth our mother). Then they 
go and spray poison on their fields and feed that food to their own families and sell it in the 
market." Founder of KVM 
 
Unlike the widely accepted critiques of the ‘Green Revolution', which have centred on 
regional imbalances in resource allocation by the federal government, reinforcement and 
exacerbation of social inequities and environmental degradation (see Shiva 1989; Griffin 
1974), KVM articulates their critique in terms of a ‘civilizational crisis'. The narrative of 
‘civilizational crisis' articulates a distinctly postcolonial critique adopting the discourse of 
																																								 																				
14 I explore this process in depth through oral histories in Chapter Two. 
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indigeneity and cultural autonomy that valorises a pre-colonial past. Material exploitation, 
mining and contamination of soils and water, in this narrative is intertwined with the 
deterioration of health and well-being of people and reflects the disruption of the cultural 
ethos of the region. The development interventions of the postcolonial state are conceived as 
an extension of Western colonisation through scientific agricultural intensification employing 
the legitimising discourse of ‘national food security'. 
 
Green Revolution production practices of monocultural farming using hybrid seed varieties, 
synthetic fertilizers and subsequently pesticides and insecticides, were aggressively promoted 
through government subsidies and extension services in the early decades. The input subsidy 
regime, and the state procurement of wheat and rice made farming households dependent on 
the state in the first instance, and subsequently on agrochemical companies. While 
landowning farmers did accumulate cash incomes in the initial two-three decades, they lost 
autonomy over cropping choices and farming practices. Transformation of the labour process 
through the commodification of inputs and knowledge, reduced farmers to ‘propertied wage 
labourers' without much control over the process of production or the value of their products 
(Kloppenburg 2004). Simultaneously monocultural cropping eliminated crop diversity and 
structured deep dependence on the market for everyday consumption needs. From KVM's 
standpoint, even more significantly, ‘Green Revolution' practices and the new work-life 
rhythms disrupted the sense of communality within the villages, producing individualistic 
thinking and materialistic consumerism. 
 
During village meetings, activists draw attention to sociocultural malpractices that have 
become widespread over the past five decades. These include increased expenditure on 
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weddings, particularly on dowry, high female feticide rates in the state15, commercialisation 
of religious institutions and ritualistic practices, the construction of large urban style houses 
on farmland, and the trend of selling land to send members of the family abroad for petty 
jobs, and most critically widespread drug and alcohol addiction especially among young men. 
Activists argue that these practices are germane to the current agrarian crisis, and are 
manifestations of the ethos created through the Green Revolution decades. The founding 
member of the movement often says in his public speeches, "the tragedy of Punjab today is 
that our land is addicted to chemicals, just as our people are addicted to drugs". Activists also 
allude to the disappearance of joint cultivation by extended kin groups, the disappearance of 
seed exchange and labour sharing practices among farmers, and traditional food such as 
millets that were a part of the local diet. The thrust of this narrative is that the quality of life 
was better two-three generations ago even though there were less material comfort and 
convenience. The structuring of the labour process through mechanisation and synthetic 
inputs generated convenience, but in the long run led to the deterioration in the quality of life. 
The disconnect with the environment, the abandonment of what activist call ‘caring farming 
practices', have polluted the water and soils, as well as the human body, visible in rising 
incidence of cancer, reproductive health issues and other diseases. 
 
KVM's framing of the agrarian crisis points at the distributed effects of degradation across 
social classes. While holding government interventions responsible for degradation, the 
discourse of a ‘civilisational crisis' that suggests colonisation of minds and practices, also 
implicates landowning farming households themselves in this process of degradation. In 
doing so, this mobilising discourse sets the stage for a prefigurative politics that centred on 
																																								 																				
15 According to the Government of India census 2011, the child sex ratio for Punjab was one 
of the lowest nationally: 846 females per 1000 males, which is much below the national 
average of 919/1000.  
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the transformation of everyday practices of production and consumption. 
 
KVM's organising model challenges the knowledge politics underpinning the propagation of 
industrial farming practices. Within this framework, shifting toward natural farming practices 
is contingent on altering the value system of Punjabi farming households shaped by 
modernization paradigm. Opposition is expressed to increasing control of transnational 
corporations over the food system, state support for agrochemical companies, and the public 
university and extension system that perpetuate a Western model of agricultural science. 
Class differences among rural households and conflicts over unequal access to resources 
within villages, however, do not surface on the organising agenda. Activists argue that 
organising predominantly among landowning farmers who also belong to the dominant Sikh 
Jat caste, is strategically essential as they are the ones who make decisions about cropping 
choices and farming practices. Moreover, activists emphasise that the socio-ecological 
disconnect shaped by the current farming system is detrimental to the well-being of all 
classes and castes. Unlike landless tenant cultivators and farm workers, the majority of whom 
are from lower caste communities that have borne the consequences of chemical agricultural 
intensification disproportionately, the Sikh Jat farmers are implicated in the process of socio-
ecological degradation and should be responsible for the work of restoration.   
 
In response to my question about which class of farmers are more likely to change their 
farming practices or reduce the usage of chemicals, Amrindar, an activist working with KVM 
since its inception says,  
"It is not about class or how much land someone owns. People who 
understand the adverse implications for social life, health and 
environment are willing to experiment. Those who only look at it 
from an economic perspective will not. When I approach farmers 
for the first time, I do not talk about organic practices and methods, 
instead, I outline the connections between social life and the 
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environment. I talk about how our grandparents' generation used to 
live, the deterioration in the quality of life –increasing health 
problems and social conflict within families and in the village 
since the Green Revolution. Cancer is destroying zamindar 
families and landless families.” 
 
When I suggest that a zamindar’s household will have more resources for medical expenses, 
Amrindar retorts that even most landowning families are unable to meet the expenses of 
cancer treatment. And that KVM's objective is not to tackle immediate distress farming 
households face, but to address the underlying causes and create a mass movement for 
restoring a healthy environment. The politics of redistribution of resources is transposed to 
the national and global scale. Occasionally KVM is involved in advocacy campaigns and 
protests as part of the national alliance of sustainable farming organisations targeting the 
government. Most recently the organisation played a key role in the campaign against 
approval of the first genetically modified food crop – herbicide tolerant variety of mustard, 
produced by scientists at a public university in India. Mustard, a native crop of Punjab and an 
important part of the local diet, has been marginalised through the Green revolution decades. 
The campaign has highlighted the potential harmful effects on farmers' livelihoods, health 
and environment, and makes the case that public resources should be used to fund research on 
and incentivize organic farming instead. Oppositional politics practised by KVM thus is 
limited to prevent further incursions into the local farming and ecosystem by agrochemical 
corporations, as well as statist interventions for agrochemical intensification. They do not 
endorse or support agitations by farmers' unions to demand higher minimum support prices 
for wheat and paddy crops or engage with farm workers unions demanding higher wages or 
protesting usurpation of Dalit share of village land by the Sikh Jat households. To enact the 
constructive agenda of transforming practices locally, it is important for activists to not 
antagonise any particular social groups.  
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While organising in the villages, activists translate the abstract idea of a ‘civilisational crisis' 
by focusing on the relationship between health and environmental degradation to lay the 
groundwork for convincing farmers to move toward natural farming.   The following excerpt 
from an introductory village meeting in Bathinda district shows that the narrative begins with 
a critique of Green revolution practices before charting a constructive agenda for action. The 
critique is centred not on economic exploitation, but on the detrimental impact on quality of 
life and well-being. 
 
At a gathering of about 30 male farmers in a village which was identified as having the 
highest level of uranium in the groundwater in the district, Amrindar talks about reproductive 
health issues, which are becoming commonplace in the villages, and argues that similar 
patterns can be seen in people and in domesticated cattle. 
 
"It is becoming harder for women to conceive without medical 
treatment. The amount of 'rae/spray' (colloquial term for 
fertilizers/pesticides) keeps increasing every year. Some people are 
using as much as 7 bags of urea while planting just one acre of 
fodder. In addition, we inject them with drugs for higher milk 
production. The fodder absorbs these chemicals and stores them, 
and the cattle then consume it. Earlier our cows had the capacity to 
give birth 17-18 times in their lifespan, now it is reduced to about 
7-8 years." 
 
Everyone in the meeting nods in agreement. After speaking about disappearing species of 
birds that kept the insect population in check, pollution of air, water and soil, he suggests that 
the only way to transform this situation is by changing farming practices and using only 
organic, non-toxic inputs. At this point, a farmer interjects and says, "our population is 
increasing rapidly, and we have to keep increasing yields, which is not possible with just 
organic farming." In response, Gaganpreet argues, 
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“we produce much more food than is required by the current 
population. We cannot worry about feeding the country anymore 
that is the job of the government. Farmers and particularly Punjabi 
farmers have been fooled for a long time by appealing to their 
moral sensibilities by governments. They call us ‘annadatta’ 
(bread-givers), shout slogans like ‘jai jawan and jai kisan’ (praise 
the soldier and praise the farmer), and we get fooled into thinking 
it’s our responsibility to sacrifice and feed the country, without 
thinking about the costs to our land and our children’s well-being. 
A farmer can feed his own family with healthy food with two and a 
half acres, let the government worry about feeding the rest. What 
have we got in return? Nothing. The prices do not compensate us 
for our labour and our polluted land, water and air are making us 
ill…The whole system will crumble without the farmer. Public 
sector employees, even at the lowest rung, receive health benefits, 
and a regular, stable salary. The government should fix an annual 
salary for farmers if they want us to work for the welfare of the 
entire nation.” A farmer in the audience poses the question –
‘should a farmer with 100 acres also get this salary that we are 
demanding from the government?’ Amrindar replies that majority 
of the farmers are indebted, and they are putting up their land as 
collateral, even those who own 100 acres.  
 
 
Farmers at the meeting, however, seem unconvinced by this argument. Some of the responses 
from farmers to this homogenising discourse echo some elements of the growing sentiment 
within the public policy domain that liberalisation in the agricultural sector did not go far 
enough. Non-targeted subsidies to the agricultural sector as a whole mean that large farmers 
are entitled to free electricity, subsidised fertilizer which benefits agrochemical companies, 
and tax-free incomes, hampering both growth and the realisation of social equity goals. These 
sops also promote the indiscriminate use of water, fertilizer especially urea, and government 
price support for wheat and rice prevents crop diversification. KVM's position is that the 
subsidies should be directed toward incentivising organic farming by supporting farmers 
during the transitory period through direct subsidies and building the organic supply chain. 
  
While there is a broadly articulated mobilisation model within KVM premised on reviving 
material and cultural autonomy, the process of organising is not coherent and unitary by any 
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means. Activists speak from their own located social positions and tend to emphasise different 
aspects during their visits to the villages. Most of the core paid staff at KVM, responsible for 
everyday grassroots organising, are locals from rural landless households. The Sikh jat 
farmers from landed farming households that they address command a dominant position in 
the village social hierarchy of class and castes. Activists are, therefore, reluctant to do 
organising work in their own villages where they occupy the lower rung of the social 
hierarchy. In other villages, they are able to establish their status as experts in organic farming 
more easily. For several of them, their involvement with KVM did not begin with an 
ideological commitment but the search for a job. And, unlike farmers entrenched in Green 
Revolution ways of cultivation, the process of learning about organic farming for these 
activists from landless households does not begin with a process of unlearning.  They 
establish their credibility through their association with KVM, and the informal education 
process they have undergone through training and interactions with organic farmers locally 
and from other parts of the country. The following trajectories of three activists illustrate how 
caste, class and gender intersect variously and shape their experience of organising. 
 
Gaganpreet has been working with KVM since its early years and is now a senior activist. 
Like a majority of rural educated youth without technical training or advanced degrees, 
Gaganpreet made several attempts to get a government job but was unsuccessful. After 
working as a teacher at a private school, and being dismissed abruptly, he found himself 
working for KVM through a chance encounter. Despite no knowledge of farming and a very 
low salary, he decided to take the job, realising that this was his only choice. He says, "I am 
from a landless household, and therefore did not know much about farming. My father was 
not a farmer, my grandfather owned a small piece of land, but he had to sell it. I learnt 
everything about natural farming from the trainings that were organised by KVM, and 
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through experience working with farmers." He recalls the tremendous uncertainty in initial 
years when KVM was established as there were no stable sources of funding. This meant that 
activists like him had to forego their salaries for months. He concludes by saying that this 
was the only way he could have obtained dignified work, “when I see my peers from school 
who are also from landless households, they are either working as daily wage labour in 
construction and during sowing and harvesting on farms or leasing land for cultivation. I 
thank my stars that I was able to find something meaningful." Gaganpreet goes on to suggest 
that unlike government jobs, which are essentially like a lottery, or insecure petty jobs in 
private companies where formal education and the ability to pay bribes matters, in this 
context he could climb up the organisational hierarchy, and the social hierarchy, by 
harnessing his informally acquired knowledge and personal charisma. His commitment to 
sustainable farming has developed through experiences over the past decade and his approach 
to organising is premised on facilitating a deeper understanding of the crisis as illustrated by 
the excerpts from village meetings above. 
 
Gaganpreet's evaluation of his life-trajectory reveals the complex ways in which aspirations 
are shaped. Aspirations are policed by individuals themselves through recognition of 
limitations that are imposed by social hierarchies, and reflect the multiple gradations in terms 
of which dignified work is defined going beyond economic compulsions. It is also suggestive 
of the role knowledge can play, and in this instance an alternative form of knowledge, in 
charting a pathway for upward social mobility. Agrarian crisis has dented, albeit in a 
marginal way, the stronghold of dominant landowning castes on generational social mobility. 
This is partly because the conception of social mobility has changed and is no longer solely 
associated with ownership of land and accumulation of and through the property. Given the 
economic distress and risk associated with farming, and the penetration of developmental 
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discourse that devalues agriculture, rural households across classes aspire to obtain white-
collar salaried jobs. This is evident in the struggles of young activists at KVM who espouse 
the cause of revaluing agroecological farming while facing pressures from their families. 
 
For young people like Gaganpreet from landless households finding a salaried job means 
escaping the life of a ‘wage hunter-gatherer’, a term coined by Jan Breman (1994) to describe 
the uncertainty and precariousness of daily wage work.  For rural youth from landowning 
households, generally with higher educational qualifications, finding ‘white collar’ jobs and 
moving out of agriculture is about doing work that is commensurate with their status. Such 
work though is rarely available within the village, and rural youth are disadvantaged in the 
urban service industry in comparison with urban educated youth with the same formal level 
of qualifications.   
 
Deep Singh, a young activist working with KVM from a medium landholding household 
experienced a sense of dissonance while pursuing an advanced degree in entomology at 
Punjab Agriculture University, as he realised that the practical work of cultivation was far 
removed from the scientific agricultural education. He wished to pursue what he calls 
‘thoughtful farming' and began experimenting on his family's land by reducing the use of 
agrochemicals. However, he was under tremendous pressure from his family who expected 
him to get a ‘white collar' job like his peers after obtaining an advanced degree. He says, 
"my family had spent money on my education and I was one of the 
privileged few from an agrarian household who managed to get an 
MSc. So they were upset when I went back to farming and that too 
natural farming. When I came into contact with KVM, I decided to 
work with them partly so that I could convert our land to natural 
farming, but also because it reassured my family that I had a job 
and was earning a salary. This was a job that seemed more fruitful 
to me and allowed me to do what I wanted to do with some 
support, which was better than becoming a puppet as a government 
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employee, or pedalling poison by working for agrochemical 
companies." 
 
Deep Singh has been working with KVM now for two years while cultivating his own bio-
diverse 7-acre farm. In his work at KVM, he primarily focuses on trainings farmers' in natural 
cultivation practices. Unlike other activists who communicate certain practices as formulas 
and focus on more on the broader narrative of exploitation and dependence, Deep Singh 
focuses on the cultivation practices. He adopts an experimental approach to training and 
drawing on his education as well as experiences of transitioning to natural farming at his own 
family's farm, he is able to articulate the logic behind the value of adopting some practices 
over others. 
 
Rajji Kaur, another activist who also grew up in a landowning Sikh jat family like Deep, but 
with a significantly smaller farm, on the other hand, expresses the standpoint of farmers' 
rights much more emphatically. Despite being the so-called ‘dominant castes', she says that 
there is constant economic distress in her house. Her father runs a tractor repair shop, and her 
brother farms the three-acre family farm, but they are always struggling to make ends meet. 
These experiences shape her approach to organising. Highlighting exploitation of farmers 
through government policies is central to her mobilising discourse, from which she concludes 
that farming households have to become self-sufficient instead of looking toward the state for 
‘hand-outs'. As she argues, 
"When people from urban areas say things like farmers are 
growing healthy food for themselves and feeding us poison, my 
response is that urban citizens or policy makers have never thought 
about the well-being of farmers. Everyone is just interested in 
keeping food prices low. If the government wants to subsidise the 
food, it should pay farmers full price –procure the food and then 
subsidise it. Why penalise the farmers? The support prices do not 
account for the labour of the farmer. The problem with farmers in 
this country is that they have never been united and therefore are 
not able to exert any pressure on the government. If today all the 
farmers in this country go on a strike and grow food just for their 
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own families, how long will the government feed the country 
through imported food? Even if they take away all our land 
forcefully, who will cultivate the food? I always unapologetically 
advocate that farmers grow organic food for their own families." 
 
 
Moreover, as a young woman activist in a region where cultivation in the fields is largely 
carried out by men from landowning households, her credibility is often questioned when she 
conducts trainings focused on the practical aspects of cultivation practices, particularly by 
elderly men. She has also been unable to convince her brother and father to reduce the use of 
agrochemicals in their family farm. Her work at KVM is now largely focused on working 
among women to grow vegetables for home consumption. Based on her experiences since 
2009, she contends, ‘it is easier to convince women who think about their children's health, 
whereas men think about yields and prices first.' 
 
It is evident that activists interpret the overarching mobilisation discourse articulated by 
KVM in varied ways. Their approach to organising is shaped by their own position in the 
social hierarchy, defined at the intersection of class, caste, gender and age, which in turn 
determines who they have access to, and are able to influence. Further, activists also push 
certain agendas within the organisation based on interactions with particular social groups. 
The loosely knit framework of KVM rooted in the rejection of conventional ideological 
politics allows for such a diffuse process of mobilisation to take shape, which is not premised 
on identifying a singular conflict, or principal contradiction. 
 
III. Prefiguration and the Politics of Practice  
 
In the last two decades, the notion of prefiguration has become critical for understanding 
emergent forms of struggles that enact social change, in the backdrop of increasing de-
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legitimization of the state as a site for political contestations in the era of neoliberal 
restructuring (Biekart and Fowler 2013; Bayat 2013; Pickerill & Chatterton 2006). 
Prefigurative struggles focus on direct action, on aligning means with ends, and ‘creating a 
new society "in the shell of the old" by developing practices and modes of interaction that 
embody the desired transformation' (Leach 2013; cf. Escobar 2008; Gibson-Graham 1996; 
Ince 2012). Drawing on the experiences of alter-globalisation movements of the 1990s and 
2000s, Maeckelbergh (2011) suggests that prefigurative politics reconfigures the temporal 
distinction between the present and the future, as social change is not deferred to the future 
by demanding reforms from the state or seizing state power. Thus, ‘the struggle and the goal, 
the real and the ideal, become one in the present' (Maeckelbergh 2011: 4). Prefigurative 
politics rooted in anarchist philosophies articulates a critique of authority and works toward 
engendering collective self-management in critical engagement with the broader state and 
market structures, eschewing the distinction between political and social change (Ince 2012). 
Calling for non-representational politics, such mobilisations seek to infuse political action in 
everyday life activities. In outlining the everyday prefigurative politics enacted by youth 
activists in provincial North India, Jeffery and Dyson (2016:96) suggest that change is 
perceived as being the ‘cumulative precipitate of action in the present.' Understanding 
temporality is central to prefiguration as the past, present and future come together in 
nonlinear ways, posing a challenge to stageist development ideology and practices. The past 
is often constructed selectively and used as a critical resource to reconfigure the present. The 
selective reconstruction of the past has been particularly significant in the postcolonial 
political landscape.  
 
The genealogy of prefigurative politics in India can be traced to Gandhian anti-colonial 
struggle. For Gandhi, the notion of swaraj (self-rule) was not limited to freedom from the 
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colonial state but embodies an anti-statist politics that challenges the concentration of 
political power. Instead, he envisaged the postcolonial nation with an alternative institutional 
form constituted by decentralised and materially self-sufficient village communities. The 
politics of noncooperation with unjust authority was to be accompanied by a constructive 
program of socio-economic revival. The communality of the village in this conception was 
not premised on primordial ties but associational voluntary ties forged through a constructive 
program of multi-faceted collective practices that included promotion of cottage industry, the 
abolition of untouchability and campaign for sanitation (Mantena 2012; Skaria 2002). As 
Mantena writes, Gandhi understood constructive work ‘less in terms of political education or 
consciousness raising than as fundamentally experiments in self-rule' (2012:562). In this 
conception of politics, practical transformations were not confined to the sphere of 
production and were potentially generative of new forms of sociality where self-sufficiency 
and localised accountability are paramount. While moralism is often attributed to Gandhian 
politics, Mantena rightly argues that practical strategies of prefiguration challenged precisely 
the moral certitude implicit in politics of representation and mobilisation around 
preconceived ideologies.    
 
Environmental mobilisations in postcolonial India have been particularly influenced by 
Gandhian modes of organising, most notably the Chipko movement (Hug a tree) in the 
Himalayan state of Uttarakhand (cf. Rangan 2000; Shiva 1986; Klenk 2004). Such 
environmental struggles in marginalised spaces that have been neglected by the development 
project, adopted non-cooperation to protest statist interventions that threatened local forest 
based livelihoods of communities. By contrast, in Punjab, the state was infused in everyday 
life through agricultural modernisation, and its established legitimacy among farmers is under 
threat. In this context, prefiguration involves the construction of an alternative trajectory of 
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production and consumption, which is not a defence but a radical restructuring of extant 
farming practices and dominant ways of life. Precipitated by disillusionment with the statist 
development project the emergent prefigurative struggle in Punjab, thus shares common 
ground with the contemporary global wave of struggles in the Global North fueled by 
austerity and dismantling of the welfare state. It does not, however, share the vocabulary of 
creating alternative and autonomus spaces from capitalism (cf. Graeber 2013). Rather, it 
employs an anti-colonial, post-development discourse that needs to be historically situated.  
 
KVM’s discourse of ‘civilisational crisis’ can be understood through the Gandhian 
conception of politics where constructive work is privileged more than resistance. Or, more 
accurately resistance is expressed primarily although not exclusively through the enactment 
of constructive practices. For KVM, what is most significant from the standpoint of enacting 
constructive politics is not only the transformation of the material and institutional landscape 
but the colonisation of everyday practices and minds. The agrarian populism of the 1970s and 
1980s created a political identity of the undifferentiated ‘peasantry’, even as it represented the 
interest of the middle caste peasant proprietor in the Green Revolution Northern belt. While 
Marxist scholars rightly criticised these New Farmers movements for employing a Gandhian 
populism that rejected class conflict and for their traditionalist/conservative agenda, these 
Farmers’ movements nevertheless inaugurated the critique of prevalent nationalist 
development that aligned linear progress, scientism and sovereignty in post-independence 
decades (Roy & Borowaik 2003; cf. Brass 1994). Challenging the decline of ‘a paternalistic 
but protective nation-state’ that was yielding to globalised capital, farmers’ unions were 
adopting neo-nationalist discourse enabled by the short-lived prosperity of the Green 
Revolution for the middle caste landowning farmer (Roy & Borowaik 2003: 74). 
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By contrast, KVM's agenda emphasises ‘place-based' practical transformation. It may be 
labelled ‘populist' in a different sense as their rejection of class, identity or interest based 
ideological mobilisation is precipitated by the need to recognise common conditions of 
exploitation across rural social groups. The mobilisation is also enlisting the support of urban 
middle classes in their constructive program. However, internal contestations within the 
movement do challenge caste, class and gendered privileges, as the constructive program of 
agroecological transformation is enacted. The underpinning conception of politics is 
Gandhian as political subjects are produced in and through the enactment of constructive 
practices, and not simply through the consciousness of common experiences of exploitation. 
KVM's critical discourse is, nevertheless, imbued with lingering traces of populist farmers' 
movements that produced a specific political consciousness - that of a rural/agrarian class and 
region exploited through the practices of the Federal Indian state (cf. Singh 2008). 
 
In terms of practical transformation, they advocate an agroecological approach premised on 
self-reliance and bio-diversity, that calls for the elimination of dependence on any external 
inputs or market-based institutions such as organic certification seals and fair-trade systems. 
Critical to the agroecological approach is practice-based knowledge through experimental, in 
situ innovations corresponding to local socio-economic needs of farmers and their 
biophysical circumstances. In privileging the ‘local' in this way, the politics of agroecology 
seeks to redefine socio-ecological relations through the reorganisation of labour and 
consumption, challenging abstraction from material processes, in the realm of knowledge 
production and through commodification (Altieri and Toledo 2011). Within KVM's discourse 
that emphasises transformation of food production and consumption practices to revive 
material and cultural autonomy, agroecological practices are politicised in ways that align 
with post-development critiques and conceptions of prefigurative politics (cf. Escobar 1995; 
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2008). They also employ the invocations of postcolonial theorists such as ‘decolonisation of 
the mind', and ‘community' over ‘class' in the service of engendering ecologically sustainable 
practices.16 The critique of the Green Revolution is centred on politics of knowledge 
production, an epistemic colonisation through the Western model of development executed 
through state practices that have paved the way for control by transnational corporations.   
 
KVM's politics self-consciously claims to make an epistemic intervention by connecting 
social and ecological degradation as being symptomatic of the same historical process, thus 
eschewing the compartmentalising logic characteristic of techno-politics. They employ the 
western-indigenous binary to make this claim, where (lost) indigenous culture stands in for 
life-worlds and practices that nurture socio-ecological relations. The politics of restoration in 
this framework is centred predominantly on the transformation of practices of production and 
consumption of food in sync with lost indigenous values. Activists perceive the green 
revolution as a moment of rupture, which led to the degradation of material resources as well 
as loss of indigenous knowledge and practices.  Therefore, prefigurative politics in this 
instance is not a defence of an extant moral economy but the construction of new practices 
and sociality legitimised in the domain of ethics and based on a selective reading of the past. 
A reversal of the process of in-situ ‘accumulation by displacement' (Araghi 2009; Feldman 
and Geisler 2012) is imagined through this subversive appropriation of the historicist 
narrative where a rhetorical return to the ‘non-modern' becomes both an organising trope, and 
a strategy for recovering lost knowledge. 
																																								 																				
16 Meera Nanda (2001) has argued that the idiom of hybridity and ‘incommensurable' 
worldviews employed by postcolonial theorists are amenable to reactionary populist politics 
of the kind practised by farmers' unions like the BKU that reinforced casteist and patriarchal 
norms which also actively colluded with Hindu nationalists in western Uttar Pradesh. Nanda 
cites Akhil Gupta's (1998) work as exemplary of this tendency in underplaying class 
contradictions and claiming that cultivation practices of green revolution farmers in western 
UP are characterised by hybridity, and the identity of ‘underdevelopment' is central to the 
populist farmers' movements of the 1980s.  
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Many scholars though have flagged the dangers of alignment whether explicit, strategic or 
unintended between neo-traditionalist scholarly and activist environmentalism, and the 
politics of Hindu nationalism in India. Both articulate a critique of colonial modernity and 
employ a discourse of indigeneity that valorises a pre-colonial past as a repository of ‘Indian 
values' (Mawdsley 2006; Philips 2001; Sharma 2012). Instead of a dialectical understanding 
of history and ecology, both these discourses tend to employ a dichotomous framework of 
opposition between Western science/technology and traditional sustainable localised 
practices (Philips 2001). At the present moment when Hindu nationalism is pervading the 
political domain in India, it becomes pertinent to examine how the ecological question is 
posed and addressed. The idiom of cultural and material autonomy, which is at the core of 
prefigurative politics for ecological sustainability, becomes particularly susceptible to 
appropriation by an exclusionary politics of nativism. 
 
Traces of such Hindu nativist discourse are present in the articulations of some people within 
KVM as well. They are mostly non-farmers who construct a simplistic narrative of 
‘civilisational crisis' as a long history that begins with Muslim invasions, followed by British 
colonialism, and postcolonial development project that has disrupted and eroded the 
ecologically balanced Hindu way of life. In this essentializing narrative, cultural autonomy 
becomes the mirror image of techno-political developmentalism.  However, these marginal 
voices do not resonate with Sikh Jat farming households, who are predominant in rural 
Punjab and perceive themselves as an exploited minority nationally.  Antagonism among 
Sikh Jat cultivators toward largely Hindu moneylenders and urban traders has deep historical 
roots in Punjab (cf. Fox 1984). The recent controversy over the ban on cattle slaughter which 
has been a staple demand of Hindu nativist groups in the name of protecting traditional 
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Indian culture, for instance, is resolutely opposed by cultivators who cannot afford to keep 
unproductive cattle past their milk bearing years. Several farmers brought up the issue of 
disruption of cattle trade at local regional markets in recent years by errant Hindu 
fundamentalist groups in Punjab, which they argue has added to their distress. The 
exclusionary discourse of Hindu nativism that has evolved into cultural nationalism also does 
not resonate with KVM activists who do the work of grassroots organising as most of them 
have experiences of being situated at the bottom of the local social hierarchy.  Moreover, in 
everyday mobilisation by KVM activists the focus is overwhelmingly on changes in 
production and consumption practices. Very few of the grassroots organisers subscribe to or 
invoke a coherent ideological discourse, except that of highlighting the material exploitation 
of farmers and their lands through statist interventions. Non-commitment to any well-defined 
ideological discourse, or political standpoint of a social group, however, means that strategic 
alliances are drawn to realise specific agendas. The recent ongoing campaign to oppose the 
approval of genetically modified mustard is an example of such an alliance. The campaign 
brought together farmers’ unions, KVM and other sustainable agriculture groups from across 
the country who form ASHA collectively, together with Swadeshi Jagran Manch an offshoot 
of the Hindu nationalist social organisation Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. The voice of the 
Swadeshi Jagran Manch received disproportionate attention in the public debates as it was 
challenging its own political party BJP that is currently in power. Emma Mawdsley (2006) 
frames this as the question of ‘guilt by association’, which has become pertinent in the 
context of the contemporary resurgence of Hindu cultural nationalism. Mawdsley writes, 
"Are neo-traditionalist activists and scholars, who seek to mobilise cultural precepts around 
the environment in positive and well-meaning ways, tarred simply because their ideas share 
some things in common with the Hindu Right? And following on from this, do these 
arguments discredit all environmental movements and initiatives that draw upon divergent 
64	
	
Hindu idioms or beliefs?” Mawdsley argues that there needs to be a critical engagement with 
selective narratives of the past that are utilised for furthering the politics of ecological 
sustainability, recognising that they are modern constructions. Some KVM activists invoke 
traditional cultural norms, but it is regional material exploitation that is central to the 
legitimising discourse employed in everyday organising. It is evident that agroecological 
practices are unequivocally emerging from present material constraints and through cross 
regional exchanges.  
 
Participation in the wider national alliance of farmers' organisations and sustainability 
movements ASHA, would also prevent the discourse of ‘civilisational crisis' from devolving 
into an exclusionary cultural nationalism. For KVM this engagement with the national 
network has been essential, as the practical work of material transformation in Punjab is 
made possible through exchange of knowledge and resources such as indigenous seed 
varieties with ‘undeveloped' regions. Regions marginalised in the developmental period, are 
repositories of seeds and knowledge of agroecological farming practices, and have become 
critical to prefigurative political practice. Natural farmers from other parts of the country 
played an active role in the initial years in conducting trainings on various forms of natural 
farming systems. KVM activists also frequently bring indigenous varieties of seeds from 
neighbouring states that have disappeared from the agrarian system in Punjab. This 
circulation of knowledge and materials suggests that the uneven development process that 
produced the spatial and temporal displacement of ecological costs also enables a politics of 
restoration. The refusal to explicitly challenge caste, class and gendered hierarchies, however, 
does have implications for grassroots organising, which I will elaborate in the final section of 
this chapter.  
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IV. Autonomy as Anti-statism  
 
The distinctiveness of KVM’s standpoint becomes clear in their critique of other forms of 
articulated resistance to the Green Revolution model and its consequences. KVM argues that 
the extant forms of critique that are seemingly divergent, most prominently Left wing 
organisations and populist farmers' unions, nevertheless share an economistic framework. 
Left organisations' focus on class inequalities, particularly in terms of ownership and access 
to land, and the populist farmers' unions' such as the BKU on demanding increased support 
prices and input subsidies from the state (cf. Lerche & Harriss-White 2013). These 
‘economistic critiques’ do not address socio-ecological relations and fail to take into account 
the historical and cultural specificity of the region. Increasing subsidies for inputs like 
fertilizers, diesel, water and electricity as well as support prices for procurement of wheat and 
rice will not alter the mono-cropping chemical intensive farming system, or alleviate the 
causes for farmers' economic distress. Like the populist discourse of the BKU (Gupta 1998), 
KVM activists also invoke the ‘urban bias’ thesis, but they emphasise the regional dimension 
of exploitation.17 From an ecological standpoint, the criticism of the Green Revolution 
policies that concentrated new technologies and state resources in the North-Western belt in 
India and created regional imbalances is inverted.   Decades of agrochemical intensification 
have led to an ecologically degraded landscape in Punjab, whereas states peripheral to the 
national development project in the 1960s -1980s such as Bihar are now vibrant sites for 
experiments in sustainable agriculture.  
 
																																								 																				
17	Varshney (1998) has questioned the ‘urban bias’ thesis in India, which was central to the 
discourse of farmers movements on the grounds that unlike in the West, democratisation 
preceded industrialisation in India, which had profound consequences because of the 
influence dominant agrarian interests had on the political landscape. 
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Based on this narrative of the crisis, which suggests that statist development interventions of 
agricultural modernisation reflect and have produced epistemic colonisation, the assertion of 
cultural autonomy becomes critical for reviving material autonomy. Within this framework, 
shifting toward organic/natural farming practices is contingent on the transformation of the 
value system of Punjabi farming households. The narrative of social degradation 
accompanying material degradation expresses an understanding of agricultural modernisation 
as biopolitics that has produced consumerist and individualistic ethos along with dependency 
(cf. Patel 2013). In the post-1990s period of structural reform where agricultural sector has 
been marginalised, this biopolitics is conjoined with a loss of organised representation of 
agrarian classes in national electoral politics.  
 
The idiom of moral decline and epistemic colonisation employed by KVM implicates farmers 
in this process of degradation structured through statist interventions.  More critically, it 
centres farmers as key political agents for the transformation of social practices and 
organising an alternative agroecological system, which is sustainable and autonomous. Anti-
statism is an integral part of how political agency is conceptualised, in the sense that farming 
communities are deemed as the primary agents of transformation. It is not surprising that 
prefigurative politics has emerged at a conjuncture when the landowning agrarian dominant 
castes, have lost their influence as an interest group to determine the shape of national 
policies. Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) argued in their seminal study that the medium scale 
farmers, or the ‘bullock capitalists' who owned lumpy forms of capital such as tractors and 
tube wells and used Green revolution inputs, gained political leverage with increasing 
productivity in the 1970s. The first phase of land reforms focused on giving land rights to 
tenant cultivators was more successful than the second phase focused on imposing land 
ceilings, and redistribution, which had the effect of strengthening the class of ‘bullock 
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capitalists'.18 Challenging scholars who argued that commercialisation and modernisation of 
agriculture led to growing class polarisation particularly in ‘agriculturally advanced’ states 
like Punjab (Frankel 1971), they suggest a more complex and ambiguous picture. They argue 
that the class of ‘bullock capitalists’ or peasant proprietors and urban educated middle classes 
who dominated the bureaucracy and the public sector were responsible for the centrist 
politics of the Indian state (cf. Corbridge 1997 for a summary of critiques of this argument). 
It is pertinent to recall that Punjab government representing the interests of large landowners 
lobbied with the federal state in the 1960s, to be chosen as the site for investment that spurred 
the Green Revolution (cf. Frankel 1971). As Terry Byres (1981) argued in his seminal article, 
rich farmers in the north-western green revolution belt did become a class for itself, 
successfully preventing agricultural taxation, further land reforms, nationalisation of the grain 
markets and maintaining the favourable inter-sectoral terms of trade. On the other hand, the 
presence of permanently attached labour, availability of migrant labour and partial 
proletarianisation prevented organised struggle by agrarian workers. The political 
implications of the incorporation of small and middle farmers on adverse terms, both as 
producers and consumers, are never fully explored.  
 
The alliance between the middle caste landed farmers, the self-employed and the urban 
middle classes that stood between the industrial capitalists (domestic and foreign) and the 
waged working classes shaped the development trajectory in post-independence years. This 
led many scholars to characterise the Indian state, drawing on Kalecki (1972), as an 
‘intermediate regime’ (cf. Raj 1973; Mitra 1977; Bardhan 1984).19 Planners allocated public 
																																								 																				
18 They were the largest agrarian class in 1971-72, comprising 34% of the population and 
controlling 51% of the land (Rudolphs1987: 52).  
19 Richard Fox (1984) analyses developments in colonial Punjab to give historical 
concreteness to this interpretation of political economy of post-independence India, and to 
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investment to heavy industries in the first few decades after independence and envisaged 
rural development through institutional reforms. These reforms included land and tenancy 
reforms, and creation of institutions of decentralised village governance. Land redistribution 
efforts, however, were derailed in most parts of the country partly because the task of 
implementation rested with the state governments where landowning agrarian castes 
exercised influence (Gupta 1998; cf. Sathyamurthy 1989).  It is noteworthy that land reforms 
were partially successful in the first phase that involved abolition of absentee landlordism and 
intermediaries, which strengthened the middle peasant proprietors. However, the second 
phase of imposing land ceiling and redistribution of surplus land was largely thwarted. 
 
The compromise struck between rural elites who controlled state governments while the 
small but powerful English educated middle classes favouring industrial expansion that 
controlled central government was partly possible because of the relative insulation from the 
global economy (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987). Nevertheless, import substitution through 
Green Revolution practices of agrochemical intensification substituted grain import 
dependence for dependence on industrial inputs (Friedmann, 2005: 246). The international 
food regime under American hegemony thus eliminated certain choices for developing 
national and local modes of regulation.20 The discourse of development in post-colonial 
nations like India employed the idea of inter-sectoral balance that never came to fruition in 
practice (cf. Friedmann and McMichael 1989).21 
 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
explain the emergence of communal political identities on the one hand, and politics of inter-
sectoral distribution on the other, both of which limited class-based political mobilisation.  
20 See Cullather (2010); Perkins (1997, cf. pp 157 – 187 for a detailed discussion on India); 
Harwood (2012)  
21 Friedman and McMichael (1989) have argued that inter-sectoral balance, between 
agriculture and manufacturing, applied only to the US and that too for a brief period but 
gained widespread ‘ideal' currency through the modernization and dependency theory.  
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In the 1970s and 1980s, medium and large agrarian producers in the Green Revolution began 
to move beyond exercising influence locally and to highlight the ‘urban bias' of national 
policies. As primary contributors to national food stocks, they had political leverage. The 
post-colonial state became the frame and space of negotiation in the second food regime, 
which as Friedmann points, was distinct because of its state-led or mercantile character and 
promoted the industrialisation of agriculture in the Third World (2005: 242). While farmers’ 
unions like the BKU demanded greater input subsidies and favourable prices for agricultural 
commodities, the so called ‘backward classes’ movements in the northern Hindi heartland 
region also comprising landowning agrarian castes challenged the literate upper caste hold on 
clerical positions and bureaucracy. Thus, the mobilisation discourse of ‘urban bias’ also 
encapsulated caste-based status politics that expressed aspirations for upward mobility. Some 
of the core activists of the movement were farmers’ sons, who were denied urban white-
collar jobs particularly in the public sector, which they thought were commensurate with their 
educational attainments (Gill 1995).  
 
The so-called ‘New Farmers movements’ that emerged in Punjab and Tamil Nadu in the early 
1970s, later spread to Karnataka, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh. The central 
slogan employed was that of Bharat versus India –Bharat being the indigenous name while 
India being the Westernised name symbolising exploitation, and the central government was 
the main target of their agitation.  Some of their specific demands included lower input prices 
on fertilizers, seeds, pesticides, lower tariffs on electricity, water, lower taxes and debt relief, 
as well as higher prices for crops (Lindberg, 1995). Led by middle and large farmers of 
dominant agrarian castes, they were deeply rooted in patriarchal ideology and opposed to 
land redistribution reforms (Brass, Banaji 1995). However, as other scholars point out that 
unlike previous peasant movements that only focused on class relations within the village, 
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these farmers’ movements foregrounded supra local structural determinants, that is, relations 
of exploitation and surplus accumulation from agriculture at the national and international 
level (Omvedt 1995; Gupta 2002). Dipankar Gupta (2002) also suggests that unlike previous 
Indian peasant movements limited to challenging exploitative practices, the new farmers’ 
movements were prospective and attempted to influence national policies on prices and 
taxation structures, and the overall development trajectory by re-centering agriculture.22  
 
The commodification of agricultural inputs in Green Revolution sites that spurred these 
movements, translated into hybridity at the level of farm practices (Gupta 1998). While 
farmers utilising hybrid seeds and biochemical fertilizers were no longer ‘traditional farmers, 
they were also not like farmers from the United States or Europe' (Gupta, 1997: p156).  
Practices of farming were shaped by multiple epistemologies and strategic choices 
determined by location in the social hierarchy and ecological contingencies. Even though 
with Green revolution technology, practices of farmers were over-determined by social logic, 
in some measure they were guided by contingencies imposed by the production process itself 
in terms of the ecological feedback loop (1998:181).  While ecological sustainability was not 
prominent in the mobilisation discourse of the farmers' movements, Lindberg (1995) suggests 
that in dry regions, farmers' movements did begin to articulate an alternative trajectory that 
included ecologically sustainable practices. 
																																								 																				
22 The debate on whether these new farmers' movements represented the interests of small 
and middle farmers has been contentious. Varshney (1993) and others have argued that small 
and middle peasantry was mobilised, as they would also benefit from increased prices of food 
grain, even as the new farmers' movements were fractured along caste, ethnicity and religion. 
Whereas, Marxist scholars like Tom Brass (1995) contended that the economic interests of 
poor and small peasants were antagonistic to that of the large farmers which led to the 
adoption of populist idiom of ‘otherness' in caste, religious and sectoral terms. One of the 
limitations of this debate is that very few analyses of the new farmers' movements were based 
on ethnographic research. There is negligible understanding of who and which farmers joined 
these movements and why, or of the process of mobilisation (Omvedt in Brass 1995; 
Corbridge 1997). 
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Lindberg contends that very little new thinking on agricultural practices or development was 
visible in the politics of the unions like BKU in the North Indian belt of Punjab, Haryana and 
Western Uttar Pradesh, and they were simply asking for a better deal. Since the Indian state 
depended on this region for food and cash crops, the BKU was in a strong bargaining 
position. In dry regions because of lack of irrigation, the Green Revolution was not very 
successful in raising productivity. Therefore, the agenda of farmers unions in these regions 
evolved to include an alternative agricultural development model. For instance, the Shetkari 
Sangathan (SS) in Maharashtra along with highlighting the urban bias’ in state policies, also 
advocated for natural/organic farming, and self-sufficient agriculture which relies on locally 
produced seeds, limited use of chemical fertilizer and pesticides, small scale irrigation and 
water sharing schemes as well as primary processing of produce at the village level. The 
Shetkari Sangathan however also advocated liberalisation of trade, which they argued would 
rectify the exploitation of farmers structured through state intervention that kept food prices 
low, thus forecasting the contradictory dynamics of the neoliberal period.23 
 
																																								 																				
23	Sharad Joshi, the leader of SS, articulated the Bharat vs India not just as a town-country 
divide but an exploiter-exploited divide. Joshi argued that ‘under capitalism the extraction of 
surplus from agriculture and from natural resources was central' and ‘exchange relations, not 
property relations were the means of exploitation which was a result of not just market 
processes but the intervention of the state’ (Omvedt, 1995: p96). Joshi in an interview in 
March 1989 observes, “The real contradiction is not in the village, not between big peasants 
and small, not between landowners and landless, but between agrarian populations as a whole 
and the rest of the society” (cited in Lindberg, 1995: p96). Joshi believed that liberalisation 
would eliminate state intervention in the form of price distortion and support Indian peasants, 
who were ‘heavily taxed' as opposed to farmers in developed countries who were heavily 
subsidised.  The BKU, in contrast, opposed the entry of foreign capital as it would undermine 
national sovereignty and depress domestic prices of agricultural output (Brass, 2000: p109). 
SS challenged Nehruvian socialism and advocated for the Gandhian model of development 
that contested the replication of Western model of development, valorised the notion of self-
sufficiency, employment generating village economies and devolution of power from the 
centre to village elected bodies. But it also supported trade liberalisation as a way of 
redressing state power.  
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Three decades later, neoliberal restructuring since the 1990s and material degradation have 
brought the crisis to the doorstep of Punjabi farmers. Withdrawal of resources from 
agriculture and deregulation has caused acute rural distress in sites of capital-intensive 
farming that were heavily dependent on the state subsidy regime (cf. Walker 2008; Vasavi 
2012; Padhi 2013; McKinney 2013; Banerjee 2015). Neoliberal restructuring of agriculture 
thus both reflects the declining power of ‘bullock capitalists' in the statist class coalition and 
further reinforces this decline. The so-called new farmers' movements are playing a reactive 
role rather than shaping policy agendas as a demand group. The various factions of the BKU 
in Punjab, for instance, have been engaged in episodic protests demanding adequate 
compensation for land acquisition, for crop damage, for suicides due to agrarian distress, and 
delays in procurement of crops by state agencies, in the last decade. 
 
The turn toward anti-statism and conceptualisation of political agency as cultural autonomy 
and transformation of social practices, embodied in the organising discourse of KVM, has to 
be understood in this context. The assertion of material and cultural autonomy is premised on 
an understanding that state policies of the development decades initiated the process of 
structuring dependence among rural communities and socio-ecological degradation. And that 
the crisis that has become visible for farmers in a stark form in the neoliberal period 
illustrates a deepening of those earlier processes and reveals their unsustainability. Unlike the 
mobilisation discourse of farmers' unions such as the BKU that worked within the frame of 
economic nationalism, the discourse of regional exploitation and socio-ecological 
degradation brings to surface the displacement of ecological costs spatially and over time. 
Such displacement has political implications as struggles are shaped by the ways in which 
crisis is experienced. For the majority of landowning farmers in Punjab, it was clear by the 
mid-1980s that economic profitability from agricultural intensification was under threat, 
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which was reflected in the demands that BKU was making on the state. The reactive 
mobilisation discourse of BKU is unable to articulate and address the current crisis of social 
reproduction, most apparent in the health implications of agrochemical intensification that are 
becoming visible after several decades even as households have little spending cash for 
meeting medical expenses.24 Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) contrasted this ‘new agrarianism' 
in the mid-1980s with the old Gandhian agrarianism. They suggested that farmers' unions 
invoke Gandhi in pragmatic and technical terms to highlight exploitative relations against 
agriculture as a sector, whereas old agrarianism employed in the anti-colonial movement 
stressed self-sufficiency at the village level. It advocated for a labour-intensive mode of 
production and restraint while challenging endless consumption. It is interesting that the 
notions of place based autonomy embodied in the anti-colonial discourse of ‘old agrarianism' 
have returned in the form of agroecological politics. 
 
Jennifer Clapp has argued that greater distancing in the food system, that is the spatial 
separation of consumption from agrarian production landscapes, enables the externalisation 
of ecological and social costs by powerful actors particularly transnational corporations. 
Lengthening of food commodity chains makes it difficult ‘to connect unsustainable outcomes 
on agricultural landscapes to specific actors and to hold those actors responsible' (Clapp 
2015: 316). The notion of ‘distancing' can be usefully employed to understand displacement 
of economic and ecological costs over time and its masking effects. In the first instance, such 
costs in Punjab were transferred to subaltern social groups that did not have access to land or 
were dispossessed through the transformation of labour practices and relations. These groups 
were not only absent from the social base of the BKU, but BKU's agenda was openly 
																																								 																				
24 I examine the various forms in which this crisis of social reproduction is unfolding in 
Chapter 3. 
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antagonistic to their interests.25 For landowning cultivators who were early adopters and 
beneficiaries of the technological package, the economic and ecological costs of the 
technological treadmill instituted through the Green Revolution decades were displaced over 
time. The political implications of this masking can be read retrospectively in examining the 
mobilising discourse of the farmers’ unions.  The displaced costs of the Green Revolution are 
becoming visible cognitively and experientially for the majority, including the once powerful 
middle sections of the peasantry. The extension of the crisis to this group that followed the 
‘modernisation script’ (cf. Van der Ploeg 2010) has inaugurated the nascent and contested 
politics of sustainability.26 The simultaneous visibility of social, economic and ecological 
consequences has opened up the space for KVM’s prefigurative politics of practical 
transformation that illustrates an integrated conception of sustainability.  
 
V. Public Agricultural Extension and Technopolitical Sustainability 
 
There is recognition of the social and ecological dimensions of the crisis within the publicly 
funded agricultural research and extension system, but their interventions are largely limited 
to the sphere of production. In this section, I examine understandings of crisis offered by 
scientists at the state-led Punjab Agricultural University (PAU), and government extension 
officials, to illustrate that they reflect an epistemic framework that separates the social and 
																																								 																				
25 I will discuss their presence in the new wave of sustainability politics, particularly in 
relation to KVM’s organising practices later in this chapter. 
26 Van der Ploeg (2010) suggests that not only has modernisation of agriculture excluded the majority 
of farmers but also destroyed those who were a part of the modernisation. Hence, it is increasingly 
becoming not only materially unsustainable but unattractive to individuals and communities. Citing 
the case of European farmers he suggests that the crisis of modernist agriculture is paving the way for 
regenerating the Chaynovian peasant mode of production. He posits the emerging restructuring of 
farming practices as active resistance to the corporate food regime as farmers move away from 
‘entrepreneurial trajectory towards the re-creation of peasant trajectory’. 
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ecological dimensions of the crisis being experienced by farming household.27 This 
separation is institutionalised in the production of agricultural knowledge within disciplinary 
silos in the university, a problem that becomes clear to extension staff when they interact with 
farmers to resolve practical problems in their fields. Even when scientists recognise the 
limitations of their frameworks and the inadequacy of new production techniques that are 
being developed to address farmers’ crises, they claim they are unable to influence policy 
shifts required for restructuring farming in fundamental ways. Moreover, the general 
devaluation of agriculture is visible in the declining resources allocated to public research and 
extension.  
 
Entrenched in the Malthusian mindset, the University’s historical mandate of fulfilling the 
objective of ensuring national food security is constantly highlighted by research and 
extension staff. There is a disproportionate focus on production and dissemination of 
improved, hybrid seed varieties and promoting new machinery, without sufficient attention to 
ecosystem management practices (cf. Dhiman et al, 2010).28 This is evident at the periodic 
farmers' fairs held at the University, where corporations advertise new farm machinery and 
agrochemical products. Farmers though say that they mostly come to these fairs to buy PAU 
seed varieties, which are not easily available in the market.  
 
At one such two-day farmer camp in March 2015 at the regional PAU centre in Bathinda, 
agricultural scientists in their speeches consistently emphasised the need for crop 
																																								 																				
27 PAU was established in 1962 by the government.  Modelled on US land grant colleges, it 
has a mandate of an integrated research, teaching and extension. The University played an 
important role in implementing Green Revolution practices, a role that scientists and 
extension officials continuously emphasise with pride (Dhiman et al 2010).  
28 Further, scientists point out that basic research in biological methods of ecosystem 
management are underfunded because they do not create avenues for profit generation in the 
same way as synthetic chemicals do (cf. Yapa 1993)	
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diversification and further mechanisation to reduce labour costs. They also talked about 
mechanical technologies that would help save water such as land laser levellers for preparing 
the fields for paddy cultivation. Urging farmers to use agrochemicals judiciously, one speaker 
says, "When we talk about fertilizer, we have to talk about soil testing. You should contact 
the University for Soil testing to determine how much urea (nitrogenous fertiliser), DAP (di-
ammonium phosphate) and micronutrients are needed by your soil. Excessive application of 
urea is harmful to the crop and the soil. It can seep into the water, and release gases which 
harm the environment." He then shows them a shade card that costs 100Rs and advises that 
they corroborate the shade of green of their plants to determine the amount of urea required in 
their fields. He says, "it will reduce the cost of cultivation, as well as the pesticides and 
herbicides required.  If you have used DAP for the wheat crop, there is no need to apply it 
again for the following paddy crop that year. If you use green manure Basmati crop can be 
grown without any urea." Out of the small proportion of farmers who attend these fairs, very 
few are sitting and listening to these speeches where scientists dispense advice in an ad hoc 
manner. Long queues can be seen in front of seed sale counters. Farmers complain that the 
availability of PAU seed varieties is much less than the demand, and this is a recurring trend 
year after year at the fair. After travelling long distances from their villages they are only able 
to procure a small amount of seeds. Apart from the seed counters, farmers can be seen at 
stalls displaying new machinery through demonstrations. In contrast to the didactic mode 
adopted by university staff, private companies use demonstrative methods and individualised 
interactions in farmers’ fields to disseminate information, which clearly resonates more with 
farmers. 
 
Alongside specific technical advice, university scientists and extension officials adopt a 
moralising tone. On the one hand, they stress the importance of scientific farming to improve 
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the quality of crops, for instance buying certified seed varieties recommended by the 
University to prevent crop damage, even as these seed varieties are not available in adequate 
quantities.   On the other and some officials also talk about social trends such as the younger 
generations' detached approach to farming and excessive expenditure on consumer goods. 
Unlike KVM's narrative of social degradation linked to the Green Revolution, however, these 
trends were attributed to moral deficiencies among farming households. One of the trustees 
on the University Board for instance in her speech says, 
           “The older farmers went to their fields daily to find out what the 
crops needed. They decided on when and how much water and 
manure was required based on weather conditions and the 
appearance of plants. Farmers today do not bother – water is easily 
available so they use it indiscriminately. It is the same story with 
pesticides. If you go to the fields frequently, you will realise that 
pesticides are not needed in the quantities they are currently being 
used in…the rising indebtedness is not the fault government we 
have to stop excessively spending on weddings, weddings took 
place earlier as well without all the pomp and show.”  
 
She goes on to talk about how idleness among people is responsible for increasing crime and 
drug addiction. Arguing or more collective action, she advises farmers to form groups and 
committees at the village level to exchange information and to create a sense of community 
instead of sitting in front of the television. While referring to similar social and ecological 
manifestations of the crisis as KVM, these articulations are characterised by historical 
amnesia. They do not acknowledge the role played by public extension system in 
engendering the current production system while pointing at the corresponding 
transformation of social relations. ‘Herd mentality' of farmers and lack of education are 
proffered as explanations to explain farmers' preoccupation with high yields and 
indiscriminate use of agrochemicals and water, as well as rising debt and social pathologies, 
despite an acknowledgement of structural constraints such as limited and declining reach of 
the underfunded public research and extension system.  Nevertheless, there is a growing 
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acknowledgement of the forms in which a sense of crises is experienced beyond the sphere of 
production and their underlying interconnectedness. For scientists, the social, ecological and 
economic manifestations are unintended consequences of technological innovations for 
which either the political classes or farmers are held responsible. Thus, they continue to 
partition off the realm of knowledge production from the process of ‘implementation', which 
is where the crisis takes shape according to them. As one agronomist at PAU admits,  
“There is no natural fertility left in our soils, they are barren. 
Punjab should get some compensation from the central government 
for bearing the burden of feeding the country using its natural 
resources disproportionately in the past five decades. Monoculture 
will eventually create ecological problems. It was the need of the 
hour in the country in the 1960s to produce food grain and prevent 
famine, which we did successfully. The university or extension 
officials did not prescribe over-fertilisation. That happened 
because of the farmers’ economic compulsions, which in turn have 
been shaped by government policies. When a farmer’s land loses 
its productivity, the government should compensate them to help 
them rejuvenate the soils.  Over time the cost of living has 
increased exponentially but not the farmers’ incomes. About 20 
years ago selling two trolleys of wheat could buy a tractor, now 
selling two trolleys of wheat cannot even buy enough diesel to run 
the tractor. The farmer does not get adequate returns for his crops, 
and the prices of other things that he has to buy from the market 
keep increasing.” 
 
The problem, as suggested by this above quotation, does not lie in a focus on increasing 
productivity that continues to be the mandate of the university, but in inadequate policies to 
address the consequences of farmers’ well-being. Like many others, the above agronomist 
goes on to suggest that the need of the hours is to move people out of agriculture. He says, “I 
do not think that increasing government support price is the solution to the crisis faced by 
farmers. There is an urgent need for creating more jobs. Frustration among youth due to 
unemployment is increasing crime and theft. Fragmentation of land over generations has 
created economically unfeasible operational holdings and so we have to adopt the model of 
contract farming and/or cooperative farming." 
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Others advocate turning agriculture into ‘white collar work' through further mechanisation. 
The Director of a regional Farm Advisory Centre points out that one of the major initiatives 
of the agriculture department is to keep youth in agriculture. 
                       “We have a government scheme called ARYA – Attracting and 
Retaining Rural Youth In Agriculture. There is also a focus on skill 
development for those who have completed high school, for 
instance in agriculture allied activities like bee keeping and 
mushroom cultivation. We have to transform agriculture into 
‘white collar’ work to attract literate youth. This is possible with 
more mechanisation – but the most significant issue is to provide a 
buffer against the extreme uncertainties in agriculture faced by 
farmers.  This is particularly important now, given that climate 
change is affecting cultivation- particularly through the 
unpredictable rainfall patterns.  Also, labour costs are increasing so 
mechanisation becomes essential.”  
 
This perspective clearly approaches the crisis from the perspective of medium and large 
landowning farm households and the educated youth, and implicit in this vision is the transfer 
of the ‘dispensable’ landless as well as those from small and marginal farming households 
out of agriculture. The solutions proposed by the government extension system for moving 
toward sustainable intensification are, therefore, a continuation of techno-politics of the 
Green Revolution. There is a slight shift from the ‘yield centric’ approach to one that focuses 
on sustainability, but this shift continues to work within a framework that does not think of 
farming as an integrated system embedded in socio-political relations. Farmers become 
recipients of ‘expert knowledge’, regardless of whether the messages are about conventional 
farming or sustainable agriculture. They implement ‘expert knowledge’ produced in 
disciplinary silos and disseminated as formulaic practices. Any modification on the part of 
the farmers based on their own needs is perceived as a deviation from the script.  
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The hybrid practices that reflect multiple epistemologies and resource constraints (Gupta 
1998) are cited as being responsible for environmental degradation and the crises that the 
farmers are facing. Scientists and agrochemicals dealers often cite the example of farmers not 
following refuge management practices while planting hybrid Bt cottonseed varieties as the 
cause of increasing pest attacks. Most farmers discard the non-Bt seeds that come with Bt 
cotton seeds or feed them to animals, instead of planting them on the periphery of the plots 
because their purpose is not clear to them. Based on their own perceptible experiences, 
farmers argue that non-Bt seeds on the periphery of the plot attract pests. The shopkeepers, 
from whom a majority of the farmers get information about agrochemical products, do not 
explain the purpose of planting them nor is it explained on the packaging. Some farmers say 
they did experiment in the initial years but came to the conclusion that it was a wasteful use 
of land. The mode in which scientists comprehend and attempt to resolve the crisis is 
identifying discrete primary causes for problems such as increasing pest attacks. This mode 
does not incorporate complex, multidimensional understandings of crisis, or devising 
solutions within a long-term analytical framework. Activists and several elderly farmers, on 
the other hand, situate the increasing incidence of pest attacks on Bt cotton in the longer 
trajectory of mono cropping, changing cotton varieties and use of pesticides since the 1960s, 
pointing to the cascading and unpredictable effects of an imbalanced ecosystem. 
 
Even within the terms of the scientific establishment’s own framework, however, the lacunae 
in implementation are glaring. Farmers are unaware of refuge management practices because 
government extension outreach in the villages is negligible. The few farmers who report 
interacting with extension officials were educated, large landowners who initiated contact 
themselves. Barring field trials of new chemical products of companies, most farmers have 
never had any interactions with the extension or University officials in their villages or fields. 
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As elderly farmers point out this was not the case in the early decades of the Green 
Revolution in the 1960s and 1970s, when the Gram Sewaks (government village extension 
workers) were actively trying to introduce fertilizers. Khushwant Singh, a farmer in his 70s 
says, “When the problems of chronic pest attacks and stagnant yields appeared in the 1980s, 
the extension officials disappeared from our villages.” In contrast, most farmers remember 
recent interactions with representatives of seed and pesticide companies who visit the villages 
frequently to advertise their products, particularly at the start of the sowing season. Thus, 
seamless privatisation of the Green Revolution followed the institution of the technological 
treadmill through public extension system in the initial decades.  
 
While acknowledging the economic constraints faced by farmers and the public research and 
extension system, the PAU scientific community nevertheless continues to attribute 
responsibility for ecological damage and the contamination of water and soils onto farmers. 
Agronomists and extension staff who frequently interact with farmers have a more nuanced 
understanding of the crisis. Research scientists, however, complain about the inability of 
farmers to follow expert advice. They cite the excessive use of fertilizers and pesticides over 
the recommended dosage, and at inappropriate times during the cropping cycle, 
indiscriminate use of water by leaving the water pumps running; blindly following the advice 
of commission agents and dealers/shopkeepers of chemical inputs instead of the 
recommendations made by the University. 
 
Extension officials at PAU also admit that lack of resources prevents them from reaching out 
to small and medium farmers in the villages. The public extension and research system are 
severely underfunded compared to seed and agrochemical companies. This particularly 
impacts field-based research and extension. Trials and demonstrations of new varieties are 
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conducted on the fields of large farmers with higher levels of literacy, who are perceived as 
‘capable of following instructions properly' or on farms that are easily accessible because 
they are closer to the road. Most extension and outreach activities are ironically now confined 
to the university campus and regional stations. Few farmers are able to come to camps and 
training sessions held at the University or the regional research/extension stations.  These 
include large farmers who employ hired labour and have the time and resources or elderly 
farmers who have little decision-making power within the household. The extension officials 
work with the same 80-100 farming households in a district over many decades. Farmers who 
have these established relationships with extension staff are the ones who call in to ask for 
solutions for problems of pest attacks, or crop diseases at the university, or the Farm Service 
Centers (Krishi Vigyan Kendras). The majority of the farmers end up going to local 
agrochemical shopkeepers during instances of pest attacks or other diseases afflicting crops 
that they are unable to control. In fact, farmers often refer to pesticide dealers and 
agrochemical company representatives as ‘Doctors'. Local dealers and shopkeepers work 
within a highly competitive environment where large agrochemical conglomerates offer 
incentives based on achievement of sales targets. There is a great deal of overlap between 
commission agents who lend money and buy crops from farmers and also act as vendors of 
agrochemicals. Commission agents in such instances often sell agrochemical products to 
farmers on loan, increasing their debt levels.29 Along with sending representatives to villages 
to conduct demonstrations of agrochemical products in farmers' fields, conglomerates also 
conduct technical trainings for shopkeepers and input dealers. These trainings provide them 
																																								 																				
29 As reported by shopkeepers and dealers in the town of Jaitu and in Bathinda city, these 
incentives include both share in profits and non-monetary incentives such as expensive 
holidays.  
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with enough knowledge to become credible as experts offering advice on crop diseases and 
pest attacks. This, in turn, has a significant impact on boosting sales.30 
 
Beyond issues of access, the autonomy of public research and extension system is 
compromised, given their entanglement with agrochemical companies, whether indirectly 
through pressures from ruling political classes that influence research agendas or directly 
through collaborations and investments. In 2012, for instance, the Punjab government asked 
Monsanto to set up a Maize research centre for developing new hybrid varieties, a move that 
was justified as part of a strategy for crop diversification particularly to replace water-
guzzling rice. Maize, incidentally, was a popular native crop in Punjab and a critical part of 
the local diet prior to the Green Revolution marginalised with the institution of wheat-paddy-
cotton mono-cropping cycle. This entanglement is not just visible in episodic instances but is 
built into institutional processes of regulation. For instance, some seed varieties and 
agrochemical products produced by private companies are recommended by the University in 
its Package of Practices that is published twice a year for the rabi and Kharif season and is 
widely disseminated among farmers. A scientist outlines the process by which such 
recommendations are arrived at: 
 
“Companies approach PAU to test their products – new seeds, 
weedicides, pesticides, herbicides and insecticides. Then we carry 
out field trials to test effectiveness as well as to figure out dosage 
requirements for these inputs Sometimes they are recommended 
and sometimes they are not. For instance, there are about 100 
																																								 																				
30 At one such day-long training in Bathinda in May 2015 conducted by one of the leading 
domestic corporations with one of the top share of the agrochemical market, sales personnel 
were introduced to new products and instructed in extremely complex technical specifications 
of each product –its chemical composition and methods of application. They were advised to 
share methods of application in detail with farmers at the time of making the sale, and follow 
up with them a few times until they are proficient. Feedback was also sought from sales 
personnel about which products farmers complained about and how to address these 
complaints by instructing farmers in precise and appropriate methods of application. 
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varieties of Bt cotton seeds available in the market right now, but 
PAU has recommended only about 3-4 varieties.”   
 
He then goes on to point out the flawed nature of this process. “The trials are not conducted 
every year, so the same recommendation for a product continues to be published year after 
year. Also, most of the times companies test directly in the fields with farmers. It is the 
responsibility of the agriculture department to check samples that are available in the market 
for consistency of quality. But the problem is that they generally take samples from the 
smallest container available, whereas adulteration is more prominent in the large quantity 
containers. The Agriculture Department owes millions of rupees to dealers for these samples, 
which they have been unable to repay. The state government is bankrupt. This gives a boost 
to companies to continue with nefarious activities and make deals with officials within the 
agriculture department to put out spurious products in the market. The problem of spurious 
pesticides available in the market is a serious one and has been partly responsible for the 
increased frequency of crop damage." He concludes by saying that in any case majority of 
farmers do not follow University recommendations. "Farmers choose higher yielding seed 
varieties over the recommended drought and disease resistant ones." 
 
While ‘precision farming', ‘integrated pest management', ‘conservation agriculture' and even 
‘multi-functionality' has entered the lexicon of recommendations made by the University in 
the last 5-6 years, in practice they have not been effective, as recognised by many of the 
extension officials. The set of recommendations published in the Package of Practices 
produced by the University continues to emphasise agrochemical product driven practices 
instead of focusing on ecosystem management practices. In recent years farmers were 
encouraged to grow guar beans and Basmati rice, crops that require less water and 
agrochemical inputs and were also in demand in the global market. The Director of the Farm 
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Advisory Centre, however, points out that they did not have much success in increasing the 
acreage under less water consuming crops because of price volatility. He says, "With guar, 
the response was good in the beginning, but dwindled as prices in the global market crashed. 
Similarly, with Basmati rice, the problem was over production, which pushed down prices, 
and we are telling farmers not to grow it this season." Farmers are asked to grow crops that 
are lucrative as export commodities and less input intensive. Such an approach requires 
consistent interaction with farmers based on up to date information on global commodity 
prices, which is simply not feasible. The definition of crop diversification within this 
approach is narrow. It entails a shift away from the current wheat-rice or cotton rotation to 
other temporarily lucrative crops, without challenging the system of monoculture cropping 
and ‘distancing’ mechanisms that structure the global food system.  
 
Research feeds into extension in a fragmented manner. For instance, there is very little 
coordination between plant breeding, soil sciences and entomology, and practices propagated 
through extension do not account for the material constraints that majority of the farmers 
face. Farmers’ decisions to not adopt these practices, however, are not explained in terms of 
these structural constraints such as inadequate outreach and extension but by constructing 
them as ‘irresponsible and ignorant’ subjects. Along with newer technological fixes such as 
genetically modified crops, state regulation and policing of farmers is gaining prominence as 
a strategy for prohibiting ecologically damaging practices.  The state government, for 
instance, fixes a date in the summer before which transplanting paddy is illegal, in order to 
ensure that transplantation is done with the onset of monsoons, to prevent extraction large 
quantities of groundwater for flooding the fields.  
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The practice of burning fields after harvest to get rid of residual rice straw, which has become 
widespread in recent years, is an instructive example of the techno-political approach adopted 
by state institutions. These large-scale fires destroy organic matter, insects and other living 
organisms in the fields with detrimental effects on soil health, and environmental pollution 
creating asphyxiating smog for days.31  University and extension officials attribute the 
problem to the ‘greed' and irresponsibility of farmers. They also claim that greater policing is 
required by the state to stop the practice which is officially banned, as the ruling political 
parties do not want to take the risk of antagonising farmers and therefore the ban is not 
implemented. This narrative excludes the origins of this practice, which is relatively new and 
explains the conditions under which it has emerged.  
 
Farmers point out that residual paddy straw became a problem after the introduction of 
combine-harvesters less than two decades ago. The combines were supposed to be more 
efficient and replaced the threshers that preceded them. Combine harvesters destroy straw 
partially rendering it unusable as fodder. Further, paddy varieties grown in Punjab produce 
straw rich in silica, which is hard to process in the short time window of a fortnight between 
harvesting and sowing of wheat. Wheat straw is preferred as fodder. Indebted farmers are 
unable to afford the costs of extra diesel, required to get rid of the paddy straw quickly and 
prepare the fields for the sowing of wheat. The cost of diesel has also been consistently 
rising. Apart from imposing a ban, the state government has attempted to introduce machines 
to sow wheat in standing rice stubble with zero tillage through the Primary Agriculture 
Cooperatives Societies at a subsidised rate.32  Most farmers though, struggling to repay 
																																								 																				
31 In the last few years, the toxic smog has travelled to the national capital Delhi that is surrounded by 
green Revolution states of Punjab, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh thereby drawing national and 
international attention to the issue (cf. Mathur 2016; Anand 2016).  
32 Machines such as ‘happy seeders’ developed by PAU and straw balers were first 
introduced in 2010, but have not been effective in stopping the practice because they are 
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existing loans, are reluctant to invest in new machinery even when heavily subsidised.  It is 
noteworthy that the cycle of chronic debt for many farming households began with 
investment in buying tractors with subsidised loans in the late 1970s and mid-1980s.   
 
The cycle of technical fixes that are premised on a narrow temporal and conceptual framing 
of the problem, were short-lived gains are followed by problems that require further 
investment in new forms of technology has pushed farmers into chronic indebtedness. The 
unsustainable arc is becoming apparent but also seems insurmountable to rural households, as 
their material resources have been eroded in the process, and the cumulative knowledge 
developed generationally through experimentation and accommodating localised ecological 
feedback loop has been interrupted. KVM activists argue that the problem of rice straw 
burning is symptomatic of the larger problem of monocultural farming, and treating 
symptoms is not sufficient. Organic farmers are not burning their fields, as they are building 
economically and ecologically viable agrarian practices contingent on improving soil health. 
KVM and other farmer organisations are also actively challenging the construction of the 
problem of crop-residue burning in the mainstream public domain that focuses on farmers 
responsibility for air pollution that is affecting the health of urban citizens while neglecting 
industrial and vehicular pollution and the distress in the agrarian economy. 
 
Rooted in the Green Revolution legacy, scientists and extension officials at PAU maintain 
that organic production cannot support a growing population, but also acknowledge that crop 
diversification is necessary. Moving away from wheat-paddy or wheat-cotton rotation is 
essential for restraining the depletion of ground water, restoring soil health and ecological 
balance in Punjab. At PAU camps farmers are encouraged to diversify into high-value crops, 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
costly, evident by burning of crop residue on a wide scale in the past two years (Roy 2010; 
Majeedi 2016). 
88	
	
particularly horticulture, mushroom cultivation, bee keeping and fisheries highlighting their 
export potential. Farmers are advised that such a shift would generate higher incomes, even if 
the initial investments require taking on loans. Alongside the shift toward technologically 
driven sustainable intensification, where sustainability is defined as conservation of natural 
resources, the discourse of national food security is being replaced by a prescription for high-
value export agriculture for economic and crop diversification for a ‘developed' region like 
Punjab. However, scientists acknowledge that unless there is a shift in government policies 
any substantive changes in terms of crop diversification are unlikely. Unless minimum 
support prices and state procurement infrastructure is extended to other crops, farmers locked 
in debt are unlikely to make that shift on any significant scale. They argue that the apathy of 
the political classes and their collusion with corporate interests stands in the way of 
meaningful reforms, and as scientists, they have no clout to influence policies. In this 
diagnosis, they converge with KVM, but their prescription for ‘meaningful reforms' is in 
conflict as it calls for a greater role for scientific expertise.33  
 
As Raj Patel (2013) contends neoliberal restructuring of agriculture or the new Green 
revolution has an even more pronounced biopolitics occluding the possibility of broader 
structural change. The Green Revolution of the 1960s began as a measure for containing 
socialism and adopted the trope of national self-sufficiency. Now the discourse has been 
reconstituted and employs the idiom of individuation that valorises entrepreneurship.  
																																								 																				
33 The Punjab government appointed Johl Committee recommended crop diversification as early as 
1986, followed by a second report in 2002. In 2002 the Johl committee report recommended shifting 
one million hectares of cultivated area of the state from under wheat and rice to other crops, 
preferably oilseeds and pulses. It also recommended providing compensation to farmers on a per 
hectare per year basis who shifted to other crops to make up for any economic losses, and monetary 
compensation to village panchayats that promoted diversification of land in their villages. However, 
the scheme remains unimplemented, as the administrative demands of the scheme were beyond the 
capacities of the state government and farmers continued to expand the area under wheat and rice (see 
Shergill 2007). 
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Agricultural modernisation is no longer framed in terms of national food self-sufficiency, but 
by employing the trope of efficiency and production of high-value agricultural commodities 
for the global market, exemplified by the speech of the Indian Prime Minister at the recent 
National Organic Convention in January 2016. At the convention, the Prime Minister 
underscored the need for technological innovations for moving toward increased productivity 
through ecologically sustainable farming. These innovations include soil health cards to 
promote the need-based use of fertilizers and agrochemicals, creating digital platforms to 
document the knowledge of ‘progressive farmers', and encouraging the entrepreneurial spirit 
in rural India to promote value addition through food processing, branding and marketing of 
organic produce. While lauding the complete shift to organic production in the small 
Northeastern state of Sikkim, hitherto peripheral to the Indian state's development project, the 
Prime Minister does not mention the ban on Sikkim government's policy that gradually 
phased out before imposing a complete ban on chemical pesticides from entering the state 
over a period of 10 years. The exclusion of the role of structural policies reflects the framing 
of ‘sustainability' in the narrowly defined terrain of scientific knowledge driven practices in 
the dominant discourse.  This recasting is symptomatic of neoliberal political rationality that 
has shaped the development strategy and practices of the Indian state and is particularly 
salient in the restructuring of agriculture and land use since the 1990s (cf. Peschard 2014). 
Moreover, agriculture sector largely falls under the jurisdiction of state governments in India, 
and state government in Punjab has been at the forefront of the neoliberal project of 
agricultural modernization.34  
 
																																								 																				
34 In recent controversy over the introduction of genetically modified mustard, for instance, 
unlike Punjab, the governments of so-called backwards states such as Rajasthan, Bihar, 
Madhya Pradesh have opposed the move and registered their protest with the federal 
government.   
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The focus on sustainable agriculture in rain-fed regions such as Sikkim that were excluded 
from the Green Revolution intensification project is not surprising. Once again the Indian 
state is ‘betting on the strong’, by focusing on rain-fed regions with healthy soils and social 
infrastructure conducive for a more sustainable Second Green Revolution.35 In addition, the 
national government agency Food Corporation of India (FCI) is also planning to phase out 
central crop procurement facilities from Green Revolution states like Punjab and invest in 
building procurement infrastructure in other states. Surplus states like Punjab have opposed 
the move towards decentralization, arguing that they do not have the institutional capacity to 
ensure procurement (Landy 2017). The focus on production of rain-fed regions as sites of 
sustainable agriculture is justified by the state in the idiom of comparative advantage, as the 
onus of dealing with the social and ecological damage through rapid agricultural 
intensification within Punjab is being passed on to the farmers.   
 
VI. The Limitations of Prefigurative Politics 
 
KVM has made extremely limited inroads over the past 10 years, in convincing farmers to 
adopt natural and organic practices. This lack of success in enrolling a significant number of 
farmers with the movement has led them to modify their organising practices. In the early 
years, the emphasis was on working according to principles of natural farming, such as using 
only organic inputs that were generated on the farm and within the household, restoring 
biodiversity by moving away from monocultures of wheat, rice and cotton, intercropping, and 
recovering indigenous seed varieties. Such radical restructuring of practices is perceived as 
being too risky by a majority of farmers in the absence of any institutional support to absorb 
																																								 																				
35 The introduction of the Green Revolution package of hybrid seeds and fertilizers in the 
1960s was also a strategy of ‘betting on the strong’, where regions like Punjab and Haryana 
with irrigation infrastructure and relatively larger consolidated landholdings were chosen for 
intensification and production of food grains to fill the national buffer stocks.  
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the losses through the transition period. As a consequence, in recent years KVM has shifted 
its strategy. Moving away from holistic natural farming embedded in ecological principles, 
they are now adopting an incremental approach that aligns more with short-term goals and 
resonates with a larger number of farming households. 
 
The primary objective of organising now is to convince farmers to gradually reduce synthetic 
inputs - fertilizers and pesticides with every cropping cycle, especially in wheat and paddy. 
KVM activists appeal to conventional farmers by arguing that reducing synthetic chemicals 
inputs would reduce their costs of production, without significantly affecting yields, if they 
follow the ‘correct' organic practices. Fear of reduction in yields is what prevents farmers 
who do recognise the harmful impact of agrochemicals from moving toward organic 
production. The other goal pursued by activists is to convince farmers to set aside some 
portion of their land, usually one or two acres, for growing wheat, vegetables and lentils with 
zero synthetic chemical inputs for their own household's consumption. The majority of 
farmers associated with KVM in Faridkot and Bathinda districts follow both or one of these 
strategies. The necessity for cultivating organic wheat and vegetables for self-consumption is 
framed in the context of public health crisis. Activists highlight the historical discrimination 
against farmers and rural inhabitants structured through national public policies since 
independence, and the general apathy of non-agrarian populations toward farmers, to 
legitimize self-consumption of organically grown food, even as they sell ‘unsafe' food 
commercially which is grown with chemical inputs. In addition, KVM is creating spaces for 
marketing organic produce in urban centres of Punjab largely catering to upper middle-class 
households at present. The modified strategies have been more effective in enrolling a larger 
number of farmers with the movement. Economistic reasoning though also shapes these 
strategies, which was at the centre of KVM's critique of the tactics adopted by farmers' 
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unions. This shift has also many that activists disseminate formulaic organic techniques 
instead of fostering the experimental production of farming knowledge through communal 
practices and collaborations among farmers. Within the movement, some activists perceive 
this shift positively arguing that such an approach is more inclusive and enables the 
expansion of the social base of the movement, while others contend that this shift is 
compromising the goals of the movement. 
 
In introductory meetings in new villages, activists continue to focus on outlining the 
connections between ‘social' and ‘environmental' aspects of the crisis. Farmers who become 
interested then subsequently attend technical trainings on organic methods of production. 
These collective meetings within villages are then followed by activists interacting with 
interested farmers individually by providing them support through the various stages of the 
cropping cycle. By adopting this method of group trainings followed by individual 
interactions with farmers, activists have become bearers of ‘specialist knowledge' who 
disseminate formulaic organic methods. They have been unable to foster experimental social 
learning, and farmer-to-farmer knowledge and seed exchanges, germane to the politics of 
agroecology (cf. Altieri and Toledo 2011; Holt-Gimenez 2006).  Activists argue that the 
pervasive individualisation ethic prevents farmers from organising and working collectively 
at the village level.  Thus, the movement functions as a network where activists are connected 
with farmers as individuals, and work as mediators in facilitating knowledge exchanges. 
 
The difference between fostering agroecological practices and dissemination of organic 
techniques and methods becomes clear by examining the critiques that are emerging from 
within the movement. These critiques are being articulated by a small number of farmers 
practising holistic natural farming. Many of them have been associated with KVM since 
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inception, and are often cited as examples that showcase the possibility of viable of organic 
farming in Punjab. These farmers who adopted natural farming through a process of self-
discovery and experimentation are critical of what they refer to as the ‘NGO-isation' of 
KVM, and the turn toward more economically driven mobilisation strategies.36 While 
supportive of the efforts to create linkages with urban consumers and creating a marketing 
infrastructure for organic produce, they challenge the ways in which farmers are convinced to 
transform their production practices. Reducing and eliminating chemical fertilizers and 
pesticides while persisting with wheat and rice monocultures, and simplification of 
organising messages to a thrust on low costs of cultivation, they argue will not lead to the 
creation of robust farming systems.  
 
According to this dissident faction, the dissemination of organic methods and techniques as 
formulas during trainings conducted by KVM workers reinforces a culture of dependence on 
‘experts'. Dissemination of formulaic knowledge of practices also fosters confusion among 
farmers and when promises of equivalent yields do not hold true, farmers are further 
disillusioned. Instead, they advocate taking a path that fosters agrarian practices based on 
sound ecological principles, focusing on reviving crop diversity, regenerating healthy soils 
with microorganisms and animals and bird species that were native to this region and integral 
to the farming system and adopting experimentation as a mode of organisation. This path, 
which is more difficult and will attract fewer farmers, will be sustainable in the long run and 
have a demonstration effect that will be more powerful than advocacy trainings. Instead of 
borrowing farming practices developed for other socio-ecological regions by organic farmers 
in other parts of the country, and then disseminating them as discretely broken down 
techniques, they favour a strategy that would focus on creating experimental farms in villages 
																																								 																				
36 For a detailed discussion of how KVM seeks to differentiate itself from NGOs to retain its 
identity as a social movement see Brown (2014). 
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that would act as demonstration plots for viable diverse farming systems and sites for 
collective learning as well as knowledge repositories for farmers. 
 
These criticisms highlight the emerging divide between KVM's work as an organisation 
working with the objective of enrolling a larger number of farmers and inclusion of more 
villages in their outreach, and farmers ideologically committed to natural farming within the 
movement. Narratives of these landowning farmers from dominant agrarian castes, however, 
also signal discomfort toward KVM workers who come from landless households or women 
workers who are now becoming active producers of farming knowledge through their 
interactions with the wider network of activists outside Punjab. KVM workers from landless 
households who have learned organic farming techniques as a part of their job, in contrast to 
farmers who grew up farming on their own land, establish their credibility as experts. And 
they are more successful in establishing a rapport with small and marginal farming 
households, and even within landless households while organising among women, by 
expressing an understanding of their economic constraints. 
 
There is a consensus within the movement on the necessity for collective organising at the 
village level, however, activists find it difficult to forge deliberative, collective spaces at the 
village level to sustain agroecological initiatives despite repeated efforts. Activists offer 
several explanations for the failure of village level collectivisation. For instance, that the 
‘mind-sets of the Jat landowning castes’ reflects deeper historical consciousness where 
communality is structured through kinship and clan ties, and not at the village level.37 In 
																																								 																				
37 The significance of the eighteenth-century attacks by vast armies in shaping political subjectivities 
of Sikh Jats has been documented in Punjab’s historiography. Their kinship and interest based ties 
extended beyond village boundaries in attempts of seeking security and patronage through warlord 
organisations, making factionalism endemic to Punjabi social structure. These extended kin networks 
across villages were stronger than village solidarity (Pettigrew 1975). Framing of Sikhs as ‘yeoman 
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more recent history, the breakdown of social ethos is attributed to the Green Revolution 
decades that fostered a preoccupation with higher yields. Further, secular spaces of sociality 
dissipated through the period of the 1980s in the wake of the brutal state repression of the 
militant Sikh secessionist movement. While not extensively examined, some scholars have 
attributed the emergence of the Sikh militant secessionist movement in the 1980s to the 
discontent and social inequality produced through agricultural modernization in the region as 
well. The communalisation of Punjabi society reflected rising social tensions among the Sikh 
landowning farmers and largely Hindu traders, between landowners and largely Dalit landless 
households, and the perceived exploitation of the Sikh minority community concentrated in 
Punjab by the national government (Corsi 2006; Shiva 1989).  
 
These divisions have also been inscribed in the spatial organisation of the villages, as Dalit 
houses and those of the Sikh Jat landowners continue to be segregated, and activists organise 
separate meetings in different parts of the village. More generally, Punjabi villages are large 
and many resemble small towns. In addition, the structure of the newly built urban style 
houses, often outside the village on farm land, have changed the nature of social interactions 
as elderly people frequently point out. Women, in particular, suggest that shift from joint to 
nuclear households, and their retraction from farming activities in the fields has restricted 
their mobility and reduced the frequency of interactions with other women outside their 
family and kinship network. Collective organising has nevertheless been somewhat more 
successful among women. Women from both landowning and landless households are 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
farmers’ and as a ‘martial race’ through material and discursive practices of the colonial state further 
reinforced political subjectivity that was not expressed in terms of village community/solidarity, but 
land ownership and clan like networks across villages (Mooney 2013). One of the founding members 
of KVM, for instance, suggests that the mistrustful and consumerist nature of Punjabi people has deep 
historical roots. Punjab's geopolitical location made it vulnerable to periodic brutal attacks by invaders 
going back to the pre-colonial period.  He quotes an old saying in Punjabi which roughly translates as 
- ‘whatever you can eat or consume is yours, and the rest belongs to Nadir Shah', which refers to the 
invasion by the eighteenth-century Persian emperor)". 
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primarily mobilised to create and sustain vegetable gardens within the house for self-
consumption. Partly, this is easier as women's meetings and activities are concentrated within 
the village in common spaces such as the government village school or Anganwadi (child 
care centres). Male farmers on dispersed farms that are located outside the village, on the 
other hand, can only be approached individually while working in the fields. Measures to go 
beyond knowledge sharing to labour sharing practices have failed among women as well. 
Rajji, a KVM activist cites a recent example of a failure. In a village, an old couple were 
unable to cultivate their land, offered their 3 acres to KVM in return for a share of the 
vegetables grown on the land. "We tried to get together a group of women from landless 
households to grow vegetables on this land. But women did not want to work in a group." 
Women, particularly from landless households, cite lack of time as the primary constraint, as 
they go out to work to earn daily wages in addition to performing household chores. They 
also bring up the lack of consistent water supply, and a shortage of organic materials such as 
dried cow dung cakes in large quantities, as most landless households are unable to keep 
livestock. 
 
Discussions at village meetings that include people who are not yet involved with KVM 
activities suggest that people are unwilling to take responsibility for the current crises and 
expect the government to take action. While addressing a women's meeting in a Bathinda 
village, Rajji suggests that women are unknowingly feeding poison to their children. One of 
the women participants interjects to argue that the food system can change only if the 
government stops production of chemical inputs. She says, "It is easier to ban things from the 
shop. We eat grains that are grown with chemicals, that is the fodder our cattle consume, and 
then we drink their milk. How much of a difference can eating home grown organic 
vegetables make, if the rest of our diets are laced with chemicals?" Articulating a 
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prefigurative political stance, Rajji reasons, "If we do not change our own behaviour and 
always rely on the government to do things for us, then nothing is going to change. If your 
child is suffering from a disease, will you do something or wait for Badals (the current ruling 
political party in Punjab) to come and help you out." Referring to urea shortages in 2014, she 
goes on to say, "they sell these chemicals but we buy them. We go out and protest in the 
streets when there is a shortage of fertilizer in the market". This interaction reveals how 
political subjectivities of farming households have been shaped by dependence on 
government for their livelihoods, mediated through subsidies and price support that sustain 
the technological treadmill.  The material consequences of this dependence have produced an 
agroecological politics of autonomy, but they simultaneously constrain the possibilities of 
collective practical transformation. 
 
Lobbying by ASHA, at the national level of which KVM is a part, echoes the position that 
government needs to provide support for farmers through the transition process to organic 
production and to cope with economic and ecological distress generated by conventional 
farming. Farmers often argue at KVM meetings that the problems they face are related to 
marketing, not production. Apart from wheat and rice, procured by the government at a 
minimum price, prices for other crops are extremely volatile. When farmers have bumper 
yields, prices crash and they suffer losses. The example of potato overproduction in Punjab in 
2014 came up at several village meetings that I attended. In the absence of remunerative 
prices, farmers in large numbers resorted to dumping their potato stocks on the roads. 
Emphasising their lack of control over price setting, a farmer says at a meeting- "it should be 
the job of the government to coordinate production at various scales or regulate prices at the 
national and international level. The farmers have no control over prices of their own product 
and can only ensure that they produce good yields." 
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The issues raised by men and women from farming households at village meetings are not 
centred on production practices, but on precariousness associated with volatility of prices, 
uncertainty about government procurement of harvested crops on account of quality, and 
delay in payments by commission agents and the incompetence of the government. Medium 
and large farmers also frequently raise the issue of labour availability. They argue that 
organic cultivation is more labour-intensive, and they are unable to afford the rising costs of 
labour. Even with conventional farming, labour costs are constantly going up along with 
costs of other inputs. Moreover, it is difficult to find labour during peak season as men from 
landless households prefer non-farm daily wage labour, which pays more. Farmers who are in 
the process of transitioning to organic farming find it particularly difficult to hire labour, as 
the work involves manual operations. In this context advocating for biodiverse cultivation 
becomes implausible for activists, as most farmers cannot afford to grow anything else except 
the state supported wheat and rice, in which most operations are fully mechanised. 
 
Eschewing the language of class, KVM activists talk about a ‘breakdown' of the relationship 
between labouring classes and farmers with mechanisation. Echoing the grievances of 
landowning farmers, they also refer to how social security policies such as the MGNREGA 
(Mahatma Gandhi Rural Employment Guarantee Act) have taken workers away from farms 
revealing the class bias of their discourse. Activists claim their aim is to create a broad based 
inclusive movement in Punjab that focuses on engendering ecologically grounded farming 
practices among rural cultivators, without targeting any particular caste or class. This would 
be a step toward building a cohesive village community. The strategies outlined above, 
however, appeal largely to medium and large-scale farmers. Small farmers with one to three 
acres of land are unable to set aside plots for organic cultivation for household consumption. 
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They also cannot bear the risk of reducing fertilizer application, as even a small decrease in 
yields would have a drastic impact on their ability to meet daily needs and pay debts in the 
short-run. The temporal configuration of prefigurative politics thus poses a dilemma. 
Agroecological practices that require foregoing immediate monetary returns for restoring 
ecological equilibrium ad material autonomy, in the long run, entail risks that can be borne 
only by households with stable non-agrarian livelihoods. Since the collective model of 
agroecological farming has not taken root and state support for organic production is 
negligible, the risks and costs of transition have to be borne by individual households. 
 
As of now, there is no systematic effort by KVM to organise among landless agricultural 
labour and landless tenant cultivators. The exclusion of groups that were marginalised and 
dispossessed through Green Revolution farming is thus reinforced with prioritisation of 
changing mindsets and farming practices over transforming policy frameworks. Long-term 
sustainability of agroecological cultivation is also suspect as more and more landowning 
households are leasing out land to avoid the risks of cultivation. Landless tenant cultivators 
are excluded in the outreach programs by state institutions and are also invisible within 
KVM's organising efforts. Interestingly, like government research and extension officials, 
KVM activists also suggest that landless cultivators who lease land use chemical inputs in the 
largest quantities. While this claim is backed by little evidence, activists reason that since 
landless cultivators pay an exorbitant rent for the land, they have to generate high yields in 
short duration, particularly with vegetable cultivation. Despite believing that they are the 
worst offenders, neither the government extension system nor KVM activists attempt to 
address landless cultivators in trainings and meetings geared toward promoting sustainable 
agricultural practices. This is illustrative of how the structuring of agrarian production 
through the Green Revolution decades is shaping the boundaries of sustainability politics. 
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The dominant focus on organising among landowning households is justified by activists by 
citing their role in co-production of the current crisis.  Refusal to identify a principal 
contradiction as the driving force of the present crisis renders the constructive work of 
resurrecting material and cultural autonomy open-ended. Alliance formation with a small 
section of urban citizens is under way through informal marketing networks for organic 
produce. But the substantive inclusion of landless workers in agroecological organising 
remains extremely limited as it would entail addressing the thorny issue of access to land. 
Organising experiences of activists among women, however, suggest nascent pathways for a 
more inclusive framework that foregrounds social equity. Women activists reach out to a 
large number of landless households for growing vegetables on homestead plots for self-
consumption. Women from landless households are more receptive to their efforts, as they 
value the savings that come with not having to buy vegetables from the market. They are also 
used to working as hired labour in the fields. The experience of working on their own 
homestead plots with some support from activists is greatly valued because they have control 
over the labour process and the final product. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
The ‘Green Revolution’ exemplified the technocratic development practices of the Indian 
state, that were set in motion by the political coalition of rural landowning and urban middle 
classes in the first few decades after independence. The influence of US government and 
actors like the Ford Foundation and Rockefeller Foundation also illustrated the tenuous 
nature of the project of national self-sufficiency and autonomy of the postcolonial 
developmental state.  By the 1970s and the 1980s, these practices precipitated agrarian 
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populist mobilisations particularly in Green Revolution regions like Punjab. By providing 
staple food grains to national granaries these regions and the landed dominant agrarian castes 
within them, had become critical to the project of nation state-making. The discourse of food 
security and providing cheap grains was germane to establishing the legitimacy of the state 
while it focused on industrial expansion. Primarily representing the interests of medium and 
large cultivators, the farmers' unions in the Green Revolution regions, including the BKU in 
Punjab, therefore articulated the mobilising discourse of ‘urban bias' in national policies. This 
discourse, on the one hand, attempted to forge a unified rural and agrarian political 
subjectivity nationally, and on the other hand highlighted regional exploitation revealing the 
tensions of the federalist state structure. Together, ‘Green Revolution' statist practices and 
farmers' mobilisations that emerged in response to these practices had the effect of 
suppressing the agenda of land redistribution and structural agrarian reform. 
 
The emergence of these populist mobilisations though also indicated the increasing 
marginalisation of rural middle classes in the statist political coalition that had led many 
scholars to characterise the post-colonial Indian state as an ‘intermediate regime'. The 1980s 
was a period when structural reforms such as the agenda of land redistribution began to be 
replaced by populist welfare politics. Anti-poverty and public works employment programs 
sought to contain the discontent generated by the deepening social inequalities through Green 
Revolution and industrial expansion that characterised the developmental decades and 
inaugurated the era of neoliberal statist policies.  Populist movements like the BKU were not 
simply reactionary and seeking to retain their class privilege in their immediate locales. They 
were also expressing discontent at the failure of the developmental promise of upward 
mobility. These aspirational politics transformed into a politics for survival as material 
degradation and social crisis precipitated by the Green Revolution deepened. Episodic 
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protests by various factions of the BKU in Punjab in recent years have been mobilised against 
land acquisition, delays in crop procurement by state agencies, demanding compensation for 
crop damage due to unseasonal rains or pest attacks, and for households where farmers’ have 
committed suicides due to economic distress. Their mobilisations though have not developed 
any substantive prospective agenda that indicates any significant shift from their earlier 
demands for greater input subsidies and support prices. 
 
By contrast, prefigurative agro-ecological politics spearheaded by KVM is counter-
hegemonic as it consciously seeks to make an epistemic intervention through practical 
transformation enacted by farming households.  While shaped by anti-globalization discourse 
of the neoliberal conjuncture, their organising also incorporates the legacy of agrarian 
resistance that articulated a discourse of rural and regional exploitation within a nationalist 
framework. KVM's narrative of crisis has successfully established the relationship between 
production practices and the crisis of socio-ecological reproduction, particularly by centering 
the connection between declining health and agro-chemical intensive farming practices. This, 
in turn, makes it possible to recognise common conditions of exploitations across social 
groups. This recognition, however, has not yet translated into cross class alliances in practice. 
Further, the individuated and economistic structuring of work entrenched through chemical-
intensive and mechanised farming has made it extremely difficult to foster collective 
practices even among the Sikh Jat landowning farmers. 
 
The ecological holism encapsulated by KVM's discourse of a ‘civilisational crisis' translates 
into prefigurative political agenda of practical transformation across the realm of production 
and social reproduction. It seeks to counter the techno-politics of compartmentalization that 
set the terms for and produced a fractured landscape of resistance represented most 
103	
	
prominently by factions of BKU in Punjab. The political idiom of prefiguration that rejects 
class and statist politics signals a radical rupture but has had limited resonance so far in terms 
of concrete outcomes such as the large-scale shift toward natural farming practices and 
healthy food consumption. However, the holistic mobilisation discourse has provided a 
vocabulary for comprehensively understanding and articulating the current crisis and shifted 
the public discourse beyond a focus on productivity and production.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
TECHNO-POLITICS AS PRACTICES:  
REVISITING THE ‘GREEN REVOLUTION’ IN PUNJAB THROUGH THE LENS 
OF WORK 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 KVM’s critique of the Green Revolution foregrounds the rupture and repair of socio-
ecological relations on the political agenda by calling for a transformation of food production 
and consumption practices. Prefiguration through such practices is both a politics of 
recognition of the material impossibility of continuing with current forms of chemical-
intensive farming, and a constructive politics to chart an alternative pathway through 
sustainable agroecological farming. As I argue in chapter one, the mobilisation strategies of 
KVM mirror the exclusions of the techno-politics of the Green Revolution. The limitations in 
translating the counter-episteme they offer into practical possibilities reveal the structuring 
force of historical processes. Prefiguration, however, focuses attention on the relationship 
between politics and everyday life. In this chapter, I draw on oral histories that describe the 
early Green Revolution period, and the following decades of transformation in villages of 
Faridkot and Bathinda district to trace everyday transformations. These oral histories 
articulate the experiences and evaluations of changes in cultivation practices with the 
adoption of HYV seeds and agrochemicals. In these experiential narratives, the 
transformation of social relations, the material landscape, and production and consumption 
practices are interwoven. Together, these constructions of changing life-worlds articulated by 
men and women reveal invisibly unfolding gradual alterations of everyday practices from 
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diverse standpoints. These less spectral alterations are critical for comprehending the present 
experiences of crisis and emergent forms of political agency.  
 
Borrowing the term ‘life-worlds’ from Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000),38 I repurpose it here to 
emphasise the embeddedness of production and therefore labour practices in social 
reproduction. I argue that narratives of changing life-worlds and collective social memory 
stress the process of rupture between production and social reproduction through deepening 
commodification. As Nancy Fraser suggests, social reproduction encompasses not just 
processes of care and affective labour, and reproduction of labour power, but ‘the human 
capacities available to create and maintain social bonds, which includes the work of 
socializing the young, building communities, of reproducing the shared meanings, affective 
dispositions and horizons of value that underpin social cooperation' (Fraser, 2014: 542). The 
question of ‘horizons of value that underpin social cooperation' has become significant given 
the focus of prefigurative politics on place-based ecological sustainability and autonomy, 
premised on a critique of erosion of community through statist interventions.  
 
The lenses of labour practices, work and ‘life-worlds' allow us to historicize the conditions 
under which the current prefigurative politics for ecologically sustainable farming have 
emerged as well as the exclusions it engenders. The experiences and memories of those who 
laboured on the land without ‘ownership’, invisible on the landscape of post- Green 
Revolution resistance, reveal most poignantly how labouring in the fields was embedded in 
social reproduction, and the disruption of this connection. Landless workers and cultivators 
are excluded from the grassroots politics of sustainability as structural conditions inhibit their 
participation, even as the practices they elaborate in their accounts of the early Green 
																																								 																				
38 Chakrabarty (2008) uses the term ‘life-worlds' to describe the non-secular activity that is 
rendered as labour or work under capitalism, and is represented as such in historiography.  
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Revolution period hold the kernels for reviving just ecologically sustainable farming. 
Landowning farmers, on the other hand, were both the beneficiaries of Green Revolution 
interventions, and are now the constituency that is targeted for enacting a shift toward 
sustainability. Landowning farmers’ experience of exploitation structured through the 
commodification of farm inputs, displacement of knowledge production off the farm, and 
pricing of agricultural commodities, borrowing from Sidney Mintz (1986) is more ‘mystical’, 
that is a result of unseen forces. Centering the transformation of labour practices analytically 
thus allows for qualitatively specific form of exploitation experienced through such a process.  
 
Without using procrustean class categories, thus, I examine experiences and perceptions of 
interactions with the material and social environment, to understand the forms in which 
exploitation is experienced, and how political subjectivities are formed (Scott 1991).39 
Commonalities in qualitative experiences of exploitation emerge across generally predefined 
social classes at the present conjuncture. For instance, women from landless and landowning 
households evicted from the fields with the shift away from labour-intensive cotton 
cultivation experience loss of autonomy, and recall their own centrality to the household 
economy in the era of relatively decommodified social reproduction. Their accounts also 
share affinities with the elderly generation of farmers, who are aware of an alternative way of 
farming embedded in social reproduction, based on their experiences of the pre/early Green 
revolution years. These crosscutting affinities across conventional class categories are a 
reminder of the singular structural processes within which seemingly divergent but related 
life-worlds unfold. They also reflect the mutually constitutive and dynamic character of 
labour practices, knowledge, and social relations within ecosystems (Carney 1992). 
																																								 																				
39   As Joan Scott argues rendering of ‘experience as evidence’ with the objective of 
highlighting marginalised voices can end up reifying class identities, where in the last 
instance relations of production become deterministic for political struggle (1991: 777). 
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Critical analyses of the Green Revolution pointing at increasing class and regional 
inequalities and environmental degradation surfaced in the early years of the Green 
Revolution in India, tempering the euphoric accounts of dramatic increases in food grain 
production (Frankel 1971; Griffin 1974; Shiva 1989). The Marxian analytic of rural class 
differentiation over-determined the economic and political analyses of the Green Revolution. 
Consequently, political agency, or the lack thereof, was inferred through objectively defined 
class positions neglecting subjective experiences of exploitation (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987; 
Byres 1981; Dhanagare 1987). Within the agrarian studies Marxist political economy 
framework, the attention to productive forces was rare (cf. Amin 1982; Pandian 1987).40 
 
Moving beyond methodological nationalism, recent scholarship on the ‘Green revolution’ has 
emphasised the significance of knowledge politics, revealing the assumptions and political 
processes underlying technocratic post-colonial development practices, and situating them in 
the global political economy historically (Cullather 2010; Baranski 2015; cf. Perkins 1997; 
Kloppenburg 2004).  These studies provide useful insights on the elision of democratic 
processes and the foreclosure of politics of social equity through the unfolding of techno-
politics. These critiques, however, reinforce the assumptions of such techno-politics in their 
analytical frameworks. Privileging of knowledge politics in the institutional domain neglects 
the transformation of quotidian life-worlds and the multiple power hierarchies that shape 
them. As Raj Patel (2013:26) argues, the most fundamental foreclosure has been a lack of 
analysis of social reproduction, making invisible the loci of resistance that did not have 
																																								 																				
40 Terry Byres (1981), for instance, does discuss the labour process in terms of how 
biochemical innovations pave the way for mechanisation and the political implications of 
regional differences in wage labour to family labour ratios. However, this analysis of the 
elements of the labour process is nested within the overarching framework that privileges the 
assumption of class polarisation.    
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effective outcomes. Accounts of the Green revolution that claimed it was a success, focussed 
on productivity, adoption of the technological package and its consequences, but these 
themes also permeated critical analyses, leaving out the localised politics of resource use and 
access and the attendant transformation of socio-ecological relations.  
 
Labour practices, as an analytical point of departure, is a political inversion in the context of a 
historical trajectory that reproduces the division between knowledge production and 
embodied labour through their hierarchical relationship. As Schneider and McMichael (2010) 
suggest the separation of the natural and social worlds in social theory has translated into an 
exclusive focus on social relations of production and reproduction. They call for a 
methodological focus on practices of labour as a corrective. Paying attention to the nitty-
gritty of production practices not only sheds light on human-nature relations but also on the 
specific historical trajectories in which exploitation is situated and experienced.  As Akhil 
Gupta (1998) argues “shifting the focus from knowledge to practices is also to shift from 
cognitive conceptions of culture toward those which emphasise the embodied and enacted 
realities of the postcolonial condition.” Moving beyond the conceptual binary of 
indigenous/scientific knowledge in agriculture, Gupta suggests that farmers in the North 
Western Green Revolution belt employ hybrid discourses to explain their decisions and 
practices. The messiness of these practices reflects cultural and strategic choices that 
challenge the inadequacy of theoretical framings. More significantly, though they reveal the 
structural constraints as well as elements of marginalised moral economies. In Gupta’s 
account, the processes through which these hybrid practices come into being, and their 
political significance, that is, their relationship with populist agrarian politics of the national 
ruling regime and farmers’ mobilisations in the 1980s, remains unspecified. In other words, 
these hybrid practices are not situated within a historical trajectory but staged as an 
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‘anthropological spectral present’ as Veena Das puts it (1989:324). Social relations are, 
therefore, analytically severed from the process of political change.  
 
Building on scholarship that focuses on agrarian practices, I discuss labour practices situated 
within narratives of change that outline and evaluate a remembered past in relation to the 
present crisis.41 These experiential narratives articulated from the situated standpoint of caste, 
class and gender, and filtered through the prism of the present agrarian crisis, suggest 
nonlinear and ambiguous trajectories of mobility, and changing notions of well-being and 
status. They also provide access to practices and ways of being that are now invisible on the 
material landscape. Stories of changes in cultivation practices through the unfolding of 
‘Green Revolution' are interwoven with changes in food and consumption practices, in the 
ecology, rising expenditure on education and health and ritualistic obligations, and 
restructuring of the gendered division of labour, familial and village social relations. These 
subjective histories challenge the existing compartmentalized bureaucratic, economic, 
agronomic, and social science accounts of the period in significant ways, and provide insights 
into the constitution of political agency.42  The relationship of labour practices with organised 
collective politics is concretizing at the present conjuncture with pre-figurative sustainability 
politics that explicitly and self-consciously employs ‘practices’ as the means for mobilisation, 
shifting from a nationalist to a regionalist framework.  
 
																																								 																				
41 As Walter Benjamin (On the Concept of History, 1940) writes, “to articulate what is past 
does not mean to recognise “how it really was.” It means to take control of a memory, as it 
flashes in a moment of danger.” 
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/benjamin/1940/history.htm 
42 Murray Leaf’s Song of Hope (1984) is one of the few anthropological accounts of a 
Punjabi village in the early decades of the Green Revolution, which provides a thick 
description of everyday transformations. His thick description nevertheless analytically 
separates the social, cultural, economic system and the village ecology.  
110	
	
The radical transformation in cultivation practices within living memory for many is 
interwoven with changes in the social and material landscape. These memories, while based 
on individual experiences, particularly for elderly men and women, reflect a shared regional 
discourse (cf. Gold and Gujar 2002, Skaria 1998). Beyond expressing nostalgic loss for the 
quality of food, healthier environment and a sense of community, differences within this 
shared discourse emerge along caste and gendered lines. For those more deeply engaged in 
the work of social reproduction because of gendered norms, class position or generation, the 
understanding of change is ‘fundamentally ecological in its sensitivity to the web-like 
interconnectedness of concurrent transformations' (Gold, 1998:168), offering a counter-
episteme to techno-political frameworks. Yet, structural constraints such as the inability to 
access land or gendered and caste norms prevent them from mounting an effective collective 
agrarian politics. In contradistinction, landowning farmers entrenched in the commodified 
agrarian practices and developmental discourse of the Green Revolution, invoke 
correspondence between moral and environmental degradation– in terms of the inevitable 
loss of cultural values.  
 
With the deepening agrarian crisis since the 1990s, farmers are recognising the impossibility 
of further profitable intensification and are therefore adopting individual strategies to combat 
the crisis (cf. Blaikie 1985). Seeking to invest in occupational diversification for the younger 
generation, restoring the long-term sustainability of the land is costly and no longer a priority. 
The few farmers who have shifted to organic and natural farming have so far been focused on 
de-commodifying their individual production practices, unable to revive a collective work 
ethic and practices of material commoning that would mitigate structural constraints faced by 
the majority (cf. Van der Ploeg 2010).  The experiential narratives and memories of the 
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transition explain these dissident trajectories and the structuring conditions that produce them 
in a relational framework.  
 
In what follows, I begin by outlining how the technological treadmill was instituted, resisted 
and normalised in Malwa, the cotton-belt of Punjab, by men and women located differentially 
in the social hierarchy. I then discuss the subsequent de-valorisation of agrarian work. 
Farmers experience loss of control over cultivation practices through simplification of the 
labour process, a process conjoined with the internalization of new forms of work ethic and 
formation of new aspirations. The specific form in which the labour process was altered 
highlights not only the dialectical relationship of human-nature interactions, particularly in 
the history of cotton production in Malwa, but also between production and the total system 
of reproduction (Watts 1983). And finally, I discuss practices that are no longer visible on the 
material and socio-political landscape transformed through the Green revolution decades. 
Constituted as the village material and social commons, these practices are present in the 
shared collective memory and particularly visible from the standpoint of those marginalised 
in the sphere of agrarian production, that is women and landless households. The narratives 
of marginalised subjects foreground the deepening commodification of social reproduction 
practices and the changing forms of gendered caste hierarchies that structured the lost moral 
ecologies. Hence, they are critical resources for challenging nativist constructions of ‘culture' 
and ‘community'. 
 
II. Normalisation of the technological treadmill in Malwa 
 
Cotton cultivation is critical to the historical trajectory of agrochemical intensification in the 
Malwa region in South-Western Punjab. Unlike other regions in Punjab (Doaba and Majha) 
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where wheat-rice mono-cropping rotation is pervasive, farmers grow cotton in this semi-arid 
region because of sandy soils and brackish water. Despite larger average operational 
landholdings, Malwa is perceived as ‘backward’ within Punjab because of less occupational 
diversification and greater dependence on agricultural incomes among rural households.43 
Emigration from other regions of Punjab beginning with British army recruitment, and 
continuing into the postcolonial period generated remittances that supplemented agrarian 
incomes. In the last three decades of growing agrarian distress, the trend toward emigration 
has gathered momentum in Malwa as well. The trajectory of cotton cultivation in the 
twentieth century in this crisis-ridden region illustrates the cascading effects of 
commodification and techno-fixes that have resulted in farming households losing control 
over production and social reproduction. 
 
Locally, most people today suggest that problems with cotton cultivation surfaced in the mid-
1980s. The crop was damaged year after year from boll weevil pest attacks, locally known as 
the ‘American bollworm'. Despite the heavy use of pesticides these pests were uncontrollable 
and destroyed the crop into the late 1990s. With the introduction of genetically modified Bt 
cotton in 2004, yields improved significantly for a few years. Bt cotton is now grown on 
more than 95% of the land under cotton cultivation in Punjab. As Glenn Stone (2011) has 
also argued, the adoption of Bt seeds by a large number of farmers was not necessarily a sign 
of ‘success but was symptomatic of their desperation resulting from the precdeding crisis of 
cotton crop failures. Farmers, however, began to report a decline in yields again since 2007. 
While Bt cotton variety was treated to resist the American bollworm, other pests became 
																																								 																				
43 Malcolm Darling while remarking of the developmental successes of British rule cites the 
south-west as an exception. "The peasant is decidedly much better off than he was seventy 
years ago when the province came under British rule. Except in the south-west, where great 
poverty still prevails, his standard of living has risen materially, and he is better fed and better 
clothed, and to some extent better housed than he was before." (1977: 249)  
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active. Further, the price of cotton had been extremely volatile in the second half of the 
2000s. 
 
In September-October 2015 large-scale destruction of the Bt cotton crop by ‘white fly', a 
sucking pest, reminded many of the indestructible bollworms in the 1990s.44 Widespread 
protests by farmers groups blocking roads and trains, demanding compensation forced the 
government into action. In the following season in 2016, the government has been promoting 
sowing of indigenous cotton seeds through its extension centres (Pal 2016). Beyond offering 
compensation the provincial government is encouraging farmers to revive indigenous 
varieties of cotton on a large scale by making the seeds available through the extension 
system. While the government is reluctantly beginning to acknowledge the problem, large 
numbers of farmers in the region are abandoning cotton to shift to the water-guzzling wheat-
paddy rotation. 45 State agencies procure paddy, unlike cotton, at a minimum support price 
and it, therefore, provides a secure income. Paddy cultivation is also less labour-intensive. 
 
Elderly men and women contrast the flooded paddy fields with their memories of semi-arid, 
desert-like landscape populated with slow growing tree species such as jand (Prosopis 
cineraria) and kikar (Acacia), and the rain-fed mixed cropping system that included 
indigenous varieties of wheat, cotton, barley, gram and pulses, prior to the Green Revolution. 
Some, particularly in Bathinda, recall the sandy hillocks that they levelled for extending 
cultivable land as hybrid wheat and cotton monocultures replaced the mixed cropping system. 
																																								 																				
44 Nearly two-thirds of the sown crop across the state was destroyed in October 2015 (Varma 
and Bhattacharya 2015; Gera 2015).  
45 In both Faridkot and Bathinda districts, farmers have been shifting from cotton to paddy 
cultivation in the last three decades. In Faridkot, this shift is more widespread unlike 
Bathinda, which is further South with saline groundwater and desert soils. According to a 
regional extension official, 10% of the land remains under wheat-cotton rotation in Faridkot, 
and 40% in Bathinda district. 
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Irrigation, the building of canals and then tube wells, has radically transformed the physical 
landscape within seven - eight decades. The desert-like landscape they describe is as 
unfathomable today, as it would have been for them to imagine flooded rice fields in this 
region a few decades ago. Not part of the local diet or landscape, paddy becomes an 
important crop in Punjab through the green revolution period. In villages in this study, 
cultivation of rice is being taken up by a significant number of farmers only in the last two-
three decades, as the crisis with cotton deepened.   
 
Transformation of cotton cultivation is germane to narratives of the transformation of life-
worlds in the Malwa region, through the colonial and post-colonial period. The Colonial state 
introduced American varieties of cotton as early as the 1830s-1840s, prior to the annexation 
of Punjab in 1849.46 In Punjab, new seed varieties and associated cultivation practices were 
introduced in the beginning of the twentieth century. The British administrator, Malcolm 
Darling (1977:152) writes in his treatise on Punjab province over 80,000 maunds (1 Maund 
=37.31 kgs) of wheat and cottonseed were sold in 1929-30. These ‘pure seed’ varieties in his 
words could be obtained from approved agents of the Agricultural Department. Wheat 
followed by cotton was the most important crop in the province.  
 
Cultivators have experienced volatility and uncertainty associated with wheat-cotton 
monocultures since the beginning of the twentieth century. The following description by 
Malcolm Darling of the introduction of American cottonseed variety 4f in Punjab and what 
followed is in many ways uncannily similar to narratives articulated by cotton producers in 
Malwa describing the upheaval in the last few decades. I quote from this passage extensively 
																																								 																				
46 Sven Beckert details how these early efforts to establish experimental cotton farms by US-
born cotton planters failed as monocultural cultivation practices were incompatible with 
rainfall patterns and too capital-intensive for Indian peasants, who resisted in covert and overt 
ways (2014:125-131).   
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to show that, while extolling the virtues of scientific farming and improved seed varieties, 
Darling’s ruminations nevertheless reflect an awareness of ecological constraints and the 
limitations of replicability, a fundamental tenet of technocratic interventions.  
 
"A variety of American origin technically called 4F and popularly 
known as Amreekan has been discovered which has a longer staple 
which can be used in Lancashire. From a single plant in 1908, it is 
grown on 11,31, 800 acres in 1925 because it gets a higher 
price…..but there is a fly in the honey that goes with all things of 
Western make. Can 4f be permanently acclimatized? In 1919 farmers 
began to complain of a mysterious disease in their cotton. In 
September and October plants dropped many of their flowers, bolls 
did not open properly, much of the lint was rubbish, and seeds 
developed less than they should. The result was a crop short by at 
least 70,000 bales of what was expected. Indian cotton, too, fared 
badly, but less so than American. The following years there was not 
much to choose between the two, but in 1921 the September rains 
failed, and 4f, being a thirsty plant, suffered severely. In the next 
four years, however, it did as well as ever: outturn and fibre were 
excellent, and it fetched so good a price that on a three-year average 
it produced Rs 40 an acre and more than its rival. Then again it came 
under a cloud, for the crop of 1926 proved a partial failure and that 
of 1928 gave the ‘worst spinning results yet recorded yet.' Yet, 
despite all its ups and downs, it is still the most popular of the 
improved varieties, and of the 30,000 maunds of cotton seed 
distributed in 1930-31, it accounted for over 15,000. It is certainly 
less hardy and drought-resistant than Indian cotton but given 
reasonably good land, good cultivation, and sufficient water, it is as 
superior in yield as it is in value." (1977: pp 152) 
 
Drawing on a social analogy as a mode of explanation, Darling nevertheless at the end 
identifies the regional environment as the primary source of difficulty, perhaps because his 
intent is to highlight the quick popularity of the seeds among farmers.  That seed varieties 
have to be bred for higher ‘yields' and traits that are commercially valuable, and ecological 
conditions should be ‘controlled' and reshaped to support these varieties. 
 
“The history of the 4f illustrates the difficulties that have to be 
overcome before any improvement can be acclimatized in a 
country like India…just like the Englishman would find it difficult 
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to settle in India without any deterioration of fibre, so in the 
vegetable kingdom it may be that improved variety of seed must 
eventually deteriorate for want of some essential property require 
on account of climate, the soil and general conditions of the 
country. One seed demands more water than is available, another 
matures too early, a third proves too attractive to the omnivorous 
insect, and what does well in the north may wither in the hotter 
south…..The Punjab climate, with its violent alterations of heat 
and cold, and rain and drought, is so exacting that it is not easy to 
develop seeds that are proof against it in every respect.” 
(1977:152-153) 
 
Techno-politics that is premised on the separation of social and ecological conditions, in order 
define discrete problems and engineer solutions, is emergent in the late colonial period, 
partially to deal with the discontent generated by dispossession through more explicitly violent 
mechanisms. In the developmental postcolonial period, such techno-politics becomes the 
dominant form for deepening commodification.  
 
The centrality of agrochemicals in Green revolution farming exacerbated the volatility and 
uncertainties that Darling attributes to see varieties developed without consideration of local 
agroecological conditions. Agrochemicals are simultaneously perceived to be the cause of the 
insurmountable challenges posed by ‘nature' and the only crutch that is accessible to farmers 
in their efforts to combat crop damage in the short-run. Some farmers had anticipated such a 
scenario as is evident from oral histories recalling the early decades of the Green revolution. 
Elderly farmers remember fertilizers (particularly urea) and irrigation, not the hybrid varieties 
as the key protagonist of the Green Revolution that brought about dramatic increases in 
yields. Recalling the early years of the Green Revolution, Gurlabh Singh, an 85-year-old 
farmer in Bathinda district with 4 acres says his family was the first in their village to start 
using fertilizer in 1962.  
“The gram sewak (government extension agent) came to our house 
and gave a bag of urea to my grandfather. My grandfather 
instructed us not to use it. After 10-12 days, the gram sewak 
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returned and he threw the urea in two plots in our fields himself. 
The barley in the plots turned a lush dark green, and there was a 
significant increase in the yield. It impressed my grandfather and 
we started using urea. The gram sewaks advertised aggressively in 
the villages in those initial years. They brought bags of urea on 
mule carts and made an announcement in the village through the 
microphone in the gurudwara. I remember my uncle said at the 
time that a very deep hole has been dug and there is no getting out 
or going back now. Now several decades later, the government is 
appealing to farmers to not use excessive amounts of fertilisers and 
pesticides….the hybrid cotton came to our village before the 
Mexican wheat. With hybrid cotton, we were still intercropping 
vegetables and the indigenous variety of cotton for the home, but 
once the hybrid wheat variety was introduced, mixed cropping of 
wheat with gram and mustard stopped. It was not possible 
anymore. The gram crop did not respond well to the fertilizer, and 
a large amount of water required for the hybrid wheat did not suit 
the gram crop. The traders asked us not to bring mixed grains, only 
cleaned and separated wheat. 
 
The reluctance of farmers to adopt the HYV package in the 1960s when it was first introduced 
has been noted even in regions of Punjab where it was documented as a success. Bureaucratic 
accounts and the innovation diffusion literature attributed this reluctance to illiteracy and an 
irrational attachment to old ways of life (cf. Sivaraman 1991). More nuanced analyses, 
however, show that farmers selectively adopted elements of the package based on utility and 
their existing material conditions. As Barbara Harriss (1974) shows in her analysis of villages 
in Punjab’s Ludhiana district, that the planners and experts’’ logic of maximizing food grain 
yields did not resonate with farmers who based their decisions on utility and at times profit 
maximization. Farmers used fertiliser in much smaller quantities than the recommended 
dosage and decided on proportions based on their prices. Nitrogenous fertilisers, available 
through government cooperatives at a subsidized rate, were used more than phosphate 
supplied by private traders and therefore more expensive, a trend that continues today. 
According to a recent government report, imbalanced fertiliser use in terms of NPK in Punjab 
is extreme, with a consumption ratio of 31.4:8:1 against a desirable one of 4:2:1 during 2014-
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15.47 The Indian government promotes such an imbalanced use as it controls the price of urea 
(nitrogenous fertilizer), whereas, the deregulated DAP (diammonium phosphate) and potash 
are exponentially more expensive.48  
 
The increase in yields of wheat coupled with the unresponsiveness of other native crops such 
as millets, gram and barley to fertilisers and excess water, as well as the pressure from traders 
to bring in clean wheat initiated the shift toward monocultural cultivation. With the 
monocultural wheat-cotton rotation in place by the late 1970s, the incidence of damaging pest 
attacks increased. Agrochemicals, pesticides and insecticides, began to be used a decade after 
fertilizer use had become widespread but were mostly sprayed on cotton initially.  As 
Gurlabh Singh points out, 
 
“First-generation pesticides like Endrin were first used only on 
hybrid cotton.49 People were scared to use them for food crops. We 
thought of them as poison and most farmers refused to touch them. 
There was a hired specialist who came to the village for spraying 
pesticides. As a precautionary measure, this specialist would drink 
lemon water, bathe in mustard oil so that any chemical that touched 
the skin would slip off. Hired specialists continued to do the 
spraying for a long time. These pesticides were highly toxic. We 
did not go to the farm for 10-15 days after they were sprayed. 
Endrin had a powerful stench and induced nausea even after 10 
days had passed since spraying. Women were not able to tolerate 
it, and many women from zamindar households stopped going to 
the fields for cotton-picking like they used to.” 
 
																																								 																				
47 Twenty-ninth report. Impact of chemical fertilizers and pesticides on agriculture and allied 
sectors in the country. Standing committee on agriculture (2015-2016) sixteenth Lok sabha. 
Ministry of agriculture and farmers welfare (Department of agricultural research and 
education).   
48 The declining response of crops to fertilizer use has been attributed to this imbalance as the amount 
of food grain produced per kg of fertilizer applied has declined from around 13kg in the 1970s to less 
than 4kg by 2010, according to fertilizer ministry data (Bera 2017).  
49 Endrin is a part of the Dirty Dozen list and was banned under the Stockholm Convention in 
2000 (Johansen 2003).  
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Another farmer recalls how birds perched on trees would drop dead when Endrin was sprayed 
in the fields. Narratives of elderly farmers like Gurlabh Singh reflect a conflicted relationship 
with fertilizers, pesticides, and machinery. The resistance they highlight was not ‘irrational’ 
but premised on manifest transformations of their valued ways of life. For instance, 
explanations of initial resistance to fertilizer use cited the interruption of the mixed cropping 
system that was critical for fulfilling the household's consumption needs. Gram, millets and 
lentils intercropped with wheat did not thrive with the application of fertilizers. Time and 
again elderly people proudly remarked that they bought nothing but salt and tea from the 
market in those early decades. Consumption needs of the household shaped production 
practices in the fields. Writing in 1974, Barbara Harriss also points out farmers rejected HY 
varieties of wheat such as Mexican red wheat that did not match the local palate. After the 
government established a procurement system, the minimum support prices for HYV wheat 
in the early 1970s varied between Rs 76-81 per quintal, and the unofficial wheat price varied 
between Rs 70-80 per quintal. But the indigenous wheat variety was being sold at a higher 
price of Rs 110 per quintal, indicating the continued high demand. Over time though assured 
procurement by the government proved to be the most significant driver for adoption of HY 
varieties. In the present day, when indigenous wheat varieties have disappeared from the 
fields in Punjab, well-off farming households are buying these indigenous varieties from 
neighbouring states like Rajasthan, while they sell their own wheat in the market. Boards 
advertising the arrival of indigenous varieties of wheat from Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh 
are displayed everywhere in market towns like Bathinda.  
 
While the government extension agencies had to work aggressively to overcome the 
resistance to ensure widespread adoption of HYV seeds and fertilizer, this was not the case 
with pesticides a decade later. Farmers perceived pesticides and insecticides as dangerous, 
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but disruption of regional ecology with monocultural cultivation had made them 
indispensable. Unlike, fertilizers and seeds, they were not available through the government 
extensions system at subsidized rates, indicating the beginnings of cultivators’ entrapment in 
the technological treadmill. As one farmer pointed out, ‘as crop damage due to pest attacks 
became widespread and persistent, the government extension agents disappeared from the 
villages.’ The material conditions thus eliminated the need for active governmental 
mechanisms for persuasion. Resistance gave way to internalisation and normalisation of 
agrochemicals reshaping socio-ecological relations. 
 
Farm workers took over the dangerous work of spraying pesticides performed by hired 
government specialists with protective gear initially. The fear of the chemicals was so 
pervasive that many farmers did not let their Siri, (semi-permanent worker attached to a 
landowning household), do the spraying either.50 Surjeet Singh, a farmer with 4 acres who 
employed a Siri on a crop-share basis, says that most siris refused to do the spraying because 
they had some leverage. Daily wage labour, on the other hand, had no choice because they 
had to earn money to meet their consumption needs. Others suggest that it was possible for 
daily wage workers to refuse as they could go and work on someone else's fields, whereas the 
Siri obligated through a patrimonial relationship with landowning households had a secure 
livelihood but little autonomy. The fear was the result of several instances of intoxication and 
dizziness, and even death due to accidental contact with pesticides. When men returned from 
the fields after spraying, women in the household would stay awake and periodically check 
																																								 																				
50 ‘Siri' is a term used to refer to farm workers who were attached to one farming household 
on a crop-sharing basis. In the late 1970s and 1980s, with rising productivity, there was a 
shift from payment through a fixed share in the crop to an annual wage contract. Later, as 
tractors and combines began to be used, and the need for hard physical labour eliminated, the 
Siri system disappeared. Barring very large absentee landowners, now most small and 
medium scale farmers hire only daily wage labour for certain operations during the cropping 
cycle.   
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on them to see if they were breathing. The fear gradually disappeared, partly because the 
subsequent generation of pesticides were not as toxic, and did not have immediately visible 
effects such as dizziness or nausea. Aerially sprayed by the government in the fields in the 
1980s, DDT was banned in 1998 by the Indian government. 
 
The harmful effects of chemicals through long-term exposure are visible on the bodies of 
farm workers. The pervasive use of agrochemicals has eliminated the option of refusal to 
spray pesticides, which many elderly farm workers recall exercising in the early years. Mansa 
Singh, an elderly former Siri, points at his swollen hands due to decades of throwing urea in 
farmers’ fields. He says,  
from 1.5 bags (1 bag contains about 40 kgs) of urea per acre, we 
have now moved to 4 bags of urea per acre. We never used gloves, 
not then, not now. But in the early years, people were more 
cautious. We used home remedies to combat harmful effects, 
constantly washed our hands. I remember not sleeping for hours 
after applying pesticides. Now, these chemicals are in our water, in 
our food. You will find empty chemical containers in every 
household that are being used for storing water and other things. 
Gradually that fear disappeared. Now the situation has reversed - 
hired workers to prefer to use weedicides, or throw fertilizer, but 
they are not happy if they are asked to carry cow dung.”  
 
After decades of excessive use of agrochemicals, there is widespread recognition of 
deterioration in the quality of soil, and contamination of food and groundwater. Increasing 
incidence of diseases particularly cancer and reproductive disorders is a frequent topic of 
discussion during conversations in the village, and people attribute these to agrochemicals 
and changes in cultivation and food practices.51 However, it does not inspire the same fear as 
																																								 																				
51 This correlation is now being recognized by the government as well. See Twenty ninth 
report. The impact of chemical fertilizers and pesticides on agriculture and allied sectors in 
the country. Standing committee on agriculture (2015-2016) sixteenth lok sabha. Ministry of 
agriculture and farmers welfare (Department of agricultural research and education).   
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the early generation of pesticides, which caused dizziness, and even deaths that led many 
workers to resist their usage or employ precautionary measures. Today people acknowledge 
the harmful effects of agrochemicals but conceive of it as an occupational hazard that is 
unavoidable. The perception of harm has been diluted, as effects of agrochemicals are not 
being experienced in an immediate way, although this is changing with growing incidence of 
cancer and its widespread coverage in the media. The health implications of agrochemicals 
are at the forefront of KVM's mobilisation aimed at altering perceptions of risk, lack of 
control and apathy. KVM activists constantly seek to redeploy the term ‘poison’ as opposed 
to ‘medicine’ to refer to pesticides and insecticides in colloquial usage.  
 
Farmers often compare weather patterns and agrochemicals while discussing variability and 
control in cultivation practices. The resilience of previous mixed cropping system was 
because of its ability to accommodate variability of weather conditions, and because 
household consumption patterns through the year were in sync with production. When crop 
damage due to unseasonal rains or drought did occur, farming households accepted it as fate 
and experienced it as a collective loss (Vasavi 1998). With agrochemicals, farmers suggest 
there is a semblance of exercising control over adverse conditions, but the control lies with 
others. They are dependent on being able to access expert knowledge that is commodified 
knowledge, which is mostly accessible through pesticide dealers and shopkeepers, and 
availability of cash or access to credit. Risks of cultivation are now borne individually and 
therefore crop damage is also experienced as individual failure and shame in this context.  
 
While male cultivators, both landowning farmers and farm workers, foreground the 
transformation of production practices in their memories, elderly women, particularly from 
landowning households, recall more vividly what was eliminated through these 
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transformations. Situating agrochemicals in the longer trajectory of agricultural intensification, 
Malkeet Kaur, an elderly woman in her 80s married into a wealthy landowning household 
when she was 12 years old, says, 
             When I was a child this area was not irrigated and there were no 
chemicals. The land was dotted with sand dunes and most people 
inter-cropped rain-fed mustard, grams, taramira (a fodder crop), 
sugarcane, cotton and wheat. There was only one crop in a year 
and the land was left fallow in a rotation. When the rains came the 
fields would turn bright and green. We (women) went to the fields 
and chewed on sugarcane while helping with picking cotton or 
weeding…gradually things began to change. The sand dunes were 
levelled, to make way for the sowing of paddy. Farmers started 
using pesticides and insecticides, to control bollworm attacks on 
cotton. When the bollworm attacked, no one knew what to do, so 
they did as they were told by extension workers and agrochemicals 
shopkeepers.  The cycle began, the insects kept increasing and the 
chemicals kept increasing as well.  When the bollworm attacks 
started destroying the cotton crop every year, farmers began to 
shift to rice. When insecticides began to be used, there was just 
monocrotophos,52 and we used that for everything, regardless of 
the crop or the insects. But it stopped working after a while and 
had no effect on the pests. For a year or two in the early 1980s 
government helicopters sprayed DDT in our fields. They would 
come to each house in the village to record which farmers wanted 
their fields sprayed and then charge a small fee. A lot of trees were 
cut down during those years as well so that the helicopters and then 
tractors could move around easily. After the DDT spraying 
stopped, pest attacks increased and were even more persistent. 
Then labour began to be hired to spray in the fields with small 
tanks on their backs.” 
 
Capturing the transnational processes at play, in the end, she laughs and remarks, “the 
American bollworm occupied our fields, and my grandchildren migrated to America.” In 
Malkeet Kaur’s narrative, conjoins socio-ecological transformations, with changes in 
production and social reproduction practices. Associated with labour-intensive cultivation in 
the collective memory, cotton evokes qualitatively contrasting yet connected chronologies.  
Middle-aged male farmers shifting to paddy associate cotton with volatile prices and rising 
																																								 																				
52 Monocrotophos is an insecticide meant primarily for the cotton crop, marked as red, which 
is the highest toxicity level, but is now widely used on food crops as well.  
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costs of cultivation. Farmers use pesticides most intensively on cotton, and persistent crop 
failures have been recurrent since the shift from improved seed varieties to American hybrids 
and most recently the shift to Bt cotton.  
 
In contrast, for women from landholding households, as well as landless labouring men and 
women, who have seen the early years of the Green Revolution decades, the salient memory 
is that of cultivating indigenous cotton that was more labour-intensive. During harvest, 
indigenous cotton plant yielded flowers every week, and therefore men, women and children 
were in the fields picking cotton. Sharing work was also a common practice during the 
picking season, as people worked on each other’s fields. Malkeet Kaur and other women of 
her generation also talk about intercropping indigenous cotton with vegetables for home 
consumption, and how these varieties provided sufficient fodder for animals. They recall 
spinning and weaving cloth with the short-staple indigenous cotton in groups to meet the 
everyday needs of the household. Therefore, women associate indigenous cotton not with 
monetary losses and ecological degradation, but with a loss of a sense of community, free 
movement between home and the fields, and a relatively decommodified life. Excluded from 
the realm of paid labour in the commodified economy, their narratives reflect what E.P. 
Thompson called the ‘legend of better days’.53 In these legends or memories, their life-worlds 
were constituted by useful work, the product of which they partially controlled and could 
consume directly. Women from landowning families were at the receiving end of double 
displacement as their work was confined to the limits of the home with commoditised inputs 
and machinery reshaping the labour process and the farming system as a whole. By virtue of 
being marginalised in the new economy, their articulated memories render the connectedness 
																																								 																				
53 In Making of the English Working Class, E.P. Thompson characterises stories about 
‘personal and …close relations” between “small masters and their men”, better quality of life 
and reflected “deep attachment to the values of independence” as ‘legend of the better days’ 
(1964: 302-305). 
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of socio-ecological reproduction visible. These memories help us comprehend more clearly 
the effects of techno-politics underpinning Green Revolution practices that work by 
‘misapprehending the mixed ways in which things happen’ (Mitchell, 2002: 44). The 
rationalizing and universalizing logic of techno-politics is confronted with the messiness of 
social practices, an encounter that is not captured adequately in compartmentalized social 
science accounts. Critical accounts that document the social and ecological impact of the 
Green Revolution are complicit in reinforcing the exclusions of such techno-politics by not 
drawing attention to what has been marginalised and eliminated. They exclude precisely what 
the memories of men and women that I highlight in this chapter reveal, that is, the 
embeddedness of production in socio-ecological reproduction and the enactment of the 
ongoing process of disembedding. In this way, they become emblematic of techno-power, 
which as Timothy Mitchell argues proceeds through ‘misapprehension, which produces the 
effect of separate realms of reason and the real world, ideas and their objects, the human and 
the non-human’ (2002:44).  
 
III. Devaluation of Agrarian Work  
 
Simplification of agrarian work resulting from the commodification of inputs, and severing of 
knowledge production from in-situ practices, has led to the loss of control over the labour 
process as the narratives discussed above suggest (cf. Scott 1998; Kloppenburg 2004). The 
simultaneous commodification of social reproduction practices conjoined with un-
remunerative prices for agricultural produce has meant that rural farming households have 
lost control over their own life-worlds. Non-remunerative prices indicate devaluation of 
agrarian work and the loss of political voice for the once dominant agrarian classes that 
exercised power as an interest group. In this section, I discuss how landowning Punjabi 
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households experience the devaluation of agrarian work. This devaluation is reflected in the 
struggle for ‘white collar' salaried jobs among the youth in landowning households. Status is 
no longer associated with working on one's own land but by obtaining an education that 
would lead to a job. 
 
Amarjeet Singh, an elderly farmer with 4 acres, who now practices natural farming and runs 
an indigenous seed bank in his village, recalls a time when people with land preferred 
farming to government jobs.  
“When I started farming in 1977, I had a job as a stenographer. I 
quit and came back to farming my family land. In those days 
people in our community preferred farming if they had land, or 
could afford to buy land. You could make only Rs 300-400 in a 
salaried job, whereas with farming you could make a profit and 
improve your situation in life. I made enough money with farming 
to get rid of household debt in a few years. My peers who had 
government jobs were envious and would have preferred to farm if 
they could afford to buy land. Sikh-jats were not happy to work for 
someone else. It is hard to imagine today when young people even 
from landed households scramble even for the lowest ranking jobs. 
People pay bribes to enrol their children in the army or get any 
kind of government job. Some even sell their land to pay hefty 
sums to middlemen who promise to get their children petty jobs in 
Canada. The shift toward cultivation by nuclear households led to 
fragmented landholdings and less capacity to manage farms 
without machinery or hired labour, especially since the younger 
generation is unwilling to farm.” 
 
 
Autonomy for elderly farmers like Amarjeet Singh was not simply about ownership of land, 
but the ability to make decisions about cropping patterns, managing the labour process, and 
ensuring that household consumption needs were met. In contrast, government jobs signified 
working for someone else and seen as incommensurate with their caste status. Conceptions of 
autonomy were clearly casteist, as working for others was associated with Dalit landless men 
and women. It is noteworthy that in the early decades of the Green Revolution, using family 
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labour was preponderant in Punjab (cf. Ruldolph and Rudolph 1987; Byres 1981).54 As large 
landowning households accumulated surplus, withdrawing women from the fields and hiring 
wage labour to carry out a majority of the tasks became a status-marker. The withdrawal of 
women became a widespread social norm among Sikh Jat households, percolating to small 
and marginal landowning households as well. Hiring wage labour, particularly migrant 
labour also became more widespread in Punjab with the advent of paddy cultivation which in 
my study villages only happened in the late 1980s onward and has become widespread in the 
last 15 years. Punjabi cultivators were not adept at practices such as transplanting which were 
specific to rice. The transformation of labour process with greater mechanisation, particularly 
use of tractors, weedicides, pesticides and insecticides contributed to women’s confinement 
to the home.  
 
Both farmers and farm workers in Malwa converge in stressing how practices on the farm 
have now become more depersonalized. The commodification of inputs has made farmers 
dependent on representatives of agrochemical companies, shopkeepers and dealers for 
information about seeds, fertilizers and sprays. Work on the farm is now broken down into 
discrete tasks as well, often performed by different people on medium to large farms. From 
watering the crops to spraying of chemicals and harvesting, there is a clockwork-like 
mechanical quality to farming operations, dictated by access to inputs and machinery. The 
material unsustainability of agrochemical intensive farming is articulated in shared regional 
																																								 																				
54 The ratio of independent cultivators using family labour to those using agricultural labour 
in the wheat growing areas of Punjab, Haryana, UP was 2:1, 3:1 and 4:1; whereas in rice 
growing areas of Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and Kerala it is 1:1, 1:1, and 1:2. Family labour 
was thus more important in wheat growing areas, whereas wage labour was more important 
in rice growing regions (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987: 352). Hiring wage labour, particularly 
migrant labour also became more widespread in Punjab with the advent of paddy cultivation, 
which in my study villages only happened in the late 1980s onward and has become 
widespread in the last 15 years. The transformation of labour process with greater 
mechanisation, particularly use of tractors, weedicides, and pesticides contributed to 
women’s confinement to the home.  
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memories, but structural conditions prevent farmers as individuals from experimenting with 
alternative forms of farming that are skill and time-intensive. In the short term, for a majority 
of the farmers, their labour practices constitute a form of firefighting with the goal of 
maximizing yields and income to invest in moving out of farming, particularly by 
provisioning for higher education of their children.  
 
Devalorisation of farm work through the developmental decades has been enacted through 
both material and discursive means (Vasavi 2012; Gupta 1998). The discursive denigration of 
agriculture through the naturalization of the notion of ‘development' as transitioning out of 
farming is in tension with the much-touted imagery of the ‘hard-working Punjabi farmer’ in 
statist interventions. The identity of the Sikh Jat as the dominant agrarian caste have since the 
colonial period been defined by their status as proprietors who were also tillers of the soil. 
Classified as ‘martial races’ and ‘yeoman farmers’, the Sikh-jats of Punjab also constituted 
the majority of the British India army, and agriculture in the region was restructured to 
increase productivity for exports (Mooney 2013).  The building of canal infrastructure, 
particularly in areas inhabited by pastoral tribes, and land grants for those who enrolled in the 
army, led many to argue that Punjabi peasant-proprietors were the ‘favoured subjects’ of the 
colonial state (Mukherjee 2005). Technical engineering that radically transformed the desert-
like, semi-arid landscape through the creation of irrigation zones, was accompanied by social 
engineering in this ‘frontier region' (Akhter and Ormerod 2015). In other words, the 
construction of the landowning Sikh Jats as ‘progressive farmer’ has deeper roots than the 
Green Revolution. Nicola Mooney (2013) has argued that the essentialized agrarian identity 
of the ‘industrious and successful tiller of the soil' invoked in popular representations as well 
as embraced by Sikh Jats themselves today, was produced as colonial social constructs in 
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service of imperial objectives. As Mooney writes, “the Jats were ideologically privileged and 
materially rewarded for living within colonial representational categories (2013: 287)”.  
 
Subjectivities of Sikh-jat farmers have been simultaneously shaped by the regionally specific 
developmental discourse of the ‘progressive farmer’, in contradistinction to the nationalist 
discourse of transitioning out of agriculture. The slogan ‘Jai Jawan, Jai Kisan' (hail the 
soldier, hail the farmer'), was launched in the mid-1960s during the takeoff period of the 
Green Revolution by the then Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, professions to which 
Punjabi rural citizens have been tethered disproportionately since the colonial period. With 
the advent of the Green revolution practices the notion of the ‘progressive farmer’ 
specifically became linked to the adoption of HYV technology for ceaselessly increasing 
productivity, and disjointed from agrarian work. Over a few decades of the stagnation of 
yields since the 1980s, depletion of soils and groundwater, and frequent crop damage due to 
pest attacks and erratic weather conditions the ‘progressive farmers' is being recast as 
‘ignorant and irresponsible' in expert narratives, and as ‘deskilled' in critical scholarship. 
 
Attention to agrarian work practices, particularly within debates on agriculture deskilling 
have focused on the separation between manual and mental labour, and the severing of social 
learning from environmental learning (Fitzgerald 1993; Stone 2007). Conceptions of 
deskilling highlight implicitly or explicitly the externalization of knowledge production 
outside the farm and specific regional ecologies, through the commodification of the labour 
process and attempts to produce standardized forms of farming. They, however, neglect 
historical relations that shape agrarian practices and the broader discursive-material 
landscapes within which they are situated. As Akhil Gupta (1998) argues, farmers' embodied 
practices in the Green Revolution belt cannot be categorised as either indigenous or as 
130	
	
industrial/scientific farming. While Gupta leans toward drawing attention to the agency of 
farmers by employing the idiom of ‘hybridity' to outline how they negotiate and explain 
technological transformations of socio-ecological relations, Glen Stone (2007) argues that 
farmers are becoming ‘deskilled fad followers' as the link between social and environmental 
learning are severed.55 Both these framings isolate particular production practices from the 
broader interdependencies in the ecosystem, and from the life-worlds that farmers and rural 
households inhabit (cf. Stone and Flachs 2017).  
 
For farmers, the preoccupation with productivity is partly an expression of lack of control 
over prices they get for the crops. The cascading effects of the technological treadmill are 
most starkly visible with recurring cotton crop failures, which combined with volatile prices 
have pushed farmers into chronic indebtedness.  When there is a delay in procurement of 
wheat and rice, or payment by state agencies, farmers in Punjab spill out onto the streets 
under the aegis of the numerous farmers' unions. There are frequent protests to demand an 
increase in the minimum support prices offered by the government as well. When it comes to 
crops that are sold in the open market, like cotton and vegetables, farmers talk about prices 
with the same sense of fatalism as unseasonal rain or conditions of drought. Cotton growers 
in Punjab are subject to transnational forces that determine the price of their crop and the cost 
of inputs they use such as genetically modified seeds, over which they have no control or 
mechanisms to ensure accountability. 
 
																																								 																				
55 David Mosse (Stone et al 2007) rightly suggests that Glen Stone’s critique of classic 
innovation-adoption theories replicates the techno-political framework that bifurcates the 
‘agro-ecological’ from the ‘socio-cultural’ and that labelling farmers as ‘deskilled fad 
followers' unwittingly becomes complicit with expert narratives of farmers as ‘ignorant' and 
‘irrational'. Kloppenburg’s (2004) characterisation of farmers as ‘propertied wage labour’ 
more adequately captures their loss of control over production practices, and the inability to 
deal with ecological consequences that have been unleashed over the last few decades as 
individuals.	
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The shift towards paddy cultivation more than anything expresses the need for stability. 
Cotton, the ‘native’ crop adapted to the regional socio-ecological conditions and grown for 
subsistence, in its new avatar has become a source of distress emerging from volatile prices 
and persistent crop damage. Paddy, on the other hand, while not consumed locally, provides 
security given its assured procurement by the state at a minimum support price. The task-
based wages for transplanting are cost-effective for farmers, and overall there is a reduction 
in labour costs. Farmers often take on loans to invest in additional tube wells require for 
paddy cultivation in the hope of assured income. These changes in production practices are 
within the realm of the possible for farmers. Farmers, unable to exercise control over global 
price-setting mechanisms and cost of seeds and agrochemicals, seek to cope with the current 
conditions primarily by changing cultivation practices, disciplining labour and trimming 
labour costs. Unlike labour, farmers perceive agrochemicals as indispensable for maintaining 
current levels of productivity, and for preventing crop failure.  
 
The now entrenched social norms prevent agrarian landed castes from employing family 
labour on the farm, particularly women, even in times of severe economic crisis. For 
Amarjeet Kaur's household, it became hard to continue growing cotton after their two sons 
joined the army.56 Her husband jointly cultivates the family 20-acre farm with his 3 brothers 
in. She says, 
We used to sow cotton on 1.5 acres but decided to stop because it 
requires a lot of work. Multiple sprayings of pesticides are 
essential to control the bollworm and it is hard to find labour for 
cotton-picking. Earlier the rate for picking was Rs. 1 for 5 kgs, 
now it Rs 1 per kg. So, for every quintal, we have to pay 500Rs to 
labour. With Bt cotton, the bollworm attacks have reduced, but the 
																																								 																				
56 In rural Punjab, joining the army and police has been and continues to be a preferred option 
for the youth. A legacy of colonial rule, when 50% of the British India army was recruited 
from Punjab, today the army is seen as the few remaining avenues of stable salaried 
employment that are available to rural youth (Fox 1985). It is common to pay bribes in an 
attempt to obtain a job in the army, which came up during several interviews. 
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seeds cost more, so in the end the end the input costs remain high. 
The truth is we will only save money if we work with our hands 
and eliminate the labour costs.  
 
Her husband, Gurmeet Singh, interjects to say that he personally would not object to 
Amarjeet working on the family farm, but others in the village would frown upon them. He 
recalls the days when the entire household used to be involved in cotton-picking.  
 
By the time my mother came with the first meal to the farm at 9 
am, I had already picked two full bags of cotton. After getting done 
with household work, my mother joined us in the field. Only one 
member of the household would stay at home, while everyone else 
was in the fields including children picking cotton. The labour 
class also came really early to the fields and worked with us late 
into the evening.  First, we picked the flowers, separated the cotton 
bolls. The ones that were not ripe yet were laid out on the terrace to 
dry. Then crop residue was removed manually to prepare the land 
for wheat sowing. The residue was used as fuel at home, but all of 
this required a lot of work that had to be done quickly. Otherwise, 
the wheat sowing was delayed resulting in lesser yields. Bt cotton 
is a longer duration crop, now the yield of wheat after sowing 
cotton is 30 man (1 man = 37 kgs), but for those who sow wheat 
after paddy instead the yield is 50 man. Rice is harvested in 
October, whereas cotton picking goes all the way up to December-
January. So, you make more money with rice, and the wheat yields 
are more as well.  
 
The rearrangement of socio-ecological relations in conjunction with and through labour 
practices has worked toward deepening commodification of farming. The primary enactors of 
these processes, landowning cultivators continue to strive to maintain their status in new 
ways even as their occupational identity is under threat. Gurmeet Singh adds,  
"it is not only women from landowning households that have 
stopped working in the fields, but men as well. We hire labour or 
let machines and agrochemicals do the work. As soon as it's noon 
you will see at least 50 people gathered at the village well to play 
cards and they will not leave until 4 pm. Workers demand as much 
as 300-400Rs per day so people are using machines for spraying 
and using weedicides instead of manual weeding. There is a 
landless community – the Bauria Sikhs in our village, and they 
nowadays lease land for 20000Rs per acre for three months from 
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farmers between the summer and the winter crop to grow 
vegetables. By using excessive amounts of chemicals they are able 
to generate quick high yields. But they make a decent profit 50000-
60000Rs in three months because their entire family –including 
women and children are in the fields from dawn to dusk. They also 
go and sell the vegetables directly in the market every day instead 
of selling them to the intermediaries." Referring to status norms, he 
concludes by saying that "zamindars cannot do things like this, so 
despite owning land in some ways we are worse-off.” 
 
Older landowning farmers often articulate deterioration in material conditions in terms of a 
moral critique. This critique centres on a decline in work ethic and is targeted at youth within 
their families, but more frequently at Dalit landless workers. Echoing a common refrain, 
Amarjeet Kaur, for instance, argues that landless communities within the village complain 
about the lack of adequate work but when there is a lot to be done in the fields during 
harvesting it is hard to find labour. Men from landless families instead prefer to work in rice 
shelling units or in construction and women on MGNREGA sites because it is easy to work. 
At this point, Sanjana a young KVM activist, who is a resident of a nearby village and from a 
landless household promptly intervenes and says, "labouring classes cannot be dependent 
only on farming for their livelihood, and they have to look after their own interests. In a few 
years' when the land is completely barren, the zamindars are going to be in the worst 
situation. They are not happy to work unlike everyone else. Instead, they take loans for 
everything.” 
 
The narrative of ‘laziness’ of labouring classes to explain their refusal to work on farms for 
low wages expresses the increasing loss of control experienced by dominant castes. 
Availability of non-farm work with relatively better conditions and ability to commute to 
nearby towns on a daily basis has partly empowered Dalit communities. Discursive 
denigration becomes a way of asserting status by dominant agrarian castes, particularly for 
small and medium farmers, in the midst of an economic crisis and a weakening agrarian 
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economy. But such status norms also close off access to livelihood options such as agrarian 
or off-farm wage work, including through the government run employment guarantee scheme 
MGNREGA. While MGNREGA is a non-targeted demand driven scheme, small and 
marginal Sikh Jat landowning households rarely avail of it even in times of tremendous 
economic distress. 
 
Farmers often substantiate the correlation between moral decay and environmental 
degradation by arguing that government schemes such as subsidised distribution of grain, and 
MGNREGA have ruptured farmer-labour relations. Landless workers point to the irregularity 
of work available on farms through the year after mechanization. Whereas farmers frame the 
problem in terms of shortage of labour (mostly during transplanting of rice and harvesting), 
which they attribute to the labouring classes becoming ‘lazy’ and unwilling to work hard as 
they can subsist easily through government largesse, supplemented by off-farm wage labour 
which is less strenuous.  
 
I discuss how the ‘erstwhile progressive farmer’ experiences what Araghi (1995) calls 
‘depeasantisation sans proletarianisation’ and the survival politics it produces in the next 
chapter. For now, it is sufficient to note that the disdain expressed by small and medium 
farmers for government schemes such as the MGNREGA and distribution of subsidized 
grain, by labeling them as ‘handouts’ that make laboring classes ‘lazy’, is also an expression 
frustration at their inability to access these schemes in times of crisis. This frustration is 
compounded by the gradual rollback in agricultural input subsidies and the minuscule 
increases in minimum support prices for crops since the early 1990s. 
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Occasionally this moral critique of declining work ethic is directed inwards as well, 
particularly in the discussion of environmental decay and increasing health problems due to 
changes in cultivation practices. Surjeet Singh for instance after complaining about the 
unreliability of workers these days adds on further reflection, “the zamindars have stopped 
working with their own hands as well. They used to work alongside farm labour, now they 
just supervise them. Zamindar’s work is confined to turning on the switch for motors to water 
the fields and operating machinery.” Many farmers correlate the rising incidence of diseases 
to the decline in physical work performed by them. 
 
Moral critique articulated by elderly farmers targeting the younger generation among their 
households reflects the remnants of the old sensibility, where caste-based occupational 
identity and claims for dominance, were linked to both work and land ownership. The nature 
of agrarian work associated with this sensibility was defined by autonomy. This autonomy 
had multiple dimensions - working on one’s own land, assured subsistence, and the ability to 
make decisions about cultivation practices. While landed farmers recall lost autonomy in the 
sphere of work – both through the commodification of farming inputs and dependence on the 
state through the subsidy regime, decommodified subsistence and social reproduction are 
central to the memories of landless workers as well as elderly women from landed 
households.  
 
IV. The Remembered Moral Ecologies 
 
The memories of those who were marginalised in the new technologically driven and 
monetized economy shaped by the Green revolution provide a glimpse into lost moral 
ecologies. I use the term moral ecologies to refer to both non-monetised social relations, 
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practices of reciprocity often structured through patrimonial relations, and flora, fauna, 
common access land and water, that formed the basis of decommodified social reproduction.   
In rural Punjab, given the rapid pace of intensification and the resultant drastic erosions over 
a few decades, these memories are the only means of accessing what has been eliminated on 
the socio-material landscape. Hence, they become politically significant for resetting the 
terrain of contestations. They complicate the valorised and abstract construction of 
indigenous culture and values and push back against narrow framings of environmental 
sustainability.  
 
The vast literature on agricultural transformation in post-colonial Punjab is largely silent on 
the erosion of the commons. This silence is peculiar given the critical role village and 
regional commons played in sustaining livelihoods, structuring interactions between 
pastoralists and cultivators and creating communities that extended beyond village 
boundaries (Kaul 1992). The term ‘village commons’ is commonly used to refer to open-
access grazing lands that allowed small and marginal farmers, and landless households to 
keep livestock. In women’s narrative though the village commons also contained native tree 
species and herbs as well as collective work practices. Native trees such as van, jhand, and 
talli, typical for an arid ecology were used in various ways in the local diet and for medicinal 
purposes. They disappeared partly due to clearance by farmers to increase the area under 
cultivation and partly due to the widespread use of agrochemicals.  These tree species 
produced uncultivated foods that were an important part of the local diet across social classes.  
Recalling the days when she worked in the fields as a daily wage labourer, Mahindar Kaur, 
now in her 60s says,  
 
“we used to stay under the shade of the trees such as jhand and 
kafir to wait out the afternoon sun and then get back in the fields in 
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the early evening. Now those trees are gone, you will only spot one 
or two remaining ones here and there. We plucked the fruit from 
these trees and used them in meals. Men zip back and forth to the 
fields on their motorcycles, but we have nowhere to rest with all 
the trees gone when it is 45 degrees Celsius. Our native trees lined 
all the farms and provided a shady pathway to walk from the 
village to the fields. The poplars and the eucalyptus may generate 
money for the farmers, but without shade or fruit they are barren 
for us.”  
 
Only poplar and eucalyptus trees are visible across large swathes of farmland now. These are 
grown commercially, particularly by absentee landowners that have emigrated. Their 
cultivation is not labour-intensive and provides a substantial income every few years. The 
practice of burning of fields post-harvest to get rid of crop residue, which I discussed in 
chapter 1, is also responsible for the elimination of flora, fauna and friendly insect species. 
Criticisms of this practice have focused on land and environmental degradation and the 
economic compulsions that force farmers to do so. The detrimental effects on social 
reproduction possibilities of landless households within the villages, however, are not a part 
of this discourse. Women from landless households historically gleaned grain, especially 
wheat, from the fields post-harvest. After manual harvesting, they were often able to gather 
enough for household consumption for one-two months. The amount of grain left reduced 
drastically after the coming of combine harvesters, and gleaning became impossible since the 
practice of burning has become widespread. Initially practised by large landowners, use of 
combine threshers and burning crop residue soon became the norm. Eighty-year old Sukhjeet 
Kaur explains, 
“When wheat was harvested by hand, women from labour 
households would go together to glean grain in large groups after 
the harvest. We went from one field to another and then divided 
the collected grain, depending on the number of people in 
everyone’ household. I also remember carrying baskets full of 
sorghum and grams home from the fields. One woman could pick 
enough grain to last 5 months for a family of four. But since 
machines began to be used for harvesting, the practice of gleaning 
stopped. The combines cut the wheat in such a way that it is not 
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possible to glean anymore, there is no whole wheat grain left, just 
plant stubble. The fields are set on fire post-harvest to get rid of the 
stubble, burning whatever leftover grain there is. For my 
generation, it is a sin to burn food.” 
 
While gleaned wheat was used for household consumption, rice was sold in the market, as 
rice is not a part of the local diet. In villages where cotton is sown by a majority of the 
farmers instead of rice, farmers’ tend to not burn the fields post-harvest. Therefore, women 
from landless households continue with the practice of gleaning wheat and left-over cotton 
from the fields. It is well known that in the North Indian Green Revolution belt the most 
significant impact of mechanization has been on the availability of farm work for women 
(Chowdhary 2010). Women were employed as wage labour on farms in Malwa for manual 
weeding (which is now done through the application of weedicides) and for manual 
harvesting of wheat, along with cotton-picking. As women from landowning households 
stopped working in the fields, as a status-norm among upwardly mobile agrarian castes, it 
also became difficult women from landless households to work as wage labour as they often 
worked under their supervision. 
 
Women’s presence in the fields was concurrent with many practices that linked farming to 
social reproduction directly. Unlike paddy and the hybrid varieties of cotton, indigenous 
cotton varieties were intercropped with vegetables, millets and gram. Landless women 
gathered fodder and wood for fuel from the farms for household consumption. This allowed 
them to keep milch cattle and goats at home, which is not possible anymore. Without land, 
the fodder has to be bought from the market. Landless households, as well as small and 
marginal farmers, are unable to afford milch cattle because of the disappearance of common 
grazing lands from villages, which were gradually occupied for cultivation. Known as 
shamlat, the common grazing patches allowed landless households to keep goats for milk. 
139	
	
Goats, like occupational herders who took everyone’s animals for grazing in exchange for 
wheat and milk, are now rare in Punjabi villages. The absence of goats is also another 
phenomenon that reflects the strong grip of new status markers that have emerged with the 
deepening of the cash economy and commodification of cultivation practices. As one woman 
points out, her young sons were embarrassed that they had goats at home, and so she got rid 
of them.   
 
Experiences of older women from landed and landless households share several 
commonalities. They highlight the relative freedom of mobility and social belonging 
associated with working in the fields collectively and with living in joint households. It was 
common for women from extended kin and caste networks to work collectively on and off 
the farm. Cooking, spinning and weaving cloth from indigenous cotton, winnowing grain, 
were all done together by women from extended caste and kin networks. With the increasing 
trend toward nuclear households, the mobility of women from landed households became 
severely restricted to the confines of the household yard. Like many other women from 
landowning households, Amarjeet Kaur draws attention to the lost collective work practices; 
the system is locally known as ‘veedi’, as its disappearance coincides with their own 
banishment from the fields. She says, “Until about 20-25 years ago people did not want to 
spend on hired labour – so they worked on each other’s farms taking turns - spraying 
fertiliser, manually harvesting wheat and cotton.” Several older women mention that their 
daughters-in-law have never even seen the family farm. Landless women, however, continue 
to work collectively whether it is with family members or with women from other landless 
households during transplantation of rice, cotton-picking, and gleaning grain post-harvest. 
They also tend to go for off-farm wage labour collectively, primarily through the 
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government’s employment guarantee scheme –MGNREGA, which involves cleaning village 
pathways and ponds and maintenance of canals.  
 
Working in groups also makes more economic sense, particularly while transplanting of 
paddy, one of the few remaining labour-intensive tasks in the cropping cycle. As I talk to a 
group of six (3 men and 3 women) from the same extended household transplanting paddy in 
July, one of them, Ram Singh contends,  
“it makes a big difference in terms of income and getting work if 
the entire family is working versus if only one person is working. 
For transplanting, we get about 2400Rs per acre, which takes 
roughly one day for 6 people. In one season we manage to 
transplant about 20-22 acres together and are able to make roughly 
50,000Rs. ‘Bhaiyas’57 however are pushing the wages down. They 
come together during the transplanting season in large groups, so it 
is more convenient for the bigger farmers to hire them. Until a few 
years ago, they came to work on farms seasonally, but now they 
are working in our factories too."   
 
Farmers prefer migrant workers, who come from traditionally rice growing Eastern states 
because they are perceived to be better and quicker at transplanting. In the weeks before 
transplanting begins, farmers flock to railway stations with signage to attract incoming 
migrant labour to their fields. Paddy cultivation introduced in Punjab during the Green 
revolution continues to be considered as an alien crop even after decades of cultivation. 
While valued by farmers because of the assured support price and procurement by state 
agencies, local farm workers have an antagonistic relationship with the crop. They associate 
it with migrant workers who push down wages and take away their work. Local workers also 
consider transplanting rice in flooded fields to be unpleasant and hard physical work.  
 
																																								 																				
57 A derogatory term used to refer to migrant labour from the Eastern states of Bihar and 
Uttar Pradesh. 
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As Vinay Gidwani (2008) argues the preference for group or task based work among farm 
workers, like the landowning farmers’ withdrawal of family labour from cultivation, is 
illustrative of the interruption of economic rationality by cultural logics. The recognition of 
living labour embedded in social and ecological relations, despite disciplining via technology 
and commodification, allows for the possibility of imagining a politics beyond conventional 
forms. He, therefore, makes a typological distinction between the politics of labour, that is 
struggles for better wages and working conditions, and the politics of work practised by both 
landowning agrarian castes and landless labour. The politics of work draws on valuations that 
are not just economic, that is a distinction in terms of caste norms but also prioritization of 
non-alienated form of labour. Whereas de-valorisation of labour is a costly move to achieve 
social distinction for landowning farmers, group work is an expression of an aspiration for 
autonomy by workers. By being able to control the tempo of work, workers can exercise 
autonomy in small measure, and partially alleviate the sense of alienation that comes with 
working in isolation. 
 
Ram Singh in his narrative above though highlights task-based work of transplanting in terms 
of tremendous constraints imposed by the changes in cultivation practices on landless and 
lower caste communities. Cultural logics also combine with economic rationales to deepen 
the exploitation of landless workers. While patrimonial relations no longer provide security 
of subsistence, in their new form they inhibit the ‘politics of labour’, by constraining the 
ability of workers to bargain for higher wages.58 Echoing a common sentiment among 
																																								 																				
58 A substantial body of literature on caste politics in India has elaborated on new forms of 
insecurity and exploitation that have accompanied breakdown of older patrimonial caste 
relations. While statist interventions and greater availability of non-farm work have enabled 
political struggles for emancipation by landless castes vis a vis locally dominant landowning 
castes, deepening commodification has also created conditions of isolation and economic 
insecurity (cf. Breman 1993; Harriss 1982; Carswell and De Neve 2014; De Neve and 
Carswell 2011). The redistribution of resources is mediated by the state through social 
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landless labourers, he suggests that while the possibility of upward mobility was non-existent 
in the days of entrenched patrimonial relations, existence of village commons, both material 
and social, made social reproduction easier. Ram Singh goes on to compare paddy with 
cotton cultivation and says,  
It has been 20-25 years since farmers started replacing cotton with 
rice because it provides a more secure income and the chances of 
crop damage are less. For us though working in rice fields is hard 
work. As you can see standing in flooded fields all day when it is 
40 degree Celsius is difficult. The sun is beating down on your 
bent back and the flooded water is hot and full of chemicals. For 
the rest of the year, there is roughly another month’s work 
available on the farms only for men - mostly weeding or applying 
urea and spraying chemicals, and the daily wage is about 300Rs a 
day. With cotton, there was more fodder, so farmers passed it on to 
us and we could keep milch animals at home. When we cannot find 
work here we go to Bathinda or Gidderbaha (neighbouring 
districts) during the cotton-picking season. Once I travelled with 
my whole family to as far as Rajasthan to get work. In other 
villages, the rate is 2700Rs per acre but in our village, it is just 
2400Rs. We cannot protest because we need to borrow money 
from these zamindars and ask them for wheat in lean months. 
About 5-6 years ago the daily wage rate was 200Rs but they also 
provided meals, now it is 250Rs but they don’t provide meals so it 
is in effect the same.  
  
 
Narratives of change suggest not just the loss of the village commons in the form of grazing 
grounds, tree species that generated food, shade and wood for fuel, but ruptures in social 
relations and cultivation practices that linked work with social reproduction, particularly for 
labouring households. Collective work practices and patrimonial relations are an integral part 
of the memory of ‘lost commons.’ The reshaping of patrimonial relations with changing 
cultivation practices is clearly not simply a linear transition from the good to the bad days, as 
labouring communities recall the of caste discrimination in everyday practices such as eating 
and drinking from separate utensils in the farmers’ households.  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
provisioning policies, but structural reforms enabling secure livelihoods such as redistribution 
of land are no longer on the political agenda.  
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Struggles against caste-based discrimination and indignities were enabled by the increased 
everyday presence of government in the village and through access to non-farm livelihoods. 
Unlike public health or education, substantial investments were made in improving transport 
infrastructure necessary for transporting food grains. Easy connectivity with nearby towns 
and cities enabled men from landless households to commute for work in construction and 
transport. For landless Dalit men, upward mobility became a real possibility albeit for a very 
small minority via non-agrarian livelihoods, particularly government jobs, or through leasing 
land and farming independently. Pirphi Singh, a 78-year-old Dalit cultivator, started leasing 
land, after working as a siri on a crop-share basis for 25 years for one zamindar family. He 
says,  
“I could never work like a daily wage farm labour with 
indifference and no attachment to the land after I was let go as a 
Siri. So, I took a loan and started to farm on about 4 acres of leased 
land. With leased land, there is very little income after paying the 
rent, but we have wheat for our household and dry fodder for our 
cattle for the whole year. My brothers could study more than I did, 
and two of them became schoolteachers, and one went into the 
army. They have big houses now, whereas my sons and grandsons 
ended up working as daily wage labour in construction.” 
 
His narrative crucially points to the relationship between changes in cultivation practices and 
the organisation of labour relations. Within the older organisation underpinned by 
patrimonial relations, farm workers like him had long-term relations with the land and 
played a key role in the generational transfer of knowledge.  
The Siri system disappeared with the coming of tractors and 
combines. Farmers with large landholdings began to hire daily 
wage labour, along with one or two farm workers on contract with 
fixed annual wage. The Siri system was more beneficial for us 
because we got one-sixth share of the crop. We worked hard 
because if the yields were good, we got a higher share as well. But 
there were also many instances of farmers firing the Siri on some 
pretext, just before the harvest, when the crop yields were expected 
to be really high. The thing is for people of my generation - our 
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bodies do not know how to do anything else except work hard. Our 
aspirations were limited to running our household without any 
scarcity and being able to eat two good meals a day back then. My 
entire family was involved in working for the farmers’ household 
when I was a Siri. Before tube wells became common since the 
supply of canal water was limited my wife and daughter carried 
buckets of water to the farm from the village tap or the pond. I also 
taught the farmers' sons everything they know about farming. 
 
He adds that when the zamindar’s son decided to experiment with organic production, he was 
able to contribute his knowledge. But as the wheat yields reduced substantially in the first 
few years, his share reduced as well and it was hard for his household to survive. He 
continued to work for the farmer, but only when he began to give him 50% of the crop as 
opposed to the standard one-sixth.  
 
Like Pirphi Singh, Bhaag Singh now in his 80s started leasing 5 acres after working as a Siri 
for 25 years. In contrast, though he equates being a Siri with being a slave. While working in 
his leased plot at 5.30 am which he manages by himself he says,  
"You have to do as the zamindar says and work whenever they 
want you to work. I remember when my daughter died when she 
was 5-7 days old, I could not even go home. I am extremely 
fortunate I that I could leave. When you lease land, at least you are 
not a slave to anyone, and you can manage and cultivate the land 
on your own terms. I have leased the same piece of land for 15 
years now. The owner works as a bank manager in Bathinda and he 
feels secure that I will not try to grab the land.” 
 
Even as leasing land is extremely risky, older landless workers construe it as upward mobility 
because it comes with self-sufficiency and autonomy, whereas others associate labouring on 
a crop share basis with more secure subsistence. From the standpoint of women and Dalit 
landless households, with the transformation of cultivation practices, the separation of work 
and social reproduction is apparent. Given the precarious availability of farm wage labour, 
the erasure and contamination of village commons, and commodification of resources such as 
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fodder and wood, are perceived to be a more potent form of exploitation than the indignities 
of caste based discriminatory practices. This is particularly true for women and older men 
who are unable to access off-farm daily wage labour in construction and transport because of 
restricted mobility and/or the inability to operate machinery. The dispensability of labour 
with mechanisation, use of agrochemicals, and with increasing acreage under wheat-paddy 
rotation, has made labouring households more dependent on landowning farmers for loans 
during lean periods of employment.  The dependence forged through these loans is unlike the 
share of fodder, wood, and gleaned grain gleaned that were seen as entitlements. Rights 
based entitlements available now through government schemes such as universal demand-
based employment guarantee scheme are often inaccessible in practice at the village level. 
Interviewees in all the villages pointed out that in the last few years they could obtain only 
15-30 days of work through the MGNREGA, and payments for these workdays were delayed 
by several months. Many suggested that landowning farmers deliberately block the scheme at 
the panchayat level so that labour is available for farm work.  
 
As Rita Brara (2006) argues, in her ethnographic account in a village in the neighbouring 
state of Rajasthan, the substitution of informal practices of open access to the village 
commons by the codification of entitlements and institutionalisation has reinforced the 
marginalisation of women and lower castes. Eighty-year old Maninder Kaur from a lower 
caste household, who now occasionally works cleaning dishes and doing other chores in a 
farmer's household that employed her husband as a siri, remembers this process in the 
following way.   
         “The shamlat (common) land of the village was a grazing ground 
for cattle. There were specific people in every village – the Baghi 
community- that would take everyone’s cattle for grazing there. 
When panchayats (elected village council) came into existence, 
that common land became panchayati land. Now the sarpanch 
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(elected head of the village council) rents it to zamindars 
(landowning farmers) for cultivation.”  
 
The Punjab Village Commons Land (Regulation) Act of 1961 allows panchayats to rent 
village land to the highest bidder, on the condition that one-third of this land is reserved for 
the scheduled castes and auctioned separately. Unsurprisingly though, this stipulation is often 
subverted by Sikh-jat farmers by using Dalit proxies or using their influence over panchayat 
members. Within the law leasing for purposes of cultivation and for homestead plot is only 
one of the 26 prescribed uses, making it extremely flexible and susceptible to misuse. One-
third panchayati land mandated for Dalit households in any case can only be leased out by 
paying an annual rent, which is unaffordable for most.59 In recent years there have been 
several instances of struggles for accessing the panchayat land, particularly by Dalit youth, in 
the Sangrur district of Malwa (Sethi 2014; cf. Martin 2015). The conversion of village 
commons into government land has not only limited access for landless households, but they 
have to struggle to even enforce this limited access via rent that is prescribed by law. This 
process of usurpation of common land is illustrative of the narrowing of the political space 
with the shift to a techno-political regime. 
 
While the sustainability discourse and practices at the institutional level are solely focused on 
technical fixes (as described in the previous chapter), the sustainability politics of KVM 
invokes the lost ‘village commons and the associated sociality’ in terms of restoring 
harmonic human-nature relations that are transcendental moral/ethical values.60 These values 
																																								 																				
59http://www.pbrdp.gov.in/documents/6205745/0/1332145804780_The_Punjab_Village_Co
mmon_Lands_Rules_19645915.pdf 
60 As Ann Gold (1998) suggests environmental activism since the 1990s has employed the 
relation between moral decay and environmental degradation commonly made by rural 
agrarian subjects in its rhetoric. Inspired by Gandhian political thought, environmental 
movements in India have drawn strategically in the past to construct a critique of industrial 
modernization, where the rural represents an emancipatory utopia of self-sufficiency and 
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can be inscribed on the material landscape by radically altering the current cultivation 
practices and the decision-making capacity for changing cultivation practices even though 
severely constrained rests with landowning farmers. The understanding of change from the 
standpoint of labour, as Ann Gold writes, is ‘fundamentally ecological in its sensitivity to the 
web like interconnectedness of concurrent transformations’ (1998:168).  While Gold suggests 
that this sense of human morality being interdependent on natural surroundings extends 
beyond class differences, those lower in the social hierarchy experience the material effects 
of the rupture more intensely and consistently. These include women from landowning 
households, landless communities and elderly farmers in small and marginal landowning 
households who no longer have decision-making powers. Therefore, even as the remembered 
commons are present in the memories of labouring subjects the labouring classes themselves 
are excluded from the politics of sustainability as well. The new imaginary of sustainability is 
expanding the political space by foregrounding the need for changing production and 
consumption practices but also operates within its limitations, as the agenda of land 
redistribution active in the 1960s and reclaiming the village commons continue to be invisible 
in the landscape of resistance. 
 
V. The Subalterns Within Sustainability Politics 
 
At a time when small and medium landowning households are trying to move away from 
farming, some landless households are renting land for cultivation at exorbitant rates.61 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
village democracy. This vision of emancipation was ahistorical in the Marxist sense but 
nevertheless political. 
61 It is not just the absentee landowners leasing out the land, but also small and medium cultivators 
who are indebted and unwilling to bear the risk of cultivation. Rents provided the much-needed cash 
for household consumption expenditure. They are also leased out by those who have emigrated and 
have no remaining kin in the villages but are reluctant to sell their land, or by those households where 
the younger generation has found stable jobs and there is no one in the family to tend to the land. 
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Despite the tremendous risk this entails, cultivation on leased land is preferred to the ordeal 
of looking for daily wage labour by many landless households. Cultivation at the very least 
generates grain (mostly wheat) for household consumption, fodder for livestock and some 
supplementary cash income in a good crop year. These tenant cultivators are trading the 
insecurity that comes with constantly having to look for wage labour, with the risk entailed in 
leasing land at an exorbitant annual rent. The growing trend toward leasing land by members 
of the Bauria Sikhs, a historically nomadic hunting tribe, that were dependent on the village 
commons is illuminating for understanding the exclusion of sustainability politics. 
 
Notified as criminal tribes, the Baurias were forced to work in canal colonies as part of the 
colonial state’s civilizing mission. Unlike the landless Dalits integrated within the agrarian 
social relations of production and hierarchy, Baurias have been historically outside the village 
agrarian social structure. Their distinct dialect is incomprehensible to others within the region 
which they use exclusively to communicate within the community.62 De-notified five years 
after independence in 1952, the social stigma continues to persist which makes it hard for 
them to find jobs even today. Bauria houses are generally situated on the periphery of the 
village.63 Unlike the Dalit landless households, they are invisible not just on the political 
landscape but also in scholarly analyses of the Green Revolution decades.  
 
With the shift toward rice cultivation and increasing economic distress, farmers are leasing 
out their land for three months between the wheat and paddy crop to make quick money 
through rent. Leasing out land for three months is more common among those farmers who 
grow Basmati rice, which is a shorter duration crop compared to other paddy varieties. Bauria 
																																								 																				
62 Swaroop Singh, a Sikh Jat farmer, suggests that Baurias are a closely-knit community that 
closely guard their dialect and have deliberately kept it alive as well as confined within the 
community.  
63 For a detailed history of ‘criminal tribes’ in colonial Punjab see Major (1999).  
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community households rent land for these three months to grow vegetables, and many report 
earning more in these three months than they do in the rest of the year. An elderly cultivator 
from the community suggests that the preference for growing vegetables is because Baurias 
have no ancestral knowledge about cultivating food grains. Some have one-two acres of their 
own in addition, that their ancestors bought during the imposition of the land ceiling in the 
1960s when large landowners were selling their land at nominal prices to avoid confiscation 
by the state.  Up until two-three generations ago, many in the community were herders who 
kept goat and sheep for meat and took cattle from other landowning households for grazing.64 
These practices disappeared with the loss of common grazing lands.  
 
The Baurias earn a reasonable income in these three months because unfettered by caste 
norms, they employ family labour including children for farm work and sell the produce 
directly in nearby towns. Farmers generally comment that Baurias’ are a very hard working 
community. They are in the fields from dawn to dusk, even when the sun is at its peak in the 
afternoon when everyone else is resting.  I speak to Joginder Singh, a young Bauria tenant 
cultivator while he is working with his wife and two young sons in the fields. They have 
leased 3.5 acres, out of which 1.5 is for the whole year, and 2 acres is for three months. In 
addition, he also works as daily wage labour seasonally to pick cotton and transplant paddy in 
other’s fields.  The amount of land they are able to lease every year varies based on rents and 
availability, and usually, it's a different field every year. He says, 
"We grow only vegetables because you can sell them in the market 
directly, and that is the only way to make some income. I take 
them to nearby towns every day on my motorcycle, while my wife 
and sons look after the farm. Shopkeepers have designated spaces 
in the towns, and do not allow us to sit in those spaces so I keep 
rotating between different markets. When we lease land, the entire 
family has work, so it is worth paying the high rent, even though 
																																								 																				
64 The responsibility for taking care of milch cattle passed on to women and stall-feeding 
within the house became the norm. 
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there is not a lot of profit to be made. With daily wage labour, only 
one person within the family can go and make money, and you 
have to constantly look for work.” 
 
Tenant cultivators from the Bauria Sikh community value working autonomously as a family 
unit. Those who grow wheat contend that having enough grain for household consumption 
and fodder to keep cattle is their primary motivation for leasing land.  
 
On the other end, more and more landowning households are leasing out land to earn stable 
cash income without having to bear the risks and the cost of cultivation. In the event of crop 
failures though, tenant cultivators are pushed into chronic indebtedness as they take loans to 
pay the rent. However, indebtedness and the inability to repay loans is not associated with 
social shame among the Baurias like among landowning Jats, for whom fear of losing land is 
paramount. In the event of crop failure Baurias return to working as wage labour. Their 
particular historical consciousness produced differentially within this regional landscape does 
not reflect aspirations for accumulation. Their developmental aspirations are also more 
circumscribed than that of landowning Jats as well as Dalit landless households. The younger 
men and women within the community do express the hope that their children will study and 
obtain salaried employment. But they are confined to sending their children to government 
run schools in the hopes that they would get public sector jobs. These expressions of hope are 
tinged with fatalism, not a sense of entitlement and are far removed from the strategic choices 
that landowning and increasingly many Dalit households are making in terms of ensuring 
non-agrarian futures for their children. 
 
Gurpyar Singh, a young Bauria in his 40s says his three children go to the village primary 
public school, adding unprompted that many people in the community now are beginning to 
send their children to school. Among the 50 Bauria households in their village, he says, 
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“there have been one or two instances where young boys have managed to get jobs – one in 
the army and one as a bank manager. But, this has only started happening very recently - 
earlier no one in our community was able to get any jobs because people still mistrust us.” 
His grandmother interjects and insists unequivocally that the situation has improved for their 
community. Recalling her childhood when they did not have enough food, she says,  
“I worked on farms harvesting wheat, picking cotton for just 25 
paise per day wage. We picked the fruit of the van tree as grain 
was scarce. The yield of wheat was very low in those days barely 
sufficient for the zamindar’s (farmer) own family. Only manure 
was used to grow rain-fed wheat, millets and pulse.  The land was 
left fallow for a part of the year. In those days, the zamindars did 
not give us anything, now at least if we need something they help 
sometimes. There was nothing else to do except daily hard labour 
on the farms.”  
 
She recalls stealing butter from the zamindar’s house and selling it to others in the village to 
make ends meet. Thus, for her higher yields because of fertilizers have translated into more 
food but only through the benevolence of landowning farmers. Gurpyar Singh and his wife 
worked as daily wage labourers on farms but started leasing land about four years ago. He 
has been farming since childhood alternating between wage labour and working on rented 
land with his family. In the first two years, they leased land for 3 months to grow vegetables, 
and then after accumulating some cash, they leased 2 acres for the whole year. They grow 
wheat and paddy and plant vegetables in the intervening months between the two crops. After 
suffering losses due to crop failure last year, and because rents are spiralling upwards in this 
area, they decided not to rent land this year. His wife says that is why they are at home now 
in the middle of the day, unlike all their neighbours who are in the fields. Gurpyar Singh says 
the whole family, including his children, work in the fields when they rent land and he goes 
to Jalandhar (one of the largest cities in Punjab) every day to sell vegetables. The wheat they 
grow is sufficient for home consumption all year and is grown without any fertilizer or 
pesticides. With vegetables, however, he says spraying is done almost every day and adds 
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"because we grow three crops in a year, more fertilizer and sprays are required. The PAU 
people say use fewer chemicals but nothing grows without them." 65 
 
The Bauria community historically referred to as tribes, but now officially classified as 
Scheduled Castes, has not only been invisible in scholarly analyses of the Green Revolution. 
Despite being almost completely dependent on farming livelihoods even today (perhaps the 
only social group in this region to do so) they have been invisible on the landscape of 
postcolonial agrarian politics including in mobilizations around land redistribution and 
agricultural wages. Their struggles in the post-independence years were confined to a demand 
for de-notification as a ‘criminal tribe', and inclusion in affirmative action policies for 
accessing welfare provisions (Singh 2008). This invisibilization partly stems from their small 
numbers (which are however concentrated in certain pockets), relative isolation from the 
village social organization. The critical factor though is their association with pastoral and 
nomadic livelihoods, which was at odds with Punjabi regional ecology and identity produced 
intensively through agrarian modernization. 
 
The current crisis has spurred new forms of tenant cultivation through short-term leasing in 
the last decade, which has provided many among the Bauria community an opportunity to 
farm autonomously although under very risky conditions. The risks of cultivation are being 
passed on to the most marginalized group. The Baurias nevertheless construe tenancy as an 
opening up of a pathway for upward mobility, which reveals the severe constrictions imposed 
by their historical trajectory. Social stigma resulting from the colonial legacy of being 
labelled ‘criminals' for their nomadic practices has persisted, manifest in discrimination 
																																								 																				
65 The insecticides he names include the most highly toxic ones such as Monocrotophos and 
Fenvalerate. 
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against the community in job recruitment in the public and private sector. They are also 
vilified within the discourse of sustainability. KVM activists, natural farmers, as well as state 
extension officials often cite the Baurias as an example of cultivators who use the most toxic 
pesticides and insecticides, and in large quantities, even though the amount of land they 
cultivate is minuscule.   
 
While KVM activists, like government extension officials, often make unsubstantiated claims 
about Bauria community using an indiscriminate amount of agrochemicals, more than other 
farmers, in order to get the highest possible yields in three months, they are excluded from 
mobilisation efforts for shifting toward sustainable farming practices. As one Bauria 
cultivator points out, ‘whether it is the agrochemical company representatives or the 
extension agents –they all leave us alone. They are only interested in those who own the 
land.' The Baurias make a substantial profit through short-term leasing, not because of higher 
yields, but primarily because they cultivate as a family with no hired labour and sell directly 
in the market bypassing the intermediaries. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
  
In this chapter, I have argued that experiential narratives and the collective shared memory of 
transformation of agrarian work reveal the foreclosures of the techno-political regime enacted 
through Green Revolution practices. These foreclosures are replicated analytically in 
compartmentalized bureaucratic, economic, agronomic, and social science accounts of the 
Green Revolution. The analytical departure point of transformation of labour practices is 
useful for understanding how the knowledge-labour rift shapes socio-ecological relations, and 
the interconnectedness of production and social reproduction.  The processes through which 
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the technological treadmill was instituted, resisted and normalized, and the simultaneous 
erasure of material and social commons is flattened in critical scholarship on the Green 
Revolution which largely discusses the impact of Green Revolution in terms of rising 
inequality and ecological degradation. Narratives of transformation in practices show the 
constitution of subjectivities at the intersection of class, caste and gender, instead of inferring 
agrarian politics through pre-configured sociological categories.  
 
Differentiated conceptions of autonomy, risk, security, aspirations and entitlements persist 
even within this relatively standardized social ecology produced through technocratic 
practices. The case of the Bauria community is emblematic in this context. Absent from 
analyses of the Green Revolution and of agrarian politics more broadly, they have become 
token offenders within the narrowly framed narrative of ecological degradations. The elisions 
structured through techno-politics in the development decades thus delimit political 
mobilisation despite the recognition of these elisions. This complex and nonlinear history of 
transformation of agrarian work and attendant social reproduction practices is critical for 
understanding the specific form of prefigurative agro-ecological politics in Punjab, in 
addition to how the key protagonists, small and medium farmers, are framing and 
experiencing the present crisis which I discuss in the following chapter. 
 
The self-conscious deployment of ‘culture’ and ‘practices’ in the grassroots politics of 
sustainability is a strategy of inversion as resistance against such techno-power. However, as 
the previous chapter suggests the material and structural constraints within which this politics 
is actualized has led to a narrow focus on ecologically sustainable production practices. These 
diluted agro-ecological politics excludes the agenda of social equity, hoping for a trickle-
down. Collective social memories and gendered narratives of the transformation of agrarian 
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work reveal the erasures from the socio-material landscape and the voices of those who are 
marginalised on the landscape of organised resistance. In recalling the connectedness of 
production with socio-ecological reproduction, these narratives illustrate the fuller potential 
of a politics of agroecological practice. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE UNMAKING OF THE ‘PROGRESSIVE’ PUNJABI FARMER 
PRECARIOUSNESS AND DOWNWARD MOBILITY 
I. Introduction 
 
A recent editorial in a popular Punjabi newspaper running a series titled Field Reports on the 
Agrarian Crisis came to the following conclusions. “The folly of (1) taking a loan to buy a 
tractor and selling it to fund a wedding, (2) wasting the state’s precious resource, water, to 
grow rice for consumers outside the state, (3) installing expensive submersible pumps to 
extract sinking groundwater, (4) abandoning less water-consuming crops and (5) pursuing 
unhealthy food habits and a laid-back lifestyle needs to be realized. One needs to be 
extraordinarily dumb to do such self-damage.”66 This sentiment is heard repeatedly in the 
region – that Punjabi rural households are afflicted with the disease of excessive 
consumerism and greed. Indiscriminate use of water and agrochemicals, high expenditure on 
weddings and farm machinery, chronic indebtedness, and unwillingness to personally labour 
in their own fields are cited as evidence. The present agrarian crisis demarcated as a post-
1990s phenomenon, manifest in stark forms with severe ecological degradation and 
unravelling of the subsidy regime with the neoliberal restructuring of agriculture, reflects the 
material unsustainability of the technocratic regime that has been unfolding since the late 
colonial period in Punjab. Discursive recasting of the Punjabi landowning farmer from being 
‘industrious' and ‘progressive' to being ‘irresponsible' and a ‘wastrel', particularly when 
articulated by political elites, media and public officials such as agricultural scientists and 
extension officials, shifts the blame for the present crisis onto farmers, and away from the 
																																								 																				
66 Sandhu, Nirmal (2016, February 2). Simply put, radical change is the only way out. The 
Tribune. Retrieved from http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/punjab/field-reports-making-
sense-of-it/190859.html 
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technocratic regime of agricultural intensification, known as the ‘Green revolution', propped 
through subsidies and pushed aggressively since the 1960s.  
 
Rural landowning households themselves, however, also echo this shared public discourse 
within the region. In this chapter, I focus on the lived experiences of the agrarian crisis 
articulated by rural landowning cultivators, and how they reference this discourse of 
cultural/moral decline. I argue that these narratives of crisis reveal an understanding of 
precariousness that goes beyond the political economy of agriculture. Actively attributing the 
crisis to government policies that instituted the technological treadmill, these narratives, 
however, do not isolate the realm of production from the social and cultural dimensions of 
precariousness. While agricultural livelihoods have always been precarious for a majority of 
Indian cultivators, the present precariousness in Punjab for landowning farmers follows a 
period of relative stability structured through the state input subsidy regime and minimum 
support prices for designated crops – wheat and rice. Recent policy recommendations also 
indicate that in the near future, the central procurement agency Food Corporation of India 
will move out of Punjab to set up operations in Eastern states that were marginalised through 
the ‘Green Revolution’ decades – further depleting support for Punjabi farmers (Kumar, 
2015). Additionally, farmers also fear that widespread perception of excessive chemical 
residue on food crops coming from Punjab would make them uncompetitive in the open 
market. 
 
Currently, less than six per cent of Indian farmers, mostly concentrated in the North-Western 
Green Revolution belt, are able to access the national state food grain procurement system 
(Kumar 2016).  The majority of landowning farmers in Punjab, including small and marginal 
farmers who produce a surplus, sell wheat and rice to central procurement agencies through 
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commission agents and a well-established network of market yards across the state. This 
privileged position of farmers in Punjab and the Green Revolution belt is often highlighted in 
scholarship on agrarian crisis in India, with a selective focus on incomes. For instance, 
Kannan (2015) in a comparative analysis of four states in India concludes that Punjab is the 
only state where farm incomes have not fallen in the post-1990s period and real wage rates 
for agricultural labour have shown an increasing trend. Such economistic analyses, however, 
present a partial picture, which does not capture the precariousness experienced by rural 
households. For landless households, this takes the form insecurity due to the irregularity of 
available work on and off the farm for landless households, exacerbated for women and the 
elderly, who are unable to commute to cities for work. And for small and medium 
landowning farmers chronic and widespread indebtedness that underpin the cultivation cycle 
means lack of access to cash.  
 
While small and marginal farmers, as well as landless rural communities experienced the 
Green Revolution as a crisis since the beginning, medium farmers who enjoyed a short period 
of prosperity are now experiencing a decline in well-being. As scholars have pointed out 
farmer suicides in India are occurring in regions of capital-intensive agriculture (Vasavi 
2012; Dandekar and Bhattacharya 2017). Dwindling profits from agriculture in a context in 
which in Thorstein Veblen's words, ‘everyday life is an unremitting demonstration of the 
ability to pay' (1965:41), means that loans are increasingly drawn not only for meeting costs 
of cultivation but for everyday consumption needs, and meeting socio-cultural obligations. 
Even households with significant assets such as land and livestock have little disposable cash 
through the cultivation cycle.  
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In this chapter, I examine how precariousness is shaping subjective perceptions of well-being 
and status, in this distinctive context of downward mobility of the rural ‘middle class’. The 
narratives of crisis articulated by cultivators that go beyond production practices broadly 
centre on three themes. First, the insecurities generated by insurmountable debt, increasing 
incidence of diseases and a dysfunctional public health care system, and the heightened 
economic risk involved in cultivation, resulting in the trend toward leasing out land to 
generate secure incomes in the form of rent. Second, the cognition that aspirations produced 
through the development decades, are unrealizable for the majority of youth. The capacity to 
obtain what is considered dignified work and urbane lifestyles has been diminished for the 
majority. And finally, the tension arising from downward mobility, pervasive individuation 
ethic combined with social obligations that are perceived as essential to maintaining status 
associated with dominant landowning agrarian castes. I end by briefly reflecting on how these 
sociocultural dimensions of precarity are shaping conceptions of political agency. I aim to 
show that people enter conditions of precariousness from class, caste, generational and 
gendered positions which shape their notions of well-being and the strategies of coping with 
the crisis in a relational framework. These different experiences of the crisis are essential for 
understanding the current landscape of resistance, and the possibilities and constraints for the 
formation of political alliances across social groups.  
 
Several scholars have usefully examined the unfolding of neoliberalism in the form of 
withdrawal of state resources from agriculture and deregulation of trade barriers that have led 
to agrarian and rural distress in India (cf. Walker 2008; McKinney 2013; Banerjee 2015). 
Neoliberal political rationality, however, goes much deeper in creating conditions and 
subjectivities that enforce individualised strategies for coping with the crises. As Wendy 
Brown suggests neoliberal political rationality is a constructivist project that encompasses but 
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goes beyond state practices, and involves ‘producing individuals as rational, calculating 
creatures whose moral autonomy is measured by their capacity for "self-care" - the ability to 
provide for their own needs and service their own ambitions’ (2003: 6). The Green 
Revolution decades instituted state support primarily in the economic domain in order to 
incentivise increasing productivity in cereal crops, with little attention to public health and 
education infrastructure even in ‘prosperous’ states like Punjab. The period of relative 
stability, when medium and large farmers were able to accumulate, was also characterised by 
dismantling of the material and social commons. It is important to note that in the 
developmental decades, state support was confined to the economic domain, leaving rural 
households to fend for themselves in the realm of education and health. The current crisis on 
the surface is a function of the withdrawal of state support for chemical-intensive agricultural 
production, which leaves farmers in regions like Punjab to continue to sustain capital-
intensive production on their own. However, the crisis is also a manifestation of the lack of 
basic public amenities, monetized consumption practices and everyday life that was 
structured through this period. The so-called ‘Green Revolution' not only transformed 
farming practices but also monetized social reproduction compressed within a few decades.67  
 
The scholarship on precarity that primarily addresses the experiences of the working classes 
in the post-industrial Global North also highlights the specificity of experiences of downward 
mobility. Insecurity of work is accompanied by a loss of occupational identity as well as 
normative expectations of self-care and self-sustainability, resulting in de-sociality in various 
forms (Allison, 2013; Lorey, Derieg & Butler, 2015). Critiques of such a formulation though 
rightly suggest that such precariousness is not a state of exception but has been the norm for 
the majority in the global South. But this literature implicitly or explicitly mostly references 
																																								 																				
67 I discuss this process through oral histories that recall the transformations since the 1960s 
in Chapter 2.  
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the experiences of urban informality and those already dispossessed from land (Breman & 
Van der Linden 2014; Davis, 2004; Chatterjee, 2004; Denning 2010). Two contradictory 
tendencies are visible in this literature. One strand suggests that increased risk and insecurity 
has weakened the social fabric, dismantling the possibility of collective politics or has led to 
the rise of regressive reactionary forms of populist mobilization. The other strand suggests 
that conditions of precariousness have opened up space for different ways of being political 
(cf. Dinerstein 2014). Such prefigurative politics which does not resemble traditional forms 
of labour struggles or struggles for mediated redistribution through the state holds the 
possibility of forging previously unlikely alliances across social groups. The Punjabi ‘bullock 
capitalists' practising capital intensive farming, occupy an exceptional position in the agrarian 
South. They share the experience of downward mobility with working classes of the post-
industrial North with the retreat of statist protections. The current agrarian crisis, manifest 
following structural reforms in India, has expanded the net of precariousness to engulf them 
in common conditions of exploitation experienced by small and marginal farmers, the 
majority of petty commodity producers, and workers in the non-farm economy. Hence, they 
provide a unique standpoint for reflecting on emerging forms of political, and for situating 
struggles of agrarian classes in relation to other forms of precarity politics at the neoliberal 
conjuncture. The present landscape of resistance in Punjab is particularly apt for examining 
the question that underpins the debates on precarity, which Isabell Lorey (2015) succinctly 
frames as whether the crisis of the collective, that is of the welfare state, will pave the way for 
the emergence of the commons? 
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II. Precarious Livelihoods and Lives 
 
The Debt Economy 
Within collective social memory among Punjabi cultivators, debt has always been a part of 
the farm economy particularly since the late colonial period that is the mid-nineteenth 
century. In the last few decades, however, chronic indebtedness has begun to cripple 
everyday life, resulting in partial or complete dispossession from land for many small and 
marginal farmers. Landowning cultivators trace the beginnings of this chronic state of 
indebtedness to investments in irrigation and farm machinery, specifically submersible 
pumps and tractors in the 1970s and 1980s. The level of indebtedness can be gauged from 
tractor ownership data in Punjab. In 2003 there were 714 tractors per thousand hectares of 
net-cropped area, as compared to the all India average of 168 (Kannan 2015). Ownership of 
high-powered tractors and other machinery, such as combine harvesters and laser levellers, 
have been actively promoted by government agricultural extension through subsidized loans. 
Over the Green revolution decades, ownership of tractors, in particular, has become a new 
status symbol for landowning households.  
 
With mono-cropping, increasing expenditure on food and other basic needs became essential, 
deepening the reaches of the cash economy into the sphere of social reproduction. As elderly 
men and women note, before the ‘Green Revolution’ the only commodities bought from the 
market on a daily basis were salt and tea. Everything else was produced on the farm, 
including indigenous varieties of cotton that was spun into cloth for the household needs. The 
need for disposable cash income was extended further with the growing value placed on 
higher education, within rural households for obtaining salaried non-farm jobs. Higher 
education for the majority of rural youth can only be accessed through private institutions. 
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Availability of cash, however, is scarce even in households with adequate landholdings as 
they service long-standing debts combined with dwindling income from agriculture. While 
consumption expenditures have grown, farm incomes continue to fall which makes 
repayment of loans as well as meeting everyday consumption needs difficult (Singh et al 
2017).68 The minimum support prices (MSP), while providing a stable income, barely cover 
the cost of production. According to the Swaminathan Commission Report in 2005-2006, in 
Punjab, the MSP for rice was marginally higher than the cost of production, and in the case of 
wheat, it was lower than the cost of production.   
 
Along with the purchase of machinery and investment in irrigation, medium farmers attribute 
accumulation of long standing debt to persistent failure of the cotton crop in the 1990s from 
which they have been unable to recover. More than usual loans were taken by farmers to buy 
pesticides that were sprayed in larger quantities.  As the crops continued to fail, farmers were 
unable to recover the costs of cultivation and accumulated insurmountable debt. Small 
farmers use most of the wheat crop for household consumption and rely on the cotton or 
paddy crop for cash income. Nagaura Singh, a farmer in his 50s who cultivates 2.5 acres with 
his son, who also works as an electrician in the village, suggests that at any given time of the 
year, they have very little disposable cash.   
“I buy seeds and sprays from the arhatiya (commission agent) on 
credit and then he deducts the amount when I sell the crop to him, 
which means that I end up with very little cash in the end. The 
whole system runs on loans and the cycle is endless once you get 
trapped in it. The rate of cotton has been fluctuating a lot, which 
has pushed farmers further into deeper debt. With wheat, there 
have been difficulties in procurement in the last few years because 
																																								 																				
68 A recent study suggests that as many as 85.9% of farming households and slightly more 
than 80% of agricultural households are under debt in Punjab, where a majority of the share 
of loans taken by households comes from non-institutional sources (Singh et al 2017:53). The 
study also suggests that while small and marginal farming households and agricultural labour 
incur debt primarily for domestic expenditure, medium and large farming households incur a 
larger share of their debt for purchasing farm inputs and for educational expenditure.  
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of quality issues. Unseasonal rains mean the moisture content of 
wheat is high and it lies in the market yard for weeks before it is 
procured. Even once it is procured, there are delays in payment.” 
 
Lack of cash is a common grievance articulated by most small and marginal farmers like 
Nagaura Singh as well as households with medium sized holdings that are mostly dependent 
on farming.  Nagaura Singh goes on to suggest that while regulation of the usage of 
agrochemicals and their prices is important, the crux of the problem is increasing the price of 
crops so people can make a decent living from farming. 
 
The MSP has increased minimally and is not commensurate with 
the rise in costs of other products. Farmers borrow from arhatiyas 
instead of Banks because they are willing to give fertilizer/sprays 
and food along with other daily consumption goods on credit. But 
they also charge higher interest rates, especially from small 
farmers. They cannot afford to offend the big landowners because 
they bring substantial business, and the very large ones even lend 
money to arhatiyas.” 69 
 
A recent study suggests the extent of dependence of farmers on commission agents through 
the cultivation cycle from buying inputs on credit to selling their produce through them to 
state procurement agencies across Punjab (Singh, Bhogal & Singh 2014; Singh & Bhogal 
2015). What is most striking in the study, however, is the extent to which farming households 
are now buying everyday consumption goods from commission agents on credit. Many 
farmers in their interviews point out that being able to get necessary consumption goods on 
credit from commission agents, with whom they often share long-term relationships, provides 
some relief given the non-availability of cash.  The infractions of commission agents are no 
longer perceived as the dominant mode of exploitation by farmers. Instead, cotton farmers in 
																																								 																				
69 Traditionally dominated by trading castes, many large farmers joined the commission agent 
business during the 1970s and 80s when productivity and profitability were highest. These few 
farmers who diversified their agricultural surplus into other businesses are the ones unaffected by the 
current agrarian crisis. For a detailed account of how the commission agent system works in Punjab 
see Sukhpal Singh, & Tejinder K Dhaliwal. (2011). The status of commission agent system in Punjab 
agriculture. Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 66(4), 662. interesting exception 
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particular attribute the crisis, which they are experiencing to the volatility of prices, 
increasing costs of cultivation with no guarantee of assured return, processes over which they 
have no control, and to the inaction of the government and political ruling classes.   
 
Public policy discourse in the last few years has discussed measures for removing these local 
intermediaries, which is premised on the notion that they engage in exploitative practices that 
are detrimental to farmers’ well-being. Exploitation by local intermediaries is used as a 
justification for allowing international food retail chains into the country that will ‘fix’ the 
inefficiencies that plague the agricultural markets and supply chains.70 However, as Richa 
Kumar (2014) suggests based on her study of soya bean in Madhya Pradesh, the deployment 
of technological solutions such as providing market price information to farmers, and 
eliminating local intermediaries from the supply chain, is unlikely to ‘empower’ farmers 
given the global structures that create the conditions of exploitation. Unlike the world of 
online commodity trading and global retail chains, she argues the government regulated 
market yards and commission agents are accessible to farmers, retaining the possibility of 
enforcing some accountability. Cultivators who grow both cotton and wheat, the former 
governed by global actors both in terms of cost of inputs and prices which has generated a 
series of crises in the past two decades, and the latter sold to the state which is a relatively 
stable process with low but assured incomes, are aware of the lack of accountability that 
comes with foreign actors entering the agricultural system (cf. Clapp 2014).  In this context, 
farmers are articulating demands for retaining state support, although the forms in which state 
support is expected has changed, a theme I return to later. Meanwhile, farmers are adopting 
																																								 																				
70 The Indian government is opening food processing and retail to global companies like 
Walmart in an incremental fashion. These companies are now pushing back on local-sourcing 
regulation (Roy 2016).  
166	
	
individualised strategies of coping with precariousness such as leasing out land or investing 
scarce resources in attempts to secure jobs for their children.  
 
Burdened by debt, and given the heightened risk entailed in cultivation, a significant number 
of small and medium farmers are leasing out land with exorbitant rents. Leasing provides 
secure income in the form of rent, which is often supplemented by off-farm employment by 
some members of the household. Since, land ownership is deeply tied to status among Sikh-
Jats, selling land is the last resort as it incurs social shame. The land is leased in by large 
farmers who want to increase their operational holdings or by landless households to farm 
autonomously. Landless households are even taking on loans to lease lands as some studies 
have suggested (Singh et al 2017). 
 
Thus, the risks of cultivation are being passed on to landless households who are for the most 
part from lower castes. Landless households incur this risk in an attempt to secure subsistence 
and to avoid the uncertainty that comes with looking for daily wage labour on and off the 
farm, evident with the tenant cultivators among the Bauria Sikh community that I discuss in 
Chapter 2. Leasing small parcels of land makes it possible for the entire family to work 
collectively instead of being dispersed, and a sense of autonomy over the labour process, 
which is valued highly. Inderjeet Singh, a young tenant cultivator has leased in 16 acres this 
year. He contends that even though the annual rent for an acre is as high as 45,000Rs and 
there is barely any scope for making a profit, cultivation generates enough wheat for 
household consumption and fodder which enables them to keep milch cattle. When I ask, 
why lease land if there is no profit, he says,  
“what else is there to do for someone like me who is barely literate. 
The few private jobs that exist are insecure and pay only 5000Rs a 
month which is hardly enough for meeting the needs of the entire 
family. With 16 acres, all of us in the family have some work to 
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do, we do not have to go out of the village or work as daily wage 
labourers. The farmers are leasing out their land because they get 
60000Rs as rent sitting at home and doing nothing. Why would 
they want to work and bear the risk of cultivation?”  
 
With irregular work available on farms and within the village, male members from landless 
households often commute to nearby towns and cities for daily wage labour in construction 
and transport.71 Unlike many other parts of rural India, the Green Revolution decades 
facilitated the creation of adequate transportation infrastructure for moving grains, providing 
easy connectivity between village and towns and cities. Women and the elderly from landless 
households, unable to commute, work in the village at minimum wages, under the 
government’s employment guarantee scheme (MGNREGA). Tenant cultivators who lease 
land express a preference for cultivation, even as it entails tremendous risk and little profit as 
opposed to these other livelihood strategies because it provides dignified work and working 
conditions.  In the event of crop failure, though, they have to incur loans to pay exorbitant 
rent in addition to inputs costs, which pushes them into poverty.  
 
Sukhpreet Kaur's extended household that includes her husband's family, for instance, leased 
about 10-12 acres, to grow cotton and guar beans. While the vegetable production was good, 
and they produced enough wheat for their household consumption for the whole year, the 
cotton crop, for which input costs are high, was damaged and they have a debt of about 2 lakh 
rupees (about USD3000). Now they have opened a small grocery shop in the village to 
supplement income from daily wage labour and get rid of the debt. Government 
compensation in the event of crop failures, when available, is inaccessible to tenant 
cultivators. After the large-scale destruction of cotton crop due to whitefly (a sucking pest) 
attacks in 2015, while compensation was offered to landowning farmers in the region after 
																																								 																				
71 In the North-western Green Revolution states, labour use per hectare declined in the 1990s 
and is particularly low in Punjab (National Commission for Farmers 2006: 91).     
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massive protests by farmers unions, tenant cultivators reported receiving no compensation or 
it was diverted to those who owned the land. Sukhpreet goes on to add,  
 
"Most young people in our (landless, lower caste) community end 
up doing odd jobs –they sell things in distant places –for instance, 
buy onions in bulk and sell it to customers in towns, work as daily 
wage labour in construction, sell jute cots, or work as rickshaw 
pullers, barbers. Most children study these days until 10-12th grade, 
but very few get jobs. Not many of them work on the farms either.”  
 
For young people from landowning households, securing livelihoods through off-farm 
employment is also difficult for different reasons. They aspire to jobs that are commensurate 
with their higher education levels and conception of status associated with the regionally 
dominant caste of Sikh Jats. Such jobs, however, are few and rural youth are unable to 
compete with the cultural capital and skills of urban educated classes in a predominantly 
service sector economy. Social stigma and shame are associated with performing daily wage 
labour or accessing the government employment guarantee scheme, which despite being a 
universal demand-based scheme is perceived as being for the ‘poor and labouring classes’. 
Unwilling to work on their own family land, or in construction and transport as daily wage 
labour, and unable to access the jobs they desire, a majority of the rural youth from small, 
marginal and medium landowning households are unemployed or investing in expensive but 
poor quality technical education.72 Private engineering institutes with dubious credentials that 
have emerged over the last decade, dot the rural and urban landscape all over Punjab. 
Aspirations among the Sikh Jats shaped by a history of dominance by virtue of land 
ownership and pride in occupational identity, as well as the development trajectory, pushed 
through the Green revolution decades, no longer align with their extant material conditions, 
generating deep discontent (cf. Jeffery 2010; Jeffery et al 2008).   
																																								 																				
72 I discuss the experience and enactment of de-valorisation of agrarian work, once at the core 
of Sikh Jat identity along with land ownership in chapter 2.  
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Lauren Berlant (2011) terms this phenomenon of holding on to conventional fantasies of 
good life even in the face of evidence of their unattainability as ‘cruel optimism'. While her 
analysis is situated in the context of neoliberal structuring in Europe and the United States, it 
provides a way of thinking about precarity and aspirations in a relational conceptual 
framework within the particular historical trajectory of agrarian societies in the Global South. 
She draws attention to the significance of understanding what it means to enter insecurity or a 
state of precarity from different class positions. Methodologically, this means employing the 
lens of crisis to track the process of adjustment to the ‘transformation of what had seemed 
foundational’ (2011: 3). In postcolonial Punjab, for a majority of the landowning households 
this moment of crisis has not only brought to a halt the process of accumulation through 
farming and maintaining their dominant caste status materially, but also interrupted the 
process of upward mobility toward transitioning to ‘white collar jobs’ for the younger 
generation that was seen as ‘natural’ just two decades ago.73 The notion of ‘inflated 
aspirations' used to describe rural youth in regions like Punjab, sharply highlights the 
contradictions of the ‘transition' discourse of development (Gill 1988). Generational shifts in 
the meanings of agrarian work illustrate how aspirations are produced through politically 
structured conditions that also constrain their realization. While the national developmental 
discourse about transitioning out of agrarian and rural spaces shapes subjectivities in 
powerful ways, the dissonance created by unmet aspirations also opens up space for critical 
rethinking.  
 
 
																																								 																				
73 As Gill (1995) pointed out some of the core activists and militants of the farmers' unions that rose to 
prominence in the mid-1980s were farmers' sons who were denied urban government jobs, which they 
thought were commensurate with their educational attainments. 
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The Political Ecology of Health 
 
New forms of risks are becoming visible in pronounced ways in the domain of health. 
Unsurprisingly, the public health crisis is most pervasive in the cotton belt, notorious for the 
highest use of agrochemicals. After more than a decade of campaigning by NGOs and civil 
society groups, the government is acknowledging the relationship between public health 
crisis and excessive use of agrochemicals.74 The health crisis gained widespread attention 
with the regional and national media’s coverage of the ‘cancer train’, which has now become 
a widely known symbol of the agrarian crisis in Punjab. The Bathinda Express train is now 
colloquially called the ‘cancer train’, as most of its passengers are cancer patients travelling 
from the Malwa belt in Punjab to the neighbouring state of Rajasthan for treatment at a state-
run cancer hospital (Bariana 2016). The Punjab government is now in the process of setting 
up a cancer hospital in partnership with Tata Corporation, which ironically is one of the key 
players in the agrochemicals market.75 
 
Increasing incidence of diseases, particularly cancer and reproductive disorders has led to 
significant medical expenditures among rural households. Privatisation of health care was a 
part of neoliberal reforms in the 1990s in Punjab, despite being a state with relatively high 
GDP in the national context (Gill and Ghuman 2000). The number of public medical 
institutions in the state declined in the 1990s, and rural health centres often lack essential 
supplies. According to the government’s National Sample Survey in 2015, Punjab had the 
																																								 																				
74Twenty-ninth report Impact of chemical fertilizers and pesticides on agriculture and Allied 
sectors in the country. Standing committee on agriculture (2015-2016). Ministry of 
agriculture and farmers welfare (Department of Agricultural Research and Education) 
75 Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry. Ushering in the 2nd Green 
Revolution Role of Crop Protection Chemicals: A Report on Agrochemical Industry. 
November 2015. Retrieved on November 1, 2016. 
http://ficci.in/spdocument/20662/Agrochemicals-Knowledge-report.pdf 
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highest expenditure on private healthcare in the country. Medical expenditure is one of the 
most frequently cited reasons for selling land by rural households. Some scientific studies 
corroborate the relationship between agrochemical contamination and rising incidence of 
diseases, which is a part of everyday discussions in the villages (Mittal, Kaur & 
Vishwakarma 2014; Blaurock-Busch et al. 2014). 
 
While the cancer epidemic has attracted the most attention in the media, conversations in the 
villages, particularly among women revolve around growing incidence of reproductive 
disorders. These discussions around health frequently go beyond expressing frustration with 
the poor state of public hospitals. They delineate changes in dietary practices, pointing out the 
correspondence between agricultural intensification and declining health and well-being. 
Going beyond agrochemical contamination, increased prevalence of certain diseases is 
understood in the context of the broader transformation of the food culture with deepening 
commodification of production and consumption practices, and attendant changes in work 
practices. Amarjeet Kaur, who has been growing organic vegetables for household 
consumption for the past four years and even convinced her husband to convert a part of their 
land to organic production, suggests like many others, that the older generation ate more 
nutritious food, performed much more physical labour and were, therefore, healthier and 
lived longer lives.  
 
“As long as we ate bajra, jowar (pearl millets and sorghum), and 
worked with our hands, there were no diseases. Now all that we eat 
is wheat. The rotis made from bajra in those years were tasty, now 
the bajra that is available is often bitter and hard to digest. My 
husband says it is because the indigenous varieties have 
disappeared, and the hybrid varieties do not suit our bodies. People 
buy American cows because they yield more milk, but I do not like 
the taste of that milk –the tea tastes different as well. In my 
parent’s house, we still have indigenous cows and there is plenty of 
milk. The American cows require bathing twice a day, and fans in 
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their shelters because they cannot tolerate high temperatures. I 
decided to keep buffaloes instead. They do not produce as much as 
the American cows, but enough for our household consumption of 
milk and butter. Nothing beats the milk of our indigenous cows, it 
is great for preventing diseases and even the doctors recommend 
it.” 
 
Her husband Kesar Singh adds that the rampant problem of drug addiction among youth in 
Punjab is also a consequence of poor diets.  
 
           “Their food is full of chemicals, and so they get tired easily when 
they work and resort to addictive substances to relieve fatigue. 
People talk about drug addiction among young people, but almost 
everyone is popping pills for something or the other. Very often 
people avoid going to the doctor because it is expensive, and 
instead just ask the chemist to give them something for their 
ailments.”  
 
He then shifts to talking about monocrotophos, a highly toxic insecticide implying a 
connection between its spraying and the increasing incidence of diseases and use of drugs. 
“There has been a reduction in the use of monocrotophos as people are becoming more 
aware, but when farmers see sundi and tela (aphids) on wheat plants they sometimes still 
spray it because it produces better-looking wheat. I have been constantly telling my brother to 
not use it, but he still sprays it sometimes. It’s like the warnings on alcohol bottles that do not 
stop people from drinking.”  
 
The interconnections charted by Amarjeet Kaur and Kesar Singh between disease, food 
production and consumption are common knowledge that continuously circulates within 
village public discourse. The sense of inevitability expressed by Kesar Singh suggests an 
inability at the level of individual households to address the problem, given its enormity. 
Apathy regarding bodily harm caused by agrochemicals is in stark contrast to the fear and 
reluctance encapsulated in the narratives recalling the early years when pesticides and 
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insecticides were introduced. The highly toxic first-generation pesticides and insecticides in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s had visible and immediate effects that ranged from dizziness 
and foul smell to death. Hence, they evoked caution and fear and were recognised as poison. 
Most elderly people remember instances of death in their village due to pesticide poisoning, 
and some attribute women’s withdrawal from the fields to this period as well. Women recall 
the anxiety with which they monitored the sleep patterns on days when male members of the 
household came back after spraying chemicals in the fields.76  
 
Toxicity levels were readjusted with second-generation agrochemicals to address these 
visible effects, enabling the gradual normalisation of the presence of agrochemicals in the 
fields and beyond. There is no provision for disposal of empty containers, and people use 
them for bathing animals, lighting lamps, to store household items including water. When 
DDT was freely available in the 1980s and 1990s, many women recall using it to kill head 
lice among children. Unlike the initial years, where avoidance or extreme caution was 
practised by cultivators and by farm workers whenever possible, the masked and unknowable 
effects in the short-term combined with increasing crop failures due to pest resistance have 
led to the aggressive use of pesticides with normalization of their presence. None of the 
numerous field visits by company representatives every cropping season to demonstrate new 
products include dissemination of safety information. Pesticide shopkeepers argue that they 
do not need to provide safety information as farmers have been using these chemicals for 
decades and know their effects. However, most farmers I interviewed were not aware of the 
colour codes that indicate different levels of toxicity, and very few are able to read 
																																								 																				
76 Data on occupational pesticide poisoning is rarely collected and unreliable as it is largely 
obtained from hospital records as the WHO study (2009) on health implications of 
monocrotophos use in India suggests, further complicated by the fact that the available data 
does not separate occupational accidental poisoning from self-intentional poisoning among 
farmers. It is also worth noting that pesticide poisoning has been completely neglected in the 
literature on the Green revolution in India, given the lack of attention to work practices.   
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instructions that are not in Punjabi. In one pesticide shop in Bathinda, none of the products 
that I asked for had attached instruction manuals. The seller had to search through his stock to 
find one of the manuals and contacted another seller to gather leaflets for the rest of the 
products. 
 
The long-term effects of the pervasive presence of agrochemicals in the environment and 
food are becoming visible with the cancer epidemic and rise in reproductive disorders over 
the last decade. Although visibility enables cognition of agrochemical contamination, farming 
households feel that they cannot control or resolve the problem. Distancing of costs in this 
way produces quiescence. Temporal lag in the manifestation of effects also allows for 
effective obfuscation through techno-political framing by experts to explain and address the 
health crisis. Such obfuscation is, ironically, articulated through claims of precision. 
Scientists and the public policy discourse more broadly focus on identifying singular causal 
factors for the growing incidence of diseases. For instance, an agronomist at the state 
university claims that  
           ‘pesticide residue is not an issue with wheat or rice in this region, 
but largely with vegetables and fruits that are generally grown by 
migrant labour from UP and Bihar on the outskirts of the city and 
consumed domestically. They lease land around urban centres. 
They also grow off-season vegetables as it fetches a good price and 
therefore the use of excessive chemicals for ripening including 
banned pesticides is common. And because vegetables are not 
always cooked before eating, they are the main source of diseases. 
With wheat, the pesticide residue evaporates by the time it is 
harvested and consumed.’  
 
The health impact is thus narrowed down to pesticide residues on food crops without 
accounting for environmental pollution, the possibility of long-term effects or even direct 
exposure to chemicals while spraying. On further reflection he suggests,  
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‘the hue and cry raised by activists against pesticide spraying on 
cotton crop and the claim that it is responsible for rising incidence 
of cancer are misplaced. A lot of the chemical pollution in this belt, 
particularly ground water contamination, is due to waste generated 
by the industries, but no one focuses on that.  It is true that 
groundwater has also been contaminated from excessive use of 
nitrogenous fertilizer in paddy and wheat. The plants can only 
absorb a certain amount and the rest seeps into the ground.' 
 
Echoing the common narrative among scientists and extension officials, he concludes that 
excessive use of agrochemicals is a consequence of ‘lack of education among farmers who 
follow each other or the advice of shopkeepers and agrochemical company representatives 
instead of university recommendations.' The ahistorical understanding of the crisis, and 
therefore the solutions he proposes, reflect an epistemic framework that clearly separates the 
social and the ecological domain, and attribute no responsibility to institutional mechanisms 
that aggressively promoted Green revolution practices. The corrective to ecological 
degradation, when the problem is framed in this way, are technical fixes, for instance 
promoting the need-based use of inputs by farmers through making available mechanisms for 
soil testing. According to him, further mechanisation can resolve the crisis of profitability as 
it would reduce labour costs for farmers, and more generally with occupational 
diversification and creation of more off-farm jobs. Practices aimed at place-based socio-
ecological rejuvenation are not within the realm of what is ‘possible’ in this framework.  
 
Technopolitical obfuscation has also been the centrepiece of the debate surrounding farmer 
suicides, which have been critical to foregrounding the agrarian crisis in the national public 
consciousness. In 2015, a Punjab-based NGO filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the 
Supreme Court of India seeking court’s intervention on the matter.  In response to the PIL, 
the central government said that farmers' suicides were not due to agrarian reasons alone but 
also for factors like "family problems, illness, drug abuse/addiction, unemployment, property 
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dispute, professional/career problems, love affairs, barrenness/impotency, cancellation/non-
settlement of marriage, dowry dispute, fall in social reputation and other factors".77 This 
disassociation of ‘social factors’ from ‘economic distress’, and what specifically constitutes 
‘agrarian crisis’ has become a point of contention within the scholarly literature as well, 
specifically with reference to farmer suicides attributed to the cultivation of genetically 
modified cotton (Kaushal 2015; Munster 2012). The expert discourse that seeks to establish 
precise causal factors responsible for farmer suicides, and for ecological degradation is 
premised on a narrow framing of the agrarian crisis. Such techno-political discourse 
externalises ‘nature’ on the one hand and compartmentalises production from socio-cultural 
reproduction on the other, disregarding the ways in which crisis is experienced by farming 
households. 
 
Consuming pesticides has been the most common method among farmers to commit suicide, 
which is a deeply tragic culmination of the trajectory, which began with deaths due to 
accidental pesticide poisoning in the early years, followed by the less visible slow 
degradation of bodies and the regional social ecology as agrochemical use became 
normalised. In a group discussion with farmers in a village in Bathinda, everyone could recall 
instances of injuries during spraying pesticides. In response to a question from a researcher 
from Pesticides Action Network about whether they complain about agrochemical products 
that cause rashes or burning, one farmer remarked sardonically, ‘we do not complain to the 
company, but drink the product instead.' Another farmer notes that while he knows that the 
insecticide monocrotophos and other products with red triangles are extremely dangerous and 
harmful, he uses monocrotophos on his wheat crop because one spraying is sufficient, to 
avoid purchasing 2 or 3 less toxic chemicals which would cost more. ‘The prospect of crop 
																																								 																				
77 http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/no-farmer-should-commit-suicide-supreme-court-tells-
government-1209745 
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failure and no income to sustain the household is more immediate. People are more cautious 
with food crops, but with cotton, we sometimes use ten times the recommended dosage of 
monocrotophos', he adds. 
 
Farmers' articulations centre the labouring bodies as being embedded in the social ecology 
where both are sites of mutually constitutive degradation. The history of health is indeed 
where the story of the separation of humans from nature, critical to the narrative of 
modernity, is starkly undermined (Nash 2006: 209). As Nash suggests the ‘material 
connections between bodies and environments to which they attest, ironically, have been the 
most clear in the most industrialized landscapes – those landscapes that are typically taken as 
symbolic of human alienation from nature’ (2006: 210). This connection, however, becomes 
visible only when the socio-ecological resources to address it have already eroded 
significantly. My questions about the availability of protective gear, or precautionary 
information about high toxicity chemicals were often met with laughter from farmers that 
implied the incredulity of such a possibility. On further reflection, a few older farmers and 
farm workers recalled the prevalence of some precautionary measures, and the specialists in 
protective gear who sprayed in the fields, in the few years after pesticides and insecticides 
began to be used. Further, landless workers who laboured in the fields, and for whom the 
effects of chemicals were visible most starkly on their bodies have no voice in making 
decisions about farming practices given their alienation from and transitory relation to land. 
The basic level of protection in the form of masks, gloves and other protective gear is not 
available to farm workers while transporting, spraying and storing pesticides (Mittal et al 
2014). Perhaps the most voiceless victims are children. Studies have reported effects of 
pesticides among rural children that range from premature greying, discolouration of teeth to 
inability to perform developmental tasks particularly in cotton-growing areas of Bathinda, 
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and traced pesticide residues in human milk (Thakur et al., 2008; Halder 2007; Kalra et al 
1994; Mittal et al 2014).  
 
Apathy results from the enormity of the health epidemic, and the lack of capacity to address it 
at the individual or the household level. While the connection between the health epidemic 
and excessive use of agrochemicals is a part of the common-sense in the region, the almost 
complete erosion of other ways of farming over five decades has produced a sense of 
inevitability, reinforced by the degraded material environment. And yet, as Nash argues, 
‘from the vantage point of health, human alienation from the landscape even in highly 
industrialized spaces remained incomplete (2006:213). Ecological understandings of the 
body, health and land survive in collective memory that offers a counterpoint to techno-
political framings, and more critically resources for overcoming apathy. For instance, people 
often draw an analogy between widespread drug addiction among rural youth in Punjab and 
the addiction of land to agrochemicals. Infertile lands, with dead soils without any 
microorganisms, are compared with reproductive disorders among humans and animals. 
People cite the elimination of nutritious coarse grains from the fields and hence from diets, as 
well as reduced consumption of milk and milk products, as reasons for younger generations' 
inability to perform manual labour in the fields or withstand high temperatures. The tension 
articulated by notions of bodily degradation over subsequent generations, and the increasing 
requirement of agrochemicals for maintaining current levels of agricultural intensification 
opens the space for challenging the encrusted developmental paradigm of increasing 
productivity (cf. Nichols 2015). 
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III. Aspirations, Status and the problem of ‘Conspicuous Consumption’  
 
Crisis discourse is by no means uniform, and its contradictory claims reveal the ways in 
which decline in well-being is experienced in the realm of production and social 
reproduction, and the categories through which people examine their own life-worlds. On the 
one hand, the agrarian crisis is explained in terms of precarious livelihoods and consequently 
precarious lives that require loans to meet everyday needs, with no realisable alternative 
futures. On the other hand, ‘conspicuous consumption’ and greed of the Punjabi landowning 
households is also a part of the narrative of decay and crisis. In the narratives of ‘experts', 
whether it is the urban-centered regional and national media or public extension officials, 
bureaucrats and scientists, the rhetoric of ‘conspicuous consumption' is employed as an 
essentialized cultural attribute of Punjabis and the Sikh Jats in particular. This 
essentialization seeks to shift the blame onto the farmers for the present crisis, without 
acknowledging the role of structural policies that enabled the Green Revolution practices, as 
well as the associated consumption practices and social reproduction strategies. An 
agronomist at PAU, for instance, argues, 
           “The problem of rising debt among farmers has to do with 
extravagant lifestyles. Consumerist culture has consumed Punjab, 
which is also partially responsible for the crisis faced by rural 
households. The young people crave branded products because 
they see it on television and to fulfil these desires people take loans 
that they cannot repay. When the cotton yield was high two to 
three years ago and people made a lot of money, the standard of 
living went up. But it does not go down when the yields or income 
are not as high.”  
 
He goes on to suggest that not only do farmers lack financial prudence, but their greed is 
responsible for the ecological crisis as well.  
           "They do not use recommended doses of agrochemicals, and farm 
with the mentality of extracting as much as possible from the land. 
People in Malwa overall have larger landholdings, and their psyche 
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is that of the big farmers regardless of how much land they have. 
They constantly want more yields and tend to, therefore, use 
fertilizer and pesticides indiscriminately." 
 
On further prodding, though he admits that monocultural cropping is bound to create 
ecological problems in the long run. Defending the role of the scientific establishment 
nevertheless, he says, 
“the need of the hour in the country in the 1960s to produce food 
grain and prevent famine, which we did successfully. The 
university or extension agents did not prescribe over-fertilization, 
which is a consequence of farmers’ economic compulsions, which 
in turn have been shaped by government policies. When the 
farmers’ land loses its productivity, the government should 
compensate them to help them rejuvenate the soils.  Over time the 
cost of living has increased exponentially, and farmers’ incomes 
have not increased correspondingly. The farmer does not get 
adequate returns for his crops, and the prices of other things that he 
has to buy from the market keep increasing.”  
 
Another scientist provides a less nuanced analysis by arguing that "excessive spending by 
farmers to maintain social status is the primary cause of indebtedness. Even small farmers 
buy tractors, which is not very efficient, and spend on lavish weddings, alcohol and 
unnecessary consumption practices.” He also attributes this ‘cultural decline’ to the influx of 
migrant labour from Bihar and UP, particularly widespread drug addiction and rise in crime 
rates. Adding that paddy cultivation, “would not have been possible without their knowledge 
and skill with transplanting, which has been detrimental for the social ecology of Punjab 
given that paddy is the main culprit as far as depleting water resources are concerned.” 
 
‘Conspicuous consumption' is thus employed in expert narratives, as a means of ‘othering', 
signalled explicitly in the above quote by holding migrant labour responsible for moral and 
ecological degradation. Punjabi cultivators are framed as purely economic subjects, and their 
sociocultural obligations and practices are considered irrational and a matter of individual 
choice. With no self-reflexive engagement about their own urban lifestyles and consumption 
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patterns, these narratives display what Kaushal (2015) calls an assumption of epistemological 
superiority, that have pervaded urban middle-class responses to current agrarian distress. 
Such ‘epistemological superiority’ is also visible in scholarly analysis of consumption 
patterns that conclude with prescriptions for behavioural development interventions (cf. 
Cavalcante 2015). 
 
These expert narratives are reminiscent of discourse that accompanied the commercialisation 
of agriculture and efforts to increase productivity through a restructuring of land tenure 
arrangements and building of irrigation infrastructure in Punjab province in the late colonial 
period. Malcolm Darling (1977: 225-227), a British administrator writes in the mid-1920s, 
for instance, that while the colonial state's interventions brought material prosperity to 
Punjab, it led to a decline in the ‘moral character of the peasant'. He cites indebtedness, 
excessive drinking, the rise in expenditure on weddings, and female infanticide as evidence 
of this ‘moral decline’ particularly in the more prosperous districts within the province. All of 
these themes have resurfaced in the narratives of ‘cultural decline' at the present conjuncture 
that is used to explain rural distress. Darling astutely though also makes the observation that 
the few with largest landholdings derived greatest advantages from colonial policies and 
acted as trendsetters for these ‘detrimental' consumption practices, arguing that ‘herd instinct' 
is particularly strong in the close-knit village society.  He writes, 
 
A ‘want’, therefore, that starts as the luxury of the few, is apt 
sooner or later to become the necessity of many; and when the rise 
in value of land has made it possible for most to borrow as much as 
they please, it is generally sooner than later…formerly, in bad 
years a self-acting law compelled (peasants) them to live on what 
was actually produced, as they had no credit to supplement it. Now 
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they find it easier to borrow than to alter their ‘scale of living’ 
(1977:215).78 
 
Unlike the expert narratives that are framed in moralistic terms or attribute cultural essences, 
emic critique of social pathologies and ‘conspicuous consumption’ refer to government 
policies that instigated the preoccupation with increasing productivity, images in the media 
that sell a particular way of life, and the influx of consumer goods in rural markets which are 
the new frontier for expansion. KVM activists, as well as members of farming households, 
particularly the elderly who have lived through the early Green Revolution period, formulate 
such critiques most cogently. Gaganpreet, a young activist from a landless family, working 
with KVM, frames the issue in the following way while addressing farmers at a village 
meeting: 
 
            The Green Revolution did not only transform our way of farming, 
but money was infused in our everyday lives. Earlier weddings 
were simple affairs, where the boy’s family provided expenses for 
the food and the girls’ family made the arrangements. Gradually, 
the girls’ family was expected to make arrangements and provide 
the food. Then, as some families became wealthier with increasing 
productivity they also began to demand dowry. Earlier the practice 
of dowry giving was confined to extremely large landowners. 
Now, our society has degraded to the extent that women are killed 
for not bringing enough dowries, and we kill our girls in the womb, 
even before they are born to avoid bearing the burden of dowry. 
Or, if they happen to survive and grow up, parents push them to 
take IELETS (International English proficiency test), as girls are 
generally good at studying and clear them more easily than boys. 
And then they are married off to strangers in Canada/America 
without any concern for their safety, in the hopes that they will 
enable the entire family to emigrate in a few years. Does anyone 
ever ask them if they want to go to a strange country with no 
family or kin...we have to understand and reflect on this whole 
picture in order to be able to come out of it. These societal trends 
are not unrelated to the Green Revolution.79  
																																								 																				
78 Interestingly, Darling in his conclusion proposes ‘cooperative farming' as a solution to the 
dilemma of rising debt that accompanies material prosperity.    
79 Punjab has very high rates of female infanticide which as Ravinder Kaur (2008) among 
others have argued is not just a reinforcement of traditional cultural norms, but a 
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Gaganpreet then raises the issue of the aspirations to exit farming, and villages more 
generally. Government jobs continue to be the most coveted jobs, particularly in the army and 
the police, followed by attempts to emigrate.80 Households often sell parts of their 
landholding to gather money for bribes for securing government jobs, or to pay brokers who 
can facilitate emigration.  Emigration, which was widespread in other parts of Punjab, has 
gathered momentum in the Malwa region more recently in the last two decades, that is the 
post crisis period, particularly after the persistent failure of the cotton crop in the 1990s. 
Referring to the unwillingness of young people to farm, and the attempts of landowning 
households to secure jobs, Gaganpreet says, 
 
This is one of the big reasons people end up putting their land as 
collateral or selling it. Young people who stay in the village and 
farm are only those who do it under compulsion. The farmer with 
2.5 acres tries to send his son to Dubai, for daily wage work, the 
one with 20 acres sends their sons to Canada or Australia. What we 
do not realize is that land is our only wealth, and if we lose it, we 
will have nothing left. People who sell seeds, chemicals, fertilizer, 
petrol and diesel live comfortably in Bathinda, Delhi and Mumbai. 
So, it is not that farming is intrinsically an unprofitable enterprise, 
everyone is making money out of it except farmers. If it was a 
losing enterprise, would the commission agents/banks be making 
so much money from it? We (farmers) are incurring losses because 
the system is against us and we collaborate with it and sustain it. If 
there is no one to farm, the land is meaningless. The whole system 
will crumble without the farmer.  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
manifestation of the increasing precarity of agrarian livelihoods. Similarly, Radhika Chopra 
(2011) examines household decision making in rural Punjab to suggest that precarity of 
agrarian livelihoods explains the systematic investment in cultivating material resources and 
networks to enable migration of some children in landed households.   
80 The army and the police seem more accessible, as a significant number of people within 
people's social networks or from the previous generations in a majority of the households are 
enrolled which is a colonial legacy. Nearly, 50% of the British India army was recruited from 
the relatively small Punjab province given its geopolitical location and the labelling of the 
Sikh Jats as ‘martial races' by the colonial state. Employment in the army also initiated the 
first wave of immigration in the early twentieth century. The large Punjabi diaspora has 
continued to facilitate the immigration of young people from their villages and extended 
social networks (Chopra 2011).   
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Providing another perspective, Jaswant Singh a school teacher in the primary government 
school in the village who also farms 4 acres of land, says, 
The issue of debt, in my opinion, is not limited to agriculture and 
has to do with the media. It is not just the failure of agriculture, but 
the development model that is being touted by the media that is 
responsible for the high levels of debt. Media has created this 
culture of hero worship, where the heroes are movie stars or people 
who are unlike the hard working labour in this country. The real 
development of any country, the revolutionary spirit is attached to 
its younger generation. Media has captured their imagination with 
mobiles, cars, branded clothes. Rural households need money to 
buy those things and they take money from wherever they can get 
it to fulfill that aspirational living standard. Punjabis, in particular, 
are susceptible to this consumerism because many people from 
here have gone abroad. They come back and build bungalows in 
the villages. This tendency to show off your status with big houses 
and tractors even at the expense of being in debt has harmed us the 
most.  
 
Ninety per cent of our young people do not want to be farmers. 
They do not want to go to the fields and do backbreaking work. 
There is no profit because people stopped working with their 
hands. Those who are working with their hands are still making 
some money. If there is a household with 2 acres and two members 
are available, should they not harvest wheat by hand? But, they 
will also rent a combine harvester. If they harvest manually, they 
will produce about 100-quintal straw. The rate of dry fodder right 
now is about 200-300Rs per quintal. In most households, the 
farmer is sitting in the field or the market yard after harvest, while 
the son is napping or sitting idle somewhere in the village or 
sniffing drugs in some cases. With weedicides and other 
agrochemicals, the money that was supposed to go to labour now 
goes to the companies. Everyone is caught in the trap of the ‘living 
standard' that we are all supposed to have but cannot. I watch the 
basti (colony of Dalit landless households), which is in front of my 
school in the village. If every farmer household has a car, every 
labouring household has a motorcycle, even if it means taking a 
loan. 
 
As Jaswant Singh highlights, perceptions of place and subjectivities are transformed through 
development discourse refracted in media images, and in the case of Punjabi youth through 
the imagined lives of those who have emigrated from their villages. These ‘virtual’ 
interactions and experiences combined with the infusion of consumer products in rural 
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markets transform social relations and notions of self, along with devaluation of agrarian 
work. Consumption practices acquire a pronounced become a site for asserting status, 
particularly for Sikh Jat young men with the dismantling of agrarian occupational identity 
and loss of autonomy over production. For landless Dalit youth, consumption can be a means 
for asserting equality. It is easier to take a petty loan and buy an expensive phone or 
motorcycle than to acquire or access land or find a stable job with a livable income. Across 
these social classes though, aspirations for a better life are displaced from the realm of work 
to consumption, as the former seems unrealisable.  
 
Gupta and Sivaramakrishnan (2003) argue that rural cosmopolitanism forged through 
experiences of migration for work by landless and lower caste workers produce an 
oppositional consciousness with the potential to challenge local subordinating relations, 
particularly caste hierarchies. Moreover, with the agrarian crisis, dominance exercised by 
landowning agrarian castes like the Sikh Jats has weakened within the village social structure 
to a limited extent (cf. Martin 2015). However, emancipation experienced by Dalit landless 
workers through moving out of exploitative agrarian social relations is severely limited in 
that they transition to insecure forms of livelihood and economic forms of exploitation (Roy 
2014; Vasavi 1998). Neoliberal practices in the postcolonial global South are being deployed 
by states as a development strategy, reconfiguring the consolidation of insecure livelihoods as 
the normal state of being not as a transitory stepping stone toward something else (Connell 
and Dados 2014; Gupta 2012). Even as Dalits have gained more formal political 
representation, rural structural reforms such as land redistribution have become invisible on 
the political agenda in a state like Punjab, which has one of the highest percentages of 
landlessness among rural households in the country. The 32% Dalit population is largely 
landless (Socio-Economic Caste Census, Government of India 2011). The crisis of the 
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agrarian economy has made farming unprofitable but access to land continues to be important 
for coping with a crisis in the short term (for instance paying medical expenses by selling a 
parcel or taking on a loan as many households do), and more fundamentally holds the 
potential for meeting household food consumption. As I discussed earlier, landless 
households that are leasing land for cultivation, despite the tremendous risks it entails, are 
doing so for an opportunity to labour autonomously and generate wheat and fodder for 
household consumption. Struggles for land redistribution and village commons among Dalit 
communities, however, have largely been displaced to struggle within political institutions 
such as panchayats for greater access to state resources. A prime example is the struggles 
over the implementation of the National Employment Guarantee Scheme, MGNREGA, 
which is accessed mostly by landless households in Punjabi villages. Resistance by Dalit 
communities has been largely in response to the funds being blocked by landowning farmers 
at the panchayat level, in order to ensure that labour is available for farm work. 
 
IV. Gendered dimensions of the agrarian crisis 
 
While landless workers move back and forth between the cities and the village, for young 
men from landowning households the dissonance created by unmet aspirations and 
unemployment, has not only kills their ‘revolutionary spirit' as Jaswant Singh argues, but has 
led to pathological behaviours. The extensive addiction to opioids among young men, in 
particular, is widely acknowledged as a symptom of such dissonance.81 
																																								 																				
81 A recent study confirmed the high rate of addiction, which had been widely known 
informally in the region. The study conducted by the All India Institute of Medical Sciences 
in 10 districts of Punjab in 2015 shows that 1.2% of the adults are hooked to opioids in 
Punjab. It was conducted within the age group of 18-35 years and 99% of the drug 
dependents were men. This is much higher than the global average of 0.2% determined 
according to a study in 2010, and the national average in India, which was 0.7% in 2001 
(Kanwari 2016). 
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Tensions and the weakening of support structures are becoming visible within the familial 
domain, including how gendered norms mediate the experience of crisis. Drug addiction 
predominantly among men, high expenditures on weddings and high rates of female feticide 
reflect the regressive restructuring of social relations through the Green Revolution decades. 
Multiple processes such as the shift away from collective work practices with extended kin, 
from joint cultivation and residential households to nuclear households, withdrawal of 
women from the fields, which became another marker of status, and the disassociation of the 
younger generation from the farms, have worked to isolate the work of managing the farm for 
men. Economic distress, crop failures and inability to repay loans are experienced as 
individual shame.  
 
Sukhjeet Kaur, an elderly woman who lives with her son and his family expresses this as she 
talks about how her son cultivates their 6 acres on his own. Contesting the claim that 
chemical-intensive agriculture and machinery decreased required work on the farms, she 
says,  
 
Men’s work burden has increased with machinery. Before mono-
cropping, we would sow crops according to seasons, and the 
quality of the land. Sandy hillocks were good for some crops, more 
fertile land for other things. Now with paddy, everything needs to 
be done at precise times, the machines and labour have to be 
available at just the right time. My son is always under tremendous 
pressure, while my grandson sits in the house with the cooler 
switched on, listening to music with earplugs. The expenses have 
increased exponentially. When men in our households come back 
from the commission agents at the end of every season, they are on 
the verge of tears. No money is saved, we only save our lives to 
give each other courage and carry on, I suppose. The entire 
farming system runs on loans. You need money for everything –for 
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school fees, food, medical expenses and social obligations. The 
burden for generating cash income to meet all these expenses falls 
on one person.”  
 
With joint family cultivation, women were active participants in the fields. In some instances, 
in large landowning households, women's work was confined to delivering food and tea to 
the fields and saving seeds at home for the next season. But a majority of women helped with 
post-harvest processing, with picking cotton, weeding and gathering fodder. Sukhjeet Kaur 
goes on to highlight gendered and generational tensions that are emerging with changing 
social norms and individuation ethic, specifically the increasing nuclear households in the 
village. 
 
A girl was given just as much as she needed to start a new life at 
the wedding – a trunk with clothes and utensils. Now, young 
women must bring all kinds of things – refrigerator, air 
conditioners, motorcycles, cars as part of their dowry. People 
spend so much on weddings that the next five generations are 
under debt. What old people who demand dowries for their sons do 
not realise is that sooner or later the daughter-in-law will keep 
these things in her own private room in the house and lock them 
out.  
 
The gendered dimensions of how the agrarian crisis is being experienced by rural households 
have largely been absent in the burgeoning scholarship. An exception is Ranjana Padhi’s 
(2012) study that examines the consequences of farmers suicides for the remaining family in 
Punjab. Padhi also points to the withdrawal of women from the fields as a critical component 
that explains men bearing the stresses of the current agrarian crisis as individuals. Women’s 
presence in the fields, performing manual labour, is perceived as shameful and a reflection of 
the household’s economic distress. Women in households where there have been suicides are 
often not aware of the level of indebtedness until after the suicide has occurred. They have to 
cope with the situation without any knowledge of farm operations, make decisions within the 
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familial and public domain, which they have not been allowed to do until that moment. Social 
stigma and shame attached to working in the fields or as wage labour, and they are often 
forced to sell the land to pay the debt. Patriarchal norms structured the division of labour in 
specific ways during the Green Revolution decades, which continue to impose tremendous 
constraints on both men and women in farming households under the present conditions of 
distress, where the task of ‘maintaining families’ becomes an ordeal (Padhi, 2009: 59).  
 
A narrow economic focus on stagnant agrarian productivity or declining farm incomes, thus, 
is misreading the crisis, which reflects the ‘individualization of risk', but without a 
concomitant individualization of social and cultural life’ (Vasavi 2012:125). Examining the 
social landscape in areas of widespread farmer suicides in India, A.R. Vasavi (2012) suggests 
that the crisis has to be understood as an experience, which in addition to being caught in 
cycles of indebtedness, is shaped by thwarted aspirations for upward mobility, 
commercialisation of ritualistic and social practices, concurrent with rural areas becoming 
sites for further expansion of a consumer market. 
 
Deconstructing the narrative of ‘conspicuous consumption’ thus reveals that growing risk and 
insecurity is translating into lack of hope for the future particularly among the younger 
generation. Unable to find meaningful work commensurate with their aspirations, and losing 
the privilege enjoyed by landowning agrarian castes within the local milieu, the narrative of 
progressive modernity is being displaced with apathy or individualized coping strategies such 
as taking on the risk of pooling all resources to enable an exit. This experience of downward 
mobility is pronounced in a national context of spiralling economic growth, where images of 
‘conspicuous consumption' of an urban minority have captured the public domain and 
imagination. 
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V. Conclusion: The Politics of Precarity  
 
Conceptions of precarity that reference the risk and insecurities of everyday life at the 
neoliberal conjuncture for the majority in the Global South, and increasingly in the global 
North, hold the potential of being politically reclaimed as affirming and valuing social 
interdependence.  As Allison (2013) notes precarity can mean connection, in the sense of 
social dependence on others for fundamental sustenance, and therefore can provide the basis 
of a new politics of communing that centres sustainability and human connection. However, 
in the context of an agrarian crisis in sites of capital-intensive agriculture, where farming 
households are adopting individualised strategies of coping, the possibilities of collective 
organising seem bleak. As Vasavi (2012) argues even the influence of populist agrarian 
movements, dominated by medium and large farmers that emerged in the 1980s in the Green 
Revolution belt, has been waning. These movements have been unable to enforce any policy 
changes since the 1990s. Further, the ‘palliative politics’ of the state in the form of welfare 
governmentality pacifies any search for alternatives or the construction of a fundamental 
challenge to the status-quo (2012:126). The social welfare measures, however, enacted by the 
neoliberal Indian state are largely a response to grassroots social and political struggles (cf. 
Harriss and Scully 2015). 
 
The landscape of resistance in contemporary rural Punjab though is complex and does hold 
the promise of paving the way for a politics of commons. The various factions of the populist 
farmers union the Bhartiya Kisan Union (BKU) are making a comeback as the crisis has 
deepened. In the last few years, there have been periodic street protests organised by BKU to 
protest delays in procurement of grain and payments, demanding compensation for failed 
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cotton crop, and for families of farmers and farm workers who have committed suicide, as 
well as against land acquisition. The government's decision to impose a cap on Bt cottonseed 
prices, despite Monsanto's threat to exit the Indian market is partially a result of this visibly 
growing discontent. The issue of compensation for suicides due to agrarian distress has also 
generated a hitherto unlikely collaboration between the farm workers unions and the farmers' 
unions. Farmers organisations are fighting agricultural land grab or at the very least for just 
compensation which is not simply the price of their land but accounts for their future 
livelihoods. This process of determining adequate compensation becomes extremely difficult 
in a context where having access to land no longer guarantees livelihood security. Yet, 
landless households are willing to cultivate on leased land even by paying exorbitant rent 
because it provides an opportunity for dignified work and achieving food self-sufficiency to a 
limited extent, illustrating that people enter conditions of precariousness from a variety of 
structural locations which in turn determines and constrains their aspirations for well-being. 
 
While the majority of mass protests are confined to immediate issues of compensation, since 
2006 the farmers' unions nationally including in Punjab have consistently raised the demand 
for a livable income. More concretely, from the list of recommendations made by the 
National Commission of Farmers in 2006 led by M.S. Swaminathan, which mostly focused 
on strategies for further sustainable intensification through technological measures, the 
unions picked up the isolated recommendation for an increase in Minimum Support Prices 
which are 50% above the cost of production. The mobilising discourse employed to justify 
these demands highlights the valuable service farmers perform for the nation. Mobilisations 
in Punjab also deploy a regionalist discourse, which contends that the exploitation of their 
natural resources and farmers’ labour has ensured the food security of the nation. Activists 
draw attention to the consistently rising salaries of public sector employees in comparison to 
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dwindling minimum support prices necessary to keep food inflation in check, which is a re-
articulation of the ‘urban bias’ discourse of the 1980s. While farmers experience 
precariousness associated with farming, both economically and ecologically, BKU continues 
to confine its agenda of demands to the economic domain. The mobilising strategies of the 
BKU, reflect no long-term vision for transforming the agricultural system but are primarily 
geared toward preventing the dismantling of state protections.82  
 
The emergent grassroots politics of sustainability, on the other hand, offers a fundamental 
critique of the Green Revolution model of farming. Like other prefigurative movements that 
reject the development paradigm, they use the vocabulary of hope, autonomy and dignity 
with a particular emphasis on nurturing socio-ecological relations, instead of class and 
identity.   It has been rightly argued that such prefigurative movements do not exist in 
isolation from existing statist and market structures, rather they are attempting to create a 
distance from such structures to carve out alternative spaces (Escobar 2008; Dinerstein and 
Deneulin 2012). But attention also needs to be paid to forms of subjectivities forged through 
other struggles that have preceded and coexist with such movements structuring the broader 
political field within which they operate. Participants in KVM's endeavour to restructure 
everyday practices variously express and understand their grievances through class, caste, 
gendered and/or regionalist forms of exploitation. The particular forms in which they 
experience precariousness enable or dissuades them from participating. Unlike the occasional 
protests organised by farmers' unions or labour unions for achieving specific ends in which 
																																								 																				
82 In the past few years several dominant agrarian castes in other parts of the country, with 
similar economic and cultural constraints as Sikh-jat Punjabi landowners have been agitating 
for a share in affirmative action quotas in public sector jobs. As upwardly mobile rural 
classes, they once expressed disdain for such statist welfare politics. These agitations by 
landowning farmers can be seen as what James Ferguson (2013) calls a ‘declaration of 
dependence’ reflecting the shift in political subjectivity brought about by their relatively new 
inclusion among the ‘precariat’.   
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people participate depending on their particular circumstances, the work of restructuring 
everyday practices is ongoing, requires a deeper commitment and resources including time, 
labour and knowledge. The economic constraints faced by indebted small and marginal 
farmers prevent many of them from taking the risk of shifting to organic practices within the 
present policy structure, even as they express support for KVM’s agenda. As I have discussed 
in this chapter precariousness is experienced as more than economic risk and uncertain 
livelihoods. Notions of status, dignified work and life constituted historically, shape 
aspirations which for the majority of the younger generation among Sikh-jat households are 
unrealisable. Consumption practices and the so-called pathologies of affluence such as opioid 
addiction, family breakdowns and increasing frequency of suicides are manifestations of 
cruel optimism produced by the visible unattainability of the developmental promise. While 
the shift toward agroecological practices produces an alternative imaginary that is beginning 
to take root among some medium scale farmers, and women from landless households, the 
pervasive ethic of individuation and apathy pose a significant challenge to the task of 
engendering collective work practices. Whether the politics of sustainable agroecological 
practice is able to transform into a politics of communing remains to be seen.   
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CHAPTER FOUR  
AGRO-ECOLOGICAL PRACTICES AND THE POLITICS OF SURVIVAL 
 
I. Introduction  
 
I began this dissertation by examining the conditions that led to the emergence of 
prefigurative politics spearheaded by KVM. The mobilising discourse and organising 
practices employed by KVM activists articulate the manifest symptoms of the agrarian crisis 
at the neoliberal conjuncture with a critique of statist development practices of the Green 
Revolution decades. The present crisis thus stems not simply from the dismantling of the 
protectionist development state with economic liberalisation since the 1990s. Rather, the 
crisis is a consequence of developmental state practices that facilitated extractive agricultural 
modernization and transformed the regional ecology of Punjab since the 1960s. While stark 
manifestations of socio-ecological degradation have created conditions that are ripe for 
imagining alternatives, they pose tremendous challenges to charting agro-ecological 
transitions and the formation of a sustainable localised food system. To recall briefly, these 
challenges included material constraints such as loss of indigenous seeds and biodiversity, 
degraded soils, contaminated and depleting groundwater, and disruption of transfer of 
embodied knowledge practices. Increasing incidence of diseases and medical expenditures 
has compounded the constraints faced by farming households, along with social pathologies 
and a general lack of interest in farming among the younger generation. In this chapter I 
further explore the politics of agro-ecological restoration through the diverse ways in which 
men and women from rural households are engaging and responding to KVM’s organising 
practices, and how these diverse forms of engagement are reshaping KVM’s own agendas. I 
focus on the varied forms of participation, why people choose to participate or not, the factors 
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that enable people to enact alternative agroecological practices, the meanings they attribute to 
them and the ways in which they cope with resource constraints.  
 
In chapter two and three, I examined how men and women from rural households (small and 
medium landowning cultivators as well as landless households), who are not engaging with 
KVM's agroecological politics, experience transformations in labour practices and articulate 
the current crisis. These narratives of crisis and oral histories of transformations of production 
and reproduction reveal the shared regional moral economy of Punjabi cultivators. 
Entrenched in the ethos of commercial cultivation, the process of shifting toward sustainable 
agroecological farming and consumption seems radical, risky and almost impossible to a 
majority of farming households in the current institutional and policy environment. The 
presentism and commoning ethic of prefigurative politics have to confront subjectivities 
produced through developmental practices over the past six decades. Agricultural 
intensification brought short-lived monetary gains for landowning farmers and cultivated 
individuated relations of production and reproduction. Thus, the slow decay was enacted 
through ‘distancing' of costs over time and to marginal social groups for landowning 
cultivators. Enactment of agroecological practices requires forgoing short-term gains and 
restoring collective autonomy premised on building cooperative and reciprocal relations. The 
relationship between declining health and excessive use of chemicals, contamination of 
groundwater, food and environmental pollution is widely recognized and is a part of the 
‘common sense'. Yet, precisely because it is pervasive, this sense of crisis breeds apathy and 
is expressed with a sense of inevitability. Within this context, KVM’s interventions are 
significant for introducing a constructive practical program of transformation that expands 
the horizons of what is possible. Therefore, understanding the motivations and trajectories of 
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the few farmers who are adopting sustainable agroecological practices reveals the 
possibilities for change. 
 
Within the scholarship on collective mobilisations for sustainable agro ecological farming 
and food systems, the focus has either been on delineation of exemplary practices and the 
ways in which they critique and provide an alternative to the mainstream industrial food 
system (Van der Ploeg 2010; Meek 2014; Rosset & Torres 2012), or on how such initiatives 
have reinforced the exclusions engendered by industrial food system (cf. Guthman 2004; 
Arora 2012; Louis 2015). I argue that the exclusions of agroecological politics, however, 
cannot simply be explained based on predefined social class categories, but have to be 
understood in terms of processual challenges, as well as how conditions and subjectivities are 
altered through critical praxis within specific socio-material configurations (cf. Patel et al 
2015). I, therefore, chart the process of agroecological transition through narratives of 
individuals and households that are drawing support from KVM activists and have diverse 
levels and forms of engagement.  
 
As outlined in chapter 1, after the initial village level meetings and training sessions 
conducted by KVM, activists interact with individual cultivators and households and support 
them through the transition to agroecological farming. But, they have been unable to forge 
self-sustaining collective practices at the village level. Exchange of knowledge and of 
indigenous seeds among farmers exists but is extremely limited. Even as there are a 
substantive number of farmers practising natural farming or moving towards sustainable ago-
ecology associated with the movement, in any given village their numbers are small which 
makes it difficult to form autonomous collectives.  The numbers of women growing 
vegetables organically at home within a village tend to be larger which also partly explains 
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the greater level of collective engagement among them. The spatial arrangement of fields that 
are located outside the village also means there is minimal interaction among farmers at 
work. Unlike a few decades ago when men and women walked to the fields generally in 
groups, farmers use motorcycles to go to the fields, where their interactions are generally 
only with hired farm workers. Villages that are a part of this study, like the majority of 
Punjabi villages, are large (with 500 - 2500 households) and semi-urbanised spaces. Kharif 
natural farmers and those reducing agrochemicals on their farms with the support of KVM 
range from only 2-15 within any village, whereas organic kitchen gardens were present in 50-
200 households in villages. However, most interactions, including knowledge and seed 
exchanges, continue to be mediated by KVM activists without much village-level 
autonomous collective activity. moong These experiences are not meant to highlight 
differences at the level of the individuals as ‘rational intentional actors', but to outline the 
formation of subjectivities capturing both the macro structural determinants and possibilities 
for collective agency and action. 
 
Following Wolford (2010) and Edelman (1999), I draw attention to the internal differences 
within KVM that continue to reshape its agenda. These internal differences reflect historical 
consciousness shaped through the Green Revolution decades, as well as the constraints 
imposed by the neoliberal political conjuncture.  They also reflect the lived experiences of 
participants positioned differentially within the social hierarchy, as well as the specific 
practices and interactions that enable or foreclose agro-ecological transitions. One of the key 
ways in which KVM has transformed over the last decade is to embrace the range of practices 
that have unfolded under an overarching umbrella of forging an ecologically sustainable and 
autonomous food system. Leaders affirmatively claim the movement to be ‘non-ideological’, 
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which renders the possibility of addressing multiple dimensions of the crisis and forging a 
cross-class alliance open.  
 
The non-coherence of unfolding forms of agroecological social change also stems from the 
hybridity of labour practices in regional ecologies produced by Green Revolution practices 
(Gupta 1998). Recovering ‘traditional knowledge' in such contexts has little meaning. In the 
North Western Green Revolution belt of Punjab, Haryana and northwestern Uttar Pradesh 
agrarian and rural resistance since the Green Revolution decades has been examined through 
the analytical lenses of class and rural exploitation shaped by statist technocratic 
interventions, particularly the politics of resource allocation through price regulation and 
subsidies. The question of how the transformation of labour practices and the material 
landscape through technological interventions shapes political agency remains unexplored. 
As Nancy Fraser writes though ‘historically specific conjunctural struggles are the agenda 
setters for critical theory” (Fraser, 1989:2). Hence, the emergence of nascent agro-ecological 
politics in the Malwa region in Punjab allows for refocusing attention on labour practices, 
and how socio-ecological relations shape political agency.  
 
In rural Punjab, the process of ‘accumulation by displacement' that is spatial and temporal 
displacement of ecological costs are reaching a point of saturation. The in-situ displacement 
of costs socially is also saturated as the crisis has spread from landless, small and marginal 
farmers to include the majority of medium farmers as their capacities to sustain agrarian 
livelihoods have been diminished. Secure non-agrarian livelihoods have only opened up for a 
select few. The failure of promises of developmentalism, that is, the promise of generational 
upward mobility through secure white-collar jobs, along with manifest economic and 
ecological crisis means that masking of displacement is no longer possible. Nevertheless, 
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unlike collective rebellion against the state that has erupted in response to direct 
dispossession from land (Levien 2013), masking or processes of distancing of costs has 
forged a different conception of political agency. KVM's critique of techno-politics names the 
collusion between state and corporate capital as well as how farmers are themselves 
implicated in the commodification of labour process and social reproduction that has 
transformed them into ‘propertied wage labourers' and consumers. In this context, while 
some movement participants view the agroecological transition as ‘constructive resistance’ 
(Kumbamu 2009) others more constrained by their material circumstances have adopted 
some practices as a part of the assemblage of mechanisms for coping with the present crisis.  
 
The competing discourses within the movement reflect the power of the compartmentalising 
logic of techno-politics that has produced the regional landscape and subjectivities in 
particular ways. The debate over whether the focus of organising should be to develop 
regionally specific practices through experimentation among a small section of farmers who 
have the capacity to do so, or whether engagement with larger numbers of farmers should be 
prioritised by adopting an economistic logic that stresses low costs of cultivation and 
comparable yields through the use organic inputs is ongoing. The increasing emphasis on the 
latter is viewed by the few natural farmers within KVM as a dilution of the core philosophy 
of the movement, while activists who do most of the everyday organising work contend that 
more flexibility is making the movement more inclusive.  
 
In what follows, I begin by examining the motivations and challenges faced by farmers who 
practice sustainable agroecology, and those who are in the process of transitioning. The 
practices of these farmers occupy a spectrum that includes natural bio-diverse farming, 
organic cultivation without synthetic agrochemical inputs but continued mono-cropping, that 
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is the wheat-rice/cotton rotation, and those who are reducing agrochemicals along with 
selective ecological management practices for reducing water consumption and minimising 
pest attacks. The dissident voices emerging within KVM, as it is scaling up its organising 
efforts are articulated by a small group of natural farmers who adopt a more radical stance on 
what constitutes agro-ecological farming. Their resistance foregrounds the tension between 
social justice and ecological sustainability in the short run that has to be negotiated in 
devising mobilising strategies. Finally, I explore the engagement of women in cultivation for 
household consumption on homestead land, which was initially a marginal endeavour within 
KVM but has gained prominence over the years.  
 
II. The Turning Point for Natural Farmers 
 
Farmers practising agroecology in various forms aim to reduce dependency on market inputs 
while maintaining their current level of income. A small number among this subset are 
committed to the principles of natural farming and are willing to take greater risk and forgo 
yields and incomes in the short-run for engaging in agroecological innovations. Through 
experimental farming, over several years they are integrating labour practices with 
knowledge production on the farm, but face constraints on the marketing front. Associated 
with KVM since its inception, these natural farmers are cited as examples that show the 
viability of sustainable agroecological farming in Punjab in outreach activities.  Many of 
them, while affiliated with KVM, had begun this journey independently. Questioning the 
viability of chemical-intensive farming for them began with the devastation of the cotton crop 
due to pest attacks in the late 1980s and in the 1990s. During these episodes, pesticides had 
very little effect in controlling the American bollworm. Others cite health concerns as the 
main trigger for making the transition, particularly the increasing incidence of cancer. The 
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predominance of elderly farmers in this group who are not necessarily large landowners but 
have other stable sources of non-agrarian income in their households is suggestive of two 
things. One, that the memory of the early Green Revolution period is a critical resource for 
imagining a different way of farming. These memories and embodied knowledge enable them 
to translate the cognition of the failure of agrochemical agriculture witnessed in the form of 
declining health and the on-going cotton crop failure over two decades, into transformative 
agro-ecological practices. Two, non-agrarian income was critical in allowing them to bear the 
short-term losses in the process of transition. 
 
In a village of approximately 200 households in Bathinda district, where a significant number 
of farmers continue to grow cotton because of brackish groundwater, Swaroop Singh, an 
elderly farmer in his 70s is perhaps the only farmer practising natural farming. He conjectures 
that there may be one or two other farmers who intermittently experiment with organic 
farming on some part of their land. His 7-acre farm visually stands out amid surrounding 
fields with densely planted straight rows of Bt cotton at the beginning of the Kharif (summer) 
season. Lined with several trees species on its boundaries, his farm, by comparison, looks 
disorderly, with a variety of vegetables and indigenous cotton plants sown haphazardly, 
empty patches and overgrown weeds. For 30 years, Swaroop Singh was also in his words, a 
‘chemical farmer by the book’. After years of reading and research by travelling to other 
states, he began experimenting with organic production in 2002 on 2-acres. Two years ago, 
he converted the entire farm to organic production. Describing his motivations for 
transitioning he says,  
 
In the mid-1980s, recurrent bollworm attacks on American hybrid 
cotton destroyed the crop year after year in this region. None of the 
pesticides recommended by the University were effective. Farmers 
were desperate–they used cocktails of pesticides and even sprayed 
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alcohol in the fields but nothing worked. One year, my wife and I, 
picked only 3 kgs of cotton from our entire farm. That was when I 
realised something was wrong with our farming system and I 
began my search for alternatives. I think I became a thinking 
human being at the age of 40. Before that I was working like a 
machine, just blindly following what everyone else was doing.” 
 
Swaroop Singh is like the majority of medium landholding farmers in this village who own 5-
7 acres of land. Despite the commonly acknowledged harmful effects of agrochemicals on the 
environment and health in the village, he is unable to convince others to move towards 
organic practices. While he attributes this to lack of education and awareness, what clearly 
distinguishes him from other medium landholding households in this village is the absence of 
debt and a son with secure employment in the merchant navy. The cognitive dissonance with 
chemical agriculture is stronger among those who followed the recommendations of the 
Punjab Agricultural University religiously through its publications and through interactions 
with extension agents and scientists.  
 
These farmers constitute what Van der Ploeg (2010) refers to as the ‘new peasantries’, that is, 
farmers who followed the ‘modernisation script’, and have been disillusioned with the 
consequences, realising that it is materially impossible to continue with the script. However, 
while such disillusionment is common among Punjabi farmers, and most people attribute 
rising health concerns to excessive chemicals in the environment and in their diets, not all of 
them are able to or willing to adopt non-chemical or natural farming. Their landholdings 
range from 4 acres to 15 acres, and in the context of Punjab, they are part of the medium 
strata of farmers. However, it is not the size of landholding that is the critical enabling factor 
that would allow them to bear the risk of transition from chemical-intensive agriculture to 
organic practices. Rather, it is the presence of non-farm income sources from salaried jobs in 
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the formal sector within the household, which defines the stability and economic resilience of 
rural households.  
 
Like Swaroop Singh many of these natural farmers methodically followed the scientific 
methods recommended by PAU and the extension system before committing to natural 
farming. Such farmers do not attribute crop failures to faulty implementation of scientific 
ways of application of chemical inputs and practices but have come to believe based on their 
experiences that they result from fundamental and systemic shortcomings of the Green 
revolution model. Harjant Singh, a farmer in his mid-50s began the transition toward natural 
farming in 2001 on his 30 acres, after actively engaging with the government extension 
system for several years. As he says, 
  
I finished my studies in 1985 at PAU and immediately started 
chemical farming. Like others in the village at the time I shifted to 
rice cultivation as pesticides were unable to control the pest attacks 
on cotton. I used to actively seek out new techniques, seed varieties 
- both indigenous and those produced by the University, read a lot 
of farming literature and interacted with PAU extension officials 
frequently by going to the Ludhiana campus every six months or 
so. I was even involved with trials conducted by PAU on new seed 
varieties and agrochemical products. For instance, in 1999 they had 
conducted soybean trials on 1000 acres in our village. This was the 
time when the cotton crop had into was the time when cotton crop 
had failed and they were trying out new crops that could be used to 
substitute cotton.  This trial was a failure, as the tobacco caterpillar 
destroyed the soybean crop. There are serious people who work at 
PAU, but it is a salaried job for them to execute commands and 
work within the rules of the existing system. They are not allowed 
to think about what they are doing and how it is affecting farmers. 
Because of my association with PAU since my undergraduate 
studies, I went on farmers' tours to other states - Bangalore, 
Mysore, Chennai and Pondicherry. This exposure led me to think 
more critically about farming. I began to reflect on all the 
chemicals, seed varieties, and techniques that involved 
mechanization being pushed on farmers, and if they were actually 
required, and came to the conclusion that most of them were 
unnecessary. In the late 1980s when new pesticides and seeds were 
flooding the market, private medical shops were increasing as well. 
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I kept thinking to myself there has to be a connection between the 
two. In 2001, I met a farmer from Rajasthan who practices the zero 
budget spiritual farming methods developed by Subash Palekar. I 
was inspired and decided to make the shift to natural farming. It 
took 4-5 years of training to learn the principles behind natural 
farming. I went to Rajasthan and some of the Southern states to 
learn practices from organic farmers. Chemical companies and the 
government have trained us so well that it is really hard to change 
your mindset.83  
 
The story of Hartej Singh speaks to the motivations and processes adopted for transitioning to 
natural farming. Most of these natural farmers are in the age group 50-70 years, with some 
recollection of early Green Revolution decades when there was a multiplicity of farming 
practices. They have witnessed the short-lived peak of Green Revolution followed by the 
unfolding crisis. Hartej Singh’s journey also reflects the structural and social constraints 
faced by farmers in making the transition. Despite owning significant undivided acreage as 
the only son in his family, practising natural farming was a constant struggle. After 15 years, 
he has now decided to give up on natural farming and rented out his land instead. Biodiverse 
cropping is at the core of cultivation for farmers like him, but marketing their produce is 
difficult as there is no organic supply chain given the lack of sufficient volumes. Harjant 
Singh says that his commitment to natural farming has come at the expense of tremendous 
losses. 
            “From 2001- 2015, I have been running losses because of farming 
organically. Farming following natural principles means having a 
diverse portfolio of crops. But it is not easy to sell anything apart 
from wheat and rice, which is procured by the government. There 
is no provision for marketing and they do not get good returns 
despite being quality products. Wheat is the only exception, which 
sells for 2800-3400Rs per quintal, which is higher than regular 
wheat. But even with wheat now there is competition from other 
states like Madhya Pradesh in Delhi markets. Even though farmers 
																																								 																				
83 For a detailed description of Zero Budget Natural Farming (ZBNF) movement and 
methods developed by Subhash Palekar, a farmer from Maharashtra, see Khadse et al (2017); 
Munster (2015). These methods are popular among several grassroots organizations and 
farmers across the country and are often referenced as an example of a system based on 
indigenous agronomy and culture.   
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in these other states grow it chemically, it is considered good 
quality, as they are indigenous varieties and grown with less 
amount of chemicals. The wheat is not almost blackish in colour 
like the wheat grown in Punjab. It is becoming difficult to sell 
cotton as well because the prices are fluctuating. I planted F1378 
cotton variety (a PAU variety) for 4 - 5 years on 5 acres. The yields 
were great without using any chemicals. I sowed poppy plants in 
between the cotton seeds, and after a month and a half used the 
poppy plants for mulching. The yield was about 5-6 quintal per 
acre and no weeding was required. In my fields, you will see that 
birds build nests in the cotton crop because there is sorghum sown 
nearby. The bird ate all the insects. It built a nest there only 
because my fields are free of chemicals. The cotton price for the 
farmer keeps fluctuating, but the prices of manufactured clothes 
keep going up. Basmati rice prices have also not been stable even 
though it is supposed to be a commercially viable crop. It was 
4000Rs per quintal last year, and this year it is only 2000Rs per 
quintal. Production is our responsibility but it is the government's 
job to regulate prices. I grow indigenous cotton, which gives lesser 
yields, but there are no premium prices or specialised supply chain 
to sell it. In the market, traders do not buy it because it looks 
unrefined.  Pests rarely attacked the indigenous cotton that was 
grown in this region before the hybrids and was a part of the mixed 
cropping cycle suited to the dry climate. It was also used at home 
to weave cloth and meet household needs. But now if there is no 
market for naturally grown produce, how can it be sustainable. 
There is high demand for some crops like mustard oil and sugar 
cane but it is hard to sell them in small quantities. You cannot go to 
Bathinda city just to sell 10kg of organic milk every day, but the 
demand is there. There has to be a significant number of organic 
farmers in the village to build a supply chain.”  
 
Pondering on the problem of volume he adds that some farmers in his village did begin to 
experiment with natural farming after watching him, but these experiments did not last long 
or were confined to cultivating organic produce for household consumption. The only farmer 
who visited his farm and is now farming organically and running a profitable business owns 
137 acres. “His farm is successful because of large scale production. I cannot lease land to 
expand production because it is risky and impossible for me to manage more acres on my 
own.” The lack of marketing infrastructure that supports mixed cropping system is one of the 
primary reasons that majority of the farmers are only growing wheat organically which is 
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easy to sell at a premium price locally. Randeep Singh, one of the few young natural farmers 
in another district also outlines a similar dilemma.  
Organic wheat can be sold at premium prices, almost double the 
price of regular wheat. But with every other crop, it is difficult, 
especially vegetables. Some of us tried to set up a collective and 
sell directly in nearby urban markets but it was time-consuming 
and did not work. You need to produce in large quantities to sell in 
the retail market, which is not possible for medium farmers 
practising mixed cropping as they only produce a limited quantity 
of any given crop at a time. So, apart from wheat everything else is 
sold in the open market, sadly mixed with chemically grown 
produce. 90% of my wheat though is sold even before it is 
harvested through informal personal networks. What is 
unfortunate, however, is that a majority of the buyers are other 
farmers owning between 5-40 acres who produce wheat with 
agrochemicals for the market. And buy organic wheat from me or 
from others states for household consumption.” 
 
Randeep argues that it is unreasonable to expect that farmers should also bear the additional 
responsibility for marketing. The current official discourse of the government and PAU, he 
says is also coaxing farmers to become entrepreneurs and focus on ‘value addition’ which is 
the government should facilitate. Others in the movement believe that it is critical to set up 
locally sustainable food systems without government intervention. They do however contend 
that the government has to be pressurized to create a conducive policy framework for 
promoting sustainable agriculture that benefits small and medium farmers. Farmers should be 
provided support in the first few years when they are transitioning to organic farming. 
Resources allocated to subsidising chemical farmers should be used to incentivise 
ecologically sustainable practices instead. In the absence of such a framework, only a niche 
organic market catering to wealthy urban consumers can exist. In the last few years, KVM 
has focused on setting up informal spaces and markets in some prominent cities of Punjab 
where farmers can sell organic produce. These markets are run primarily by a network of 
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urban volunteers and are based on trust.84 KVM is opposed to organic certification systems, 
which are expensive and put an additional burden on natural farmers. Their position is that 
labelling should be implemented for food grown with synthetic agrochemicals instead, and 
accountability can be ensured if food systems are local and there is direct interaction between 
farmers and consumers.   
 
Within the movement, there is a consensus that the primary focus should be on the 
availability of healthy food for rural agrarian households by encouraging production for 
household consumption.   Some farmers like Sukhdev Singh committed to natural farming 
even advocate complete self-sufficiency. He contends that landowning households should go 
to the market only to buy salt, and grow most of the things they need on their land. “We are 
planning to form a group in our village of zamindars (landowners) who will produce food for 
home consumption, and only sell the surplus as a collective. We have to learn how to save 
money instead of being preoccupied with making more money.” Needless to say, that such 
conceptions of self-sufficiency do not resonate with small and marginal farmers or landless 
households completely dependent on wage work and tenant cultivators who have to pay hefty 
rents. For landowning households’ as well cash is always scarce and essential for education 
and medical expenses.  
 
																																								 																				
84 As this initiative is new, its viability remains to be seen. A systematic analysis of KVM’s 
marketing initiative was not a part of this research. It is evident though that organic 
cultivation is a viable livelihood strategy in the current policy framework if farmers can 
access markets to sell produce at premium prices. A recent survey of organic farming in India 
concluded that farmers who make a profit are the ones selling certified organic produce at 
premium prices who have lowered their costs of cultivation, that is, they are not purchasing 
their packaged off-farm organic inputs (Ramesh et al 2010). KVM is now employing 
participatory guarantee system (PGS) that does not rely on third party certification but 
structured through stakeholder participation of local producers and consumers. 
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Within the current institutional and policy setup, some farmers within the movement contend 
that the focus of organising should be to encourage healthy food production for self-
consumption among rural households. Promoting organic farming as a livelihood strategy is 
simply not feasible under the current conditions. Amarjeet Sharma, for instance, is a 
committed natural farmer with 4 acres and believes that it is futile to try to retain young 
people on the land. His farm is often cited as an exemplary repository of tremendous 
biodiversity and is completely self-sufficient, and he also runs a seed bank with indigenous 
varieties in his village. He says, 
 
"Not any farmers are moving toward agroecological practices 
despite recognising the harmful effects of chemicals on health and 
the long-term sustainability of farming because it involves too 
much work, and there are losses in the initial years.  Chemical 
farmers get subsidies, but there are no incentives for natural 
farmers. There is no profit and income with farming, so obviously, 
people want to leave. The youth see how selling wheat brings in Rs 
50,000 that barely covers the costs of production, but they can get 
Rs 2000000 by selling an acre of land so they want to do that and 
move to other things. People like me continue doing this because 
we are old and don't know how to do anything else.  Perhaps when 
the crisis deepens even further those who have no other options but 
to remain in the village will have to move toward alternative ways 
of farming." 
 
He goes on to suggest that the crisis will indeed deepen in the coming years with further 
neoliberal restructuring: "when the government stops procuring wheat and rice, Punjabi 
farmers will be squeezed out. In the open market wheat coming from other states in India is 
beginning to be preferred by consumers because Punjab is notorious for the excessive use of 
chemicals. Produce from other states is exported, but not from Punjab because of concerns 
over pesticides and excess chemical residue. The groundwater currently at a critical level will 
soon become expensive. But if there is no support from the government, organics will remain 
a niche market catering to the rich consumer." 
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III. Confronting Socio-ecological Ruptures 
 
While the marketing of organic produce is the primary impediment identified by farmers in 
adopting bio diverse natural farming, unavailability of workers willing to shift to qualitatively 
different forms of labouring is another critical issue. Labouring practices on natural farms 
require more physical effort and knowledge but there is no corresponding increase in 
workers' wages. Harjant Singh who has decided to quit natural farming after 15 years and 
rent out his 30-acres to a landless cultivator explains the problem in this way: 
 
     "When the farmer does not earn any profits, how will they pay farm 
labour adequately? The landless labouring communities have been 
shifting to new forms of work for many years now. They prefer 
non-farm wage agro-ecological because it pays better and is 
available more regularly.  The workers who are employed to 
operate farm machinery – combine harvesters, laser levellers, 
tractors, or spray chemicals using pumps earn about 20,000Rs as a 
lump sum and then do not return to farm work for 2-3 months. In 
1985, the rate of hired labour was just 10Rs a day, and now it is 
300Rs per day, but men from labouring classes spend that money 
at liquor shops. Natural farming requires a different kind of work 
ethic, working with one’s hands and consistent knowledge of 
conditions through the cropping cycle. Unlike the old days, no one 
wants to become a Siri anymore, that is become attached to one 
farmer. Since I could only manage cultivation on 7 acres on my 
own I tried renting out the rest of my land through the hissa system 
(a form of sharecropping), where all the inputs and costs such as 
the tractor, diesel, water were provided by me. I attached the 
condition though that the tenant will have to farm organically –
without any chemicals and they would get 25% share of the crop. I 
did not want to destroy my land, but people refused to farm 
organically as it was hard to sell a number of different kinds of 
agroecological. I once gave half an acre to a landless neighbour for 
cultivation without asking for any rent on the condition that they 
would grow vegetables without any chemicals. He informed me 
later that he used chemicals to ripen the vegetables quickly so I 
decided not to do it again the following season." 
 
Another farmer Jagtar Singh remarks, “People do not like to lift cow dung for making organic 
manure. I was once sowing onions in my field and asked the hired labour to make green 
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manure using cow dung cakes, and he said he would do it this one time but I should not ask 
him to do it again in the future. Apart from the preparation of organic sprays for improving 
soil fertility and pest management, natural farming also requires manual weeding." 
Explanations offered by farmers like Jagtar and Sukhdev Singh along with economic 
compulsions reflect their unease with the loss of caste-based privileges as Dalits have gained 
more political rights through persistent struggle over the development decades. The 
reluctance of landless workers to perform certain kinds of labour, or become attached to 
particular landowning households is related to caste-based indignities associated with such 
practices in the past. The work of weeding manually and dealing with cow dung and urine 
has been traditionally relegated to lower caste landless workers or women. Women continue 
to be primarily responsible for the upkeep of milch cattle. KVM activists refer to organic 
preparations using the term Jeev Amrit, which denotes immortality or life and emphasise the 
sanctity of cows and their products as a part of traditional knowledge and practices. And yet 
the lower status associated with such practices is pervasive.  
 
While lower caste workers' refusal to perform them is a form of resistance, Sikh Jat natural 
farmers are also ridiculed for performing these tasks. As Harjant Singh narrates his struggles 
in practising natural farming over the past decade to me, his elderly mother sitting next to 
him adds that relatives and neighbours thought her son was crazy when they saw him 
collecting cow urine and dried dung cakes for manure. "That is not appropriate behaviour for 
someone from a prominent zamindar household with 30 acres,” she said. Familial and social 
pressure to maintain status is a significant part of Harjant Singh’s decision to quit. They have 
just constructed a new house on their farmland outside the village and his daughter is of 
marriageable age, so he says he cannot continue to incur losses. Familial pressures are 
particularly strong for farmers who have joint operational landholdings with extended kin. 
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Farmers who plant crops other than wheat, rice and cotton also complain of neighbours 
stealing sugarcane, mustard and vegetables from their fields. Given the near absence of forest 
cover, and native tree species, attacks by wild animals particularly nilgai (blue bulls) are 
frequent on non-grain crops as well. 
 
Natural farming practices are not simply more labour-intensive, but agrarian work 
qualitatively transforms in complex ways that are not aligned with the extant structuring of 
social relations of production. It requires more physical work as well as cumulative 
knowledge generation through experimentation. While daily wage labour is hired for some 
discrete operations such as manual weeding, other kinds of work require sustained attention 
and engagement. Ravdeep who practices natural farming on 12 acres of his family land says 
he is able to do it successfully because he has contracted a worker on a permanent basis. They 
plan the cropping cycle and are able to take care of most of the work on the farm.  
 
The shift from a long-term attachment of landless workers with particular landowning 
families toward monetized contractual labour relations and increased mechanisation was 
accompanied by the transformation of work to an execution of discrete manual labour by 
different people devoid of knowledge making and decision-making.  When workers received 
a share in produce and worked on the same land over several decades they were invested in 
the sustainability of land and its value for sustaining their lives, but their attachment was also 
predicated on caste-based patrimonial relations and indignities. While many KVM farmers 
refer to the dismantling of the Siri system as a breakdown of farmer-labour relations that 
adversely affected ecologically sustainable farming, this shift is viewed in ambiguous ways 
by those located at the bottom of the social hierarchy. Elderly farm workers recall more 
secure subsistence in terms of food, but also caste-based discrimination as well as a future 
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devoid of any possibility for upward mobility. Younger men from landless households’ 
express disdain for the Siri system (described in detail in chapter 2) with more certitude and 
associate farm work with caste oppression more generally. They also conceive non-agrarian 
urban wage work as holding some possibilities for providing a better life in the future. The 
sense of futurelessness is more visible among youth from small and medium landowning 
households, who think of petty wage work as demeaning and incongruent with their caste 
status and view farming as a non-viable livelihood as well. 
 
Contrary to the conception that organic farming is labor-intensive, farmers like Randeep and 
Swaroop Singh who want to continue to move towards deeper forms of natural farming also 
foresee a decline in the labour requirements. Ravdeep says, “Occasionally, I hire daily wage 
labour for weeding in vegetables and transplanting paddy. But my use of labour over the 
years in organic farming is going to decrease I think. In the first year, we hired labour for 
manual weeding and the yield was good. This year I got the weeding done only once, and 
next year I am thinking of not getting it done at all, moving closer to natural farming 
practices where no plants are seen as ‘weeds’.” He points to a small weed-removing machine 
that he purchased recently and says that he is ambivalent about small machinery. “On the one 
hand, it is better than using harmful chemicals or large machinery which has bankrupted 
many small farmers and led to consolidated landholdings, but on the other hand encouraging 
the use of small machinery will lead to the complete eviction of landless workers from the 
fields and eventually from villages." The possibility of small machinery being employed by 
farm workers to reduce the drudgery seems implausible to him given the hierarchical agrarian 
social relations and norms. Farmers perceive small machinery as a means for saving labour 
costs and that is how it’s being promoted by extension services as well. Hired workers often 
complain that farmers delay the payments. Once they have performed the tasks for the day, 
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they are told by farmers to come the following day or a few days later to collect wages.  
Given the scarce cash flows, farmers prioritise expenditures on seeds, agrochemicals and 
renting farm machinery. Workers have little incentive to perform beyond the mandatory 
requirements of the discrete tasks for which they are paid -- generally weeding, transplanting 
paddy or picking cotton, unlike the older generation who received a share of the crop and 
worked for a long period of time on the same farms which enabled them to acquire 
knowledge about the entire cropping cycle. In this context, the question of how landless 
workers configure in the politics of agroecology remains unresolved. Unlike Ravdeep, for 
most natural farmers landless workers are outside the ambit of their conception of restoring 
autonomy. There is an uneasy conjunction of agroecological politics with the logic of 
developmentalism in this context as farmers argue that the movement of landless workers to 
non-agrarian precarious unemployment is inevitable. Sustainability of these few natural farms 
is uncertain as in most instances the younger generation in these households has stable 
salaried non-agrarian employment, which in turn enabled these farmers to bear the risk of 
transitioning in the first place. It is difficult for natural farmers to hire workers for the reasons 
discussed above, nor is it likely that tenant cultivators will be able to practice natural farming 
given their material constraints and their exclusion from ecological sustainability outreach 
activities. 
 
The incremental process of agroecological transition required in the context of degraded soils 
in Punjab is possible for these farmers as they are not concerned with generating surpluses to 
invest in the education of the younger generation.  They begin with organic cultivation on 
one-two acres, experimenting with various crops and methods, and have then expanded 
gradually. Bio-diverse farming over many years has improved the fertility of their land, 
reducing the incidence of crop failures and has created a complex and resilient ecosystem 
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with which they are able to meet many of their everyday consumption needs. Swaroop Singh 
describes the process of reversing ‘simplification’ on his 7-acre farm since 2002 as we pick 
vegetables for the day’s meals.  
The University recommends ‘clean farming', that is, only one crop 
at a time. They also recommend high-density sowing for increased 
yields. Cultivation in this way requires large amounts of water and 
fertilizer for it to work. The seeds required for sowing has 
gradually gone up from two and a half kg per acre to almost 12 kg 
per acre. People think I am lazy because of the way my farm looks 
– right now some land is fallow after wheat harvest, another patch 
has vegetables and medicinal plants grow everywhere that are 
often classified as weeds and removed by most people. I sow seeds 
haphazardly with a lot of space in between. Before 2002, like 
everywhere else there were hardly any trees on my farm. When my 
wife came with tea and food, we had to walk several kilometres to 
find a shady spot to sit down and eat. Now the farm is lined with 
rows of native tree species. It took many years to raise these trees 
gradually, one by one. On every auspicious occasion in the family, 
we planted another tree on the farm. 
 
Inspired by Japanese naturalist Masanobu Fukuoka, after having recently discovered a 
Punjabi translation of “One Straw Revolution’, he plans to start moving from organic to 
natural farming. This year he will begin experimenting on 1.5 acres with no ploughing or 
weeding, without using a tractor, and planting crops strictly according to seasonal variations 
and without any organic manure. “Masanobu’s formula is simple and straightforward – just 
go with nature and do not try to control it”, he says.  
Even with organic farming- with the Kharif crop of wheat there is 
not much to do. The organic wheat sells for a higher price so I have 
sufficient income in one season, and I can experiment or leave 
parts of the land fallow during the rabi season. Based on the 
methods of “One Straw Revolution’, I have sown barseem, a 
fodder plant in October, after cotton was harvested. Then one 
month later I sow wheat in that field after removing the stubble of 
the cotton crop. I realised the benefits of sowing barseem simply 
through observation. About two years ago I noticed that on a small 
portion of my field the yield of indigenous cotton was much higher 
than in rest of the field. This was the plot where barseem preceded 
cultivation of cotton. Even the next crop of jow (millet) after 
cotton had high yields. It is important not to interrupt nature too 
much but to understand its workings and then work accordingly. 
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But for that to happen one has to be connected with the farm, 
observe carefully what goes on there, the relationship between all 
the living organisms-plants, ‘weeds’, insects and how they respond 
to each other.” 
 
Unlike Swaroop Singh who charted the transition largely through self-learning, Buta Singh a 
young farmer was influenced by a relative actively involved with KVM who has guided him 
through the transition since 2013 and is more circumspect in his approach. In the first year, he 
practised organic cultivation on 1.5 acres out of the17 acres jointly owned with his 2 brothers 
and father. Now he grows organic wheat on his entire farm one season, and in the next season 
continues to practice natural farming on 1.5 acres.  
 
"I plant moong, maize and vegetables for our own household 
consumption. The yields are good, I have got as much as 30 man 
( 1 man is roughly 37 kgs) of wheat from 6 kanals (1 Kanal =1/8 
of an acre). However, in the first year, the yield was very low - it 
was only 14 man. I had used fewer seeds than I should have. There 
was too much distance between the rows. Next year I reduced the 
distance and had better yields. I realised the mistake on my own 
while harvesting, as the machine did not work well. Initially, I 
decided to grow organic food just for self-consumption. I asked my 
uncle who has been associated with KVM for indigenous seeds, 
observed his methods and practices in his fields. In the first year - I 
planted methi, gram, mixed with a few different varieties of wheat. 
I carried out weeding and mulching twice, and sprayed gurjal 
amrit (organic growth preparation recommended by KVM). There 
were no pest attacks. Next year I did not even use any organic 
spray - just did some weeding, and used cow dung manure, and 
mild spraying of sour buttermilk for sucking pests. There were 
beetles in my fields and they ate most of the sucking pests. I think 
the beetles were thriving because of the mixed cropping of wheat 
with gram and methi. During the Kharif season, I planted moong, 
maize, sugarcane and vegetables. I use a mix of indigenous and 
hybrid seeds both bought from the market, but I am never sure if 
the ones that are being sold as indigenous seeds are actually so. For 
maize next year, I am planning to make my own seeds and store 
them. But I currently do not have any plans to expand organic 
cultivation to the rest of my land. With organic cultivation, the 
yields are less, but so are the harmful pests and insects and it 
requires more manual work, particularly weeding. The cost of 
cultivation remains the same - but instead of paying for pesticides, 
the money is going to hired labour." On further reflection, he 
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contends, "fertilisers, which cost 7000Rs per acre and sprays I have 
lost count of (pesticides/insecticides/weedicides and fungicides), 
definitely cost more than what it would to employ labour and 
cultivate organically. In the first year, my brothers and father were 
reluctant and not very supportive, but now they are convinced as 
well that this is the right path. We do burn the fields after the rice 
harvest to get rid of the residue but not after the wheat harvest like 
other farmers. And I do not grow any paddy in the organic patch. 
The burning is essential because the quantity of straw is too much 
and it cannot be suppressed by ploughing. With wheat residue, we 
make dry fodder and the rest is mixed back into the soil.” 
 
Buta Singh’s cautious approach in devising ecological management practices reflects a 
careful balancing act between maintaining economic profitability, household consumption 
needs and health of the soil.  This approach is closer to the experience of most farmers 
associated with KVM that employ an assemblage of practices. Farmers begin with a gradual 
reduction of chemicals particularly in the wheat crop which is often consumed at home as 
well, and many quit after the first season if there is a significant decline in yields. Activists 
concur that yields remain the primary metric by which farmers evaluate the viability of 
agroecological practices in the initial phase, which makes it difficult to convince farmers to 
persist for several cropping cycles. Farmers persuaded by KVM to experiment initially think 
of agroecological farming in formulaic terms as reducing the use of fertilisers, replacing 
pesticides and insecticides with organic sprays that KVM activists prescribe, and replacing 
the use of weedicides with manual weeding by hired or family labour. The few who do 
manage to persevere for a few years go on to expand the ambit of their practices to include 
bio-diverse farming going beyond the wheat-rice or wheat-cotton rotation, which in turn 
generates greater yields. They also rely primarily on selling organic wheat at premium prices 
to maintain or increase their current level of incomes.   
 
The risk of loss of yields and monetary income in the short run makes it impossible for tenant 
cultivators to adopt agroecological practices. Apart from the economic compulsions 
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stemming from having to pay annual rents, tenant cultivators for the most part lease different 
farm land every year which provides little incentive for investing in restoring its ecological 
viability. With leasing, the constant rotation of land between different cultivators is likely to 
accelerate in the foreseeable future. Landowning households are leasing out land to earn cash 
through rents for investment in building non-agrarian livelihoods for the younger generation, 
or when young people are unwilling to work on the farm, the elderly are unable to manage 
the farms. In other instances, sustaining the household solely with farm income becomes 
impossible, as land is fragmented through inheritance with successive generations into 
extremely small operational parcels of less than 2 hectares. Randeep suggests that in his 
village which is close to the highway many households are keen to sell their land if they can 
negotiate lucrative compensation, which indicates the deepening of the agrarian crisis in the 
last decade. 
 
“People here want their land to be acquired. In the late 1990s, the 
agitations were genuinely against land acquisition. The agitations 
and protests that are being held now are just to push up the 
compensation rates. Most farmers today are disconnected from 
farming. They are just doing it for time pass, or out of compulsion, 
not with any interest or joy, or hopes for making a decent living for 
their families. Not many young people want to farm. For the past 
few years, even the rents have been declining because fewer people 
are leasing land, as there is no profit in cultivation. Small farmers, 
who were leasing land, even lost their one or two acres in the 
process. The only reason I was able to start farming and then 
transition to natural farming is that there was no existing family 
debt. My father was a government employee but kept his farm 
going on the side even though it was running into losses. I wanted 
to be in the army, like everyone else it was my first preference but 
when that did not work out, I decided to farm after finishing my 
Masters.” 
 
Randeep's testimony speaks to the conjunction of economic non-viability of farming with the 
deep-seated devaluation of agrarian work produced through the developmental discourse. 
Yet, his decision to practice farming and subsequently shift to natural farming also reveals 
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that contingent factors can create alternate possibilities. He, unlike some other natural 
farmers, has also been able to strategically manage the qualitative transformation of work on 
the fields. Such qualitative transformation requires the cumulative in-situ production of 
knowledge through experimentation and recovering the value of certain material practices 
such as manual weeding and channelling organically available inputs back into the farming 
ecosystem. The division of labour enacted on his field, between him and his permanent 
employee is not managerial and manual. Instead, it is an exceptional form co-management or 
work practices that integrate knowledge and labour seamlessly. Reminiscent of the Siri 
system described by the earlier generation, such an arrangement is distinct in being devoid of 
caste based discrimination it represents a secular revaluing of agrarian work. In this way, 
Randeep's farm is different from that of elderly natural farmers, who have difficulties in 
employing and retaining hired workers who as they say are unwilling to perform ‘manual 
labour’ required for natural farming. While elderly farmers are repositories of embodied 
knowledge, this knowledge is embedded in hierarchical caste and class relations. Systemic 
barriers such as the presence of significant debt that carries over generations that foreclose 
alternate trajectories are coupled with barriers to qualitative transformation of work practices 
on account of caste and gendered norms that are now conjoined with developmental notions 
of mobility and status.  
 
IV. Dissident Voices within KVM 
 
The more committed natural farmers associated with KVM have charted the agro-ecological 
transition through self-learning and experimentation and not through exchange of knowledge 
and resources in deliberative collective networks. They draw on diverse range of literature 
procured through contingent encounters, occasional interactions with natural farmers from 
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other regions in the country but primarily rely on ongoing experimentation on their own 
fields to develop apt methods and cropping systems. These cropping systems are not only 
tailored to their fields but also to their household consumption needs, availability of labour 
and economic compulsions. While occasionally engaging in advocacy on behalf of KVM, 
facilitating meetings in their own villages, sharing their experiences through different 
platforms they are not involved with everyday organising.  Several of them are critical of 
KVM’s organising model. At the center of these criticisms is the pedagogy of agro-ecological 
farming. Based on their own experiences these farmers argue that KVM should invest time 
and resources in creating functional agro-ecological farms that can become demonstration 
plots as well as hubs for learning and exchange. As Sumit Singh argues, "In all these years 
KVM has not been able to develop a good model for natural farming.  There are of course 
financial constraints but there is also a lack of coordination amongst KVM workers and 
farmers. If we had spent a fraction of the money that is spent on organising trainings, printing 
pamphlets and organisational literature, on developing just 5 model farms it would have 
convinced more people that natural farming can be viable." Referring to the remarks made by 
the Chief Minister of Punjab at the National Organic Convention in 2015, Sumit Singh 
further elaborates: 
 
Even Badal said at the convention that meetings will not achieve 
anything -we will give you land on lease in five blocks and ‘show’ 
us how to do it. The Chief Minister did a very typically jat like 
thing. On being asked for funds he responded with ‘show us first 
then we will believe you.’ Regardless of his intentions, there is 
power in illustration. Knowledge on paper and expressed through 
words will not achieve anything. So far, we keep bottling the 
methods of successful farmers from other states and distributing 
them –first it was Subhash Palekar (ZBNF), then OP Rupela, now 
Subhash Sharma. This has not been fruitful. We have to develop a 
model suitable for our climate and ecological conditions. The crops 
they work with are different, we have to develop a cropping cycle 
apt for conditions in Punjab. One should not confuse natural 
farming with organic farming – KVM keeps changing its stand. 
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Now they are advocating reducing costs of cultivation by using less 
fertilizer and chemicals. If we focus simply on cost reduction we 
will forget the real purpose and principles behind natural farming.” 
 
In a similar vein, Jaswant Singh, a primary school teacher who practices natural farming on 2 
acres argues: 
When Subhash Palekar, a natural farmer from Maharashtra, came 
in 2007-2008 at an event organised by KVM, he introduced us to 
new organic techniques. I experimented with those techniques and 
suffered losses. His methods were based on his experiences in 
Maharashtra. They were not suitable for our environment. Unlike 
in Maharashtra our weather pattern is not very stable and we 
comparatively have more water for irrigation. But I also noticed 
from his talk that because of less availability of water, farmers 
were not using fertilisers, so I was able to make the connection 
between the two. Subhash Palekar’s methods and practices were 
based on sound logic but just not suitable for blind adoption in 
Punjab and not compatible with our socio-environmental 
conditions. His method of Jeev Amrit preparation (an organic 
preparation key to the methods advocated by KVM) was useful if 
you had certain kinds of insects, which were not found on the 
farms in Punjab, so why would it work here? There is need to be 
consistent with principles advocated by the movement. From 
talking about natural farming one day, we moved to organics. We 
should have invested in developing our own model and practices, 
based on how farming was practised in Punjab prior to the Green 
Revolution." 
 
These dissident farmers question the model of replication and even adaptation of natural 
farming practices developed elsewhere, strongly asserting the value of place-based 
innovation. Harpal Singh’s views also reinforce the significance of harnessing ‘traditional 
knowledge’, that is knowledge of pre-Green Revolution ways of farming in Punjab for 
restructuring production practices. While asserting ‘cultural autonomy’ by revaluing the past 
is rhetorically emphasised by KVM activists in their everyday organising, it is not imbued 
with any concrete meaning in terms of specific practices. The agro-ecological practices and 
formulations that are advocated in trainings are rarely derived from any knowledge of 
cropping patterns or practices from pre-Green Revolution years. As oral histories of elderly 
men and women in chapter two suggest such knowledge is present in collective memory, but 
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not on the material landscape or even as marginal lived practices. Ruptures in the inter-
generational transmission of such practices make it difficult to reenact them in altered socio-
ecological conditions, and by people who have a different set of embodied experiences. There 
are a few discrete practices that have survived as tacit knowledge and are being revived such 
as practices of saving seeds and traditional forms of food preparation. As women largely 
performed these tasks they come up during women’s meetings, which are focused on growing 
vegetables for home consumption.  
 
Agro-ecological transitions on the fields require long periods of experimentation to develop 
new place-based practices and the reconstruction of social and ecological interdependency, 
which formed the basis of ‘past' practices that are invoked as being valuable. Therefore, 
natural farmers like Jaswant Singh also object to the turn toward economistic reasoning 
deployed by KVM activists to enrol a larger number of farmers with the movement. 
 
Advocacy for natural farming practices means talking about the 
reality like it is - it is not sustainable to enrol farmers based on 
false promises of equivalent yields. They will eventually realise it’s 
not true and it will prove counterproductive for the movement. 
Now my farm is thriving, but I made a lot mistakes in the 
beginning. Getting it right requires experimentation, which creates 
a better understanding of your soil and farm, environmental 
conditions. But it is not sustainable to attach people when they are 
not convinced about the fundamental principles. That's why we 
have not been successful in all these years. Farmers do not 
understand the logic behind natural practices when they are doled 
out as formulas. For instance, it is often recommended that Jantar 
(a leguminous plant used for fodder) should be planted between 
main crops to increase the fertility of the soil and reduce the use of 
urea. But it is not explained that Jantar only gathers nitrogen until 
it flowers. After that, it starts using Nitrogen and will even take up 
all the existing Nitrogen in the soil leaving nothing for the 
following crop. When farmers do not understand the logic behind 
processes they will fail and become disillusioned. The logic is 
never communicated to the farmers, which will also clarify the 
time required for enacting such a transition in our degraded 
landscape. The focus of advocacy so far is just on positive 
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outcomes in terms of yields and lowering costs of cultivation and 
on fear of disease.  
 
Farmers like Jaswant Singh also believe that paid worker activists at KVM do not really 
understand the principles of natural farming and are therefore confined to communicating 
formulaic practices, working more like agricultural extension agents. He further continues to 
argue that in order to allow farmers to endure the short-term risks, it is important to push for a 
change in government policies.  
The government has to support farmers in the first three years or so 
when they make the switch to organic practices. It is a fact that 
organic producers are suffering as compared to chemical farmers 
economically. If someone works really hard to produce organic 
crops and takes them to the market only to discover that they are 
going to be sold along with everything else grown chemically, why 
would they continue? This path is not viable for those who are 
completely dependent on farming for their livelihood. In my 
understanding, it is mostly the middle classes that have brought 
about the revolution anywhere. The small farmers cannot take the 
risk; the big ones do not care as they are making profits. It is the 
medium farmers who have to lead the way and as some of us are 
beginning to realise if we do not demand change we will be pushed 
down the class hierarchy. 
 
The pathway to autonomy for these farmers does involve demanding support from the 
government in the form of compensation that would enable farmers to bear short-term 
monetary losses and a policy environment that does not disadvantage organic and natural 
farmers. KVM is engaged in oppositional politics, to a limited extent, that targets government 
policies to create a more conducive institutional context for facilitating agro-ecological 
transitions. But this is confined to the leaders of the organisation supporting and participating 
in the campaigns of ASHA – the national coalition of farmers’ organisations and civil society 
groups from different parts of the country advocating for socially just and ecologically 
sustainable food systems and agrarian livelihoods. These efforts are disconnected from 
KVM’s organising practices in the villages and are carried out mostly by non-farmer leaders 
within the movement. They focus on resisting further government intervention or policies 
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enabling corporate intervention in the food system. Most prominently, KVM has campaigned 
against recent attempts to allow the introduction of genetically modified food crops 
(particularly the ongoing resistance to GM mustard most recently, produced by scientists at a 
public university), and occasionally articulating demands for resources to incentivise organic 
farming. Farmers are not directly mobilised however to participate in these kinds of 
interventions. In fact, KVM activists associate forms of mobilisation, such as mass rallies and 
protests, with farmers’ unions like the BKU and are critical of its episodic and inconsistent 
character.  
 
The perceived dilution of KVM’s organising strategies, which farmers like Harpal Singh and 
Sukhdev Singh suggest is a consequence of NGO-isation, is partly symptomatic of deeper 
democratisation of agro-ecological politics. This democratisation partly stems from KVM’s 
engagement and interactions with grassroots groups and organizations from other parts of the 
country as part of the national coalition ASHA (Alliance for Sustainable Agriculture). But 
more significantly, it stems from the involvement of paid worker activists from socio-
economic backgrounds other than Sikh-jat households, particularly women and men from 
landless households.  These activists are more attuned to socio-economic concerns of rural 
households. They view the purist approach of natural farmers to agro-ecological transition in 
the realm of production practices as unfeasible from the standpoint of organising. Their 
interactions with a diverse set of people in the villages are expanding the discussion within 
the movement beyond the concerns of the medium landowning Sikh Jat male farmer to focus 
more on sustainable livelihoods and social reproduction.  
 
Undoubtedly though constraints imposed by the neoliberal policies and rationality are also 
constitutive of the shifting agenda of the movement. For instance, the struggle to garner 
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resources that can enable the employment of paid workers and other operational expenses 
requires demonstration of success in concrete terms such as the number of farmers enrolled. 
So far KVM has largely sought individual donations from urban Punjabi citizens that come 
without any attached conditionality, but the growing scope and the scale of work require the 
acquisition of more stable project based funding.85 The inability to foster a collective work 
ethic and material commoning suggests that organising practices in the villages are 
constrained by the ‘individualization ethic’ that AR Vasavi (2012) has identified as a key 
process shaping the agrarian crisis particularly in sites of capital-intensive agriculture. Thus, 
reinforcing notions of ‘self-care’ that scholars like Wendy Brown (2003) and others have 
argued are constitutive of neoliberal political rationality (cf. Guthman 2008). For instance, 
when KVM activists distribute indigenous seed varieties that they procure from other states, 
they expect farmers to save these seeds for sowing next year and also generate a culture of 
seed exchange. Activists complain however that most farmers simply expect them to provide 
seeds and they have not been able to create a self-sustaining cycle of seed production and 
exchange. 
 
V. The ‘Place’ of Women in Socio-ecological Restoration 
 
Organising among women is aimed at ensuring growing on small plots to promote healthy 
food consumption among farming households. This approach is premised on an instrumental 
logic that seeks to build on existing gendered norms. Meetings with women are primarily 
centred on health concerns, as they are deemed responsible for food preparation, and making 
																																								 																				
85 For instance, during a meeting among activists, it was proposed by one of the leaders that 
they should initiate the formation of women’s self-help groups (SHGs) in villages, which 
would enable KVM to apply for a range of grants. However, there was substantial push back 
from grassroots activists who argued that it would divert attention from their agenda. Some of 
the women activists also complained about being overworked and that they would be unable 
to create SHGs while continuing with the work of expanding kitchen gardens.  
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decisions about meals. Activists specifically draw attention to the health crisis, particularly 
increasing the incidence of cancer and reproductive disorders during village meetings. They 
argue that since women care more about the health and well-being of the household, unlike 
men, who tend to focus solely on higher yields and monetary incomes, they have to take 
action. Women are encouraged to grow vegetables on homestead land for household 
consumption, as gendered norms restrict them from going to the farm, which is generally at a 
certain distance from the village. Growing vegetables on homestead land is a way of 
reconnecting women particularly in landowning households with farming, as their attachment 
with family farms was severed with the onset of mechanisation and chemical intensive 
agriculture.86  On the part of activists, the process leading towards reconnection is a cautious 
one that does not confront gender hierarchies.    
 
The issues raised by women especially at the first few meetings in a village nevertheless 
break through such compartmentalisation between agro-ecological practices and social power 
relations that structure them.  Women bring up the lack of time, particularly younger women 
who have to look after children, livestock and perform other household chores. Additionally, 
women from landless households also work as hired labour or on NREGA sites. Many also 
talk about opposition from men and sometimes from elderly women within the household to 
their participation in such meetings, and to their taking on a more active role in cultivation 
even it is within the confines of the house. Other who have existing kitchen gardens suggest 
that the men in their family ridicule the idea of growing vegetables without using any agro-
chemicals.  Material constraints such as unstable and inadequate water supply, difficulties in 
accessing indigenous seeds and organic matter such as dried dung cakes for manure in large 
																																								 																				
86 Vegetables arguably have the worst health impact in terms of pesticides. Unlike grains where there 
is a time lag between spraying and consumption, vegetables are often consumed within 1-3 days of 
spraying. In addition, they are injected with chemicals for quicker ripening.  
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quantities, also make it hard to sustain cultivation. The airing out of these issues at village 
meetings remains just that. Activists do not facilitate discussions about ways to negotiate or 
collectively take action to resolve such issues. Instead, such meetings are simply followed by 
trainings on organic methods and individual support for women who decide to persist despite 
such constraints. Activists periodically visit their homes to observe and examine their kitchen 
gardens and offer help with preparing the beds, sowing and pest control methods, and 
occasionally facilitate seed exchanges.  
 
The lukewarm response to investing time and labour in growing vegetables needs to be 
understood in the context of how women understand and experienced the transformation of 
agrarian work and social landscape of the village in the last few decades. As I have discussed 
earlier, elderly women's narratives of the transformation and experience of the crisis suggest 
two things. They point at the increasing vulnerability and instability of agrarian livelihoods, 
as well as a decline in the general sense of well-being in terms of quality of life. This decline 
is primarily referenced in terms of growing requirement of cash for education, health 
expenses and consumer goods, without a commensurate increase in cash incomes, in contrast 
to greater self-sufficiency in meeting needs earlier. Subsequently, they also bring up the 
higher incidence of health problems, less social interaction among people in the village, their 
own exclusion from working in the fields which are correlated with restricted mobility and 
confinement at home. Breaking down of joint-family households is often also included but 
there is more ambiguity around it. 
 
While a decline in overall well-being is asserted, elderly women also claim that the lives of 
young women today is easier. They recall that domestic violence was a normal part of their 
everyday lives, and they had to work very long hours, taking care of chores within the 
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household and in the fields. They had little to no autonomy within the household that 
included extended kin. However, the narratives around the transformation of gendered norms 
and practices are not always linear. The withdrawal of women from work in the fields and 
lessening of sociality within the village has contributed to a heightened sense of insecurity in 
public spaces for women. Further, women also suggest that men bear the disproportionate 
burden of labouring to feed the entire family with the deepening of the money economy, 
which has led to tremendous stress in the context of the volatility of crop prices and 
increasing indebtedness. As younger women are not aware of decisions about farming 
operations, they find out about the strained financial conditions or indebtedness under 
extreme situations. This is an observation that has also been made by Ranjana Padhi (2012) in 
her study that looks at the impact of farmer suicides in Punjab on women. 
 
I quote extensively from an interview with Sukhjeet Kaur who is in her 60s, which is 
indicative of the experiences of women in Jat Sikh medium landholding households. Their 
household owns 6 acres, which is managed by her only son.  Her interview reveals the 
ambiguities surrounding organic production but more significantly shows the 
interconnections between transformations of agrarian work and gendered familial relations. 
Sukhjeet was married when she was 14-15 years old. She recalls that in the years just after 
her marriage she went to the family farm to pick cotton, peanuts and vegetables in the mid-
1970s. She also carried food for her husband and other male family members. Before wheat-
rice cropping rotation became widespread, with mixed cropping, women helped in the 
manual harvesting of wheat, maize and millets. They would also cut fodder and bring it home 
for feeding the animals. In their field, during the Rabi season, the crop in the mix were grams, 
millets, wheat, mustard, and a variety of fodder crops. In the Kharif season, they grew 
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indigenous cotton and hybrid American cotton, paddy, pulses and millets. Parts of the land 
were also left fallow in a rotation.   
At that time, farmers had started using fertiliser but in very small 
quantity. Gradually with the increase in the use of fertiliser, other 
crops were eliminated, and now there is just wheat, paddy and 
cotton in the fields. In those days when maize was grown, there 
were so many birds especially parrots in the fields. We have made 
our life convenient. There is no need to stand guard because there 
are no birds to eat the grain and extracting grain from maize was 
time-consuming hard work performed mostly by women. Some 
women still go to pick cotton on their own farms, but the practice 
of ‘veedi’ (labour sharing) among farming households has 
disappeared. It is considered shameful now to work on someone 
else’s farm. For women, it is unthinkable. People will see you and 
equate you with daily wage labour if you are working on someone 
else’s farm. Women do not even go to their own farms. It is a 
matter of status for farmers to be able to hire labour for picking. 
 
Describing how she came to be associated with KVM, she emphasises that it has been 
relatively easy for her to grow vegetables as their family farm is attached to the house. 
Apart from easy access as a woman, cultivation on farm land also means there are fewer 
material constraints such as lack of water and appropriate soil. But she concludes by 
saying that organic production only works for home consumption, it is not economically 
feasible to transform commercial cultivation.  
We have been growing vegetables for as long as I can remember. 
Fortunately, our farm is attached to the house, which makes it easy 
for us (women) to work there. Earlier my son and husband would 
grow vegetables along with other crops, but now my daughter-in-
law and I have taken over. My son works and manages the farm 
alone, so he welcomes all the help he can get. I began growing 
vegetables organically about three years ago. There was a meeting 
organised in the village by KVM. I liked what they said about 
health benefits and decided to experiment. When we cooked the 
first batch of vegetables we had grown organically, the difference 
was obvious. The vegetables cooked faster and tasted much better. 
In particular, when one of the activists talked about the irony of 
how we sell milk produced at home and buy vegetables from the 
market, which would never happen in Jat households some decades 
ago, it struck a chord with me. I realised we could use the money 
we would save, to fund our children’s education. Small farmers are 
in a tough spot, we cannot work on other people’s fields or do 
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other wage work, so cash is always scarce, and saving money is 
important. We have also started making and saving our own seeds 
for vegetables. We use homemade sprays with organic ingredients 
to manage pests. These methods are generally good enough to take 
care of the plants, this time though there has been some damage 
because of unseasonal rain and hailstorms. Otherwise, most of our 
household’s consumption needs are met from this patch. I 
experiment on my own as well. For instance, I sprayed wood ash 
on onions and garlic and wilting plants stood up again. But it is 
important to experiment with some knowledge. Not all ash is good 
for the plants, but only that generated by cow dung cakes. We do 
not buy vegetables anymore. Growing food without any chemicals 
though is not economically feasible. It works if you own some land 
and want to cultivate on a small portion for self-consumption, but 
not if you are leasing land and have to pay a high rent. It is not 
feasible to experiment on the commercial crops. It is too risky and 
they cannot afford lower yields on leased land. 
 
Elderly women like Sukhjeet Kaur, who have more time and have also farmed in their early 
years, mostly agree to cultivate vegetable kitchen gardens and are more likely to keep them 
running. The exception to this is landless households where younger women who haves some 
experience of cultivation as hired farm workers although under very restrictive conditions. 
They are keen to grow vegetables in order to save money.  Binder Kaur, for instance, who is 
her mid-20s has carved out a small bed in her home yard and started growing organic 
vegetables about three years ago. The arguments of the organic activist about saving money 
and eating healthier food appealed to her. She says,  
 
“I have been working as farm labour since I was very young, 
mostly transplanting paddy or picking cotton. It is different 
cultivating things on your own. As hired labour we just do as we 
are instructed, here I have to apply my mind. I can take decisions 
about what to do. Men negotiate for wages, so I do not really know 
how that happens or whether they negotiate at all. Women never 
say anything to the zamindars. We just go and work, and all the 
talk happens between men. This at home where I grow vegetables 
is my domain. When I began to do this, my husband was not 
happy. He said why go through all this trouble, but gradually he 
came around. I said to him if I am working in my own house, 
where is the trouble. It is not like I am going outside to work. It 
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saves a bit of money. No vegetables today can be bought for less 
than 50Rs a day. They are becoming more and more expensive.”  
 
However, her vegetable plot currently is empty, as extremely high temperature in the last few 
weeks has killed all the plants. The waterworks supply in this village has been cut off for 
nearly 8 months due to non-payment of bills, and even drinking water has to be fetched from 
the village tap. While most landless households have small patches within their household 
yards sufficient for growing food to supplement household consumption, they struggle with 
access to means required for cultivation, particularly irrigation water and organic inputs for 
those who are unable to keep livestock. Binder goes on to say,  
 
Now that no vegetables are growing this year because of water 
problems, we have to buy them from the market. There is no other 
option. I can see there are significant differences between 
chemically grown vegetables and the ones we grew at home. 
Organic vegetables cook faster and taste much better. In our 
village, many women grow vegetables at home. We talk about 
them amongst ourselves too. If a disease affects someone’s plants, 
they will come and ask others what to do. We often look at each 
other’s plots to see what is growing. I will try to continue growing 
vegetables with the tap water as much as I can. But for indigenous 
seeds we are dependent on the activists. It’s very hard, almost 
impossible to get them in the market. When I make seeds for 
anything, I share them as well, so that the KVM activist can pass it 
along to someone else.  
 
As Binder Kaur’s narrative suggests women from landless households value the savings that 
accrue from not having to buy vegetables. But they also value the ability to control the 
production process and the product of their labour. Further, KVM activist who reach out 
landless women also tend to be women from lower-caste, landless household, and therefore 
enjoy a better rapport based on shared mutual experiences.  Activists like Sanjana, a young 
woman from a landless household, continuously expand the boundaries of KVM’s agenda 
and confront gendered and caste hierarchies in their everyday work. During conversations 
with women from landed households, for instance, Sanjana challenges the insinuation that 
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labour is not easily available anymore because people do not want to work hard in the fields, 
and would rather make easy money through the government employment guarantee scheme 
(MGNREGA). She reasons that work available in the farms for hired labour is sporadic and 
therefore labouring classes cannot be dependent only on farming. They have to look after 
their own interests. Her extensive experience of working on land leased by her family, 
growing vegetables using agro-chemicals, prior to being employed by KVM has been useful 
in mobilising women. In the initial years, she faced stiff opposition. Women would often 
dismiss her by saying that there would be mosquitoes and snakes in the house if they had a 
vegetable garden, and that had no time. But she persevered and after several visits to 
households and villages, despite her young age they began to see that she had the knowledge 
and practical experience, and so they began to take her seriously. While she received formal 
training on organic methods and practices such as pest management, she had to learn the 
strategies for mobilising and convincing women on her own. This was particularly difficult 
given the culture of villages where young women are not supposed to be in public spaces on 
their own. She would seek help from women workers in schools and the Anganwadi 
(government run child care centres) to become familiar with people in new villages. In 
particular, she realised that elderly women were the most helpful and they would accompany 
her to different houses. And yet, they would also tell her that she should look for work that 
involves sitting in an office since it is unsafe for a young woman to ‘roam around in villages 
and go to strange houses'. 
 
Sanjana’s own trajectory, since joining the movement and her experiences with organising 
within landless households, illustrates the potential for greater inclusivity. The inclusion of 
marginalised groups influences the broader conception of socio-ecological sustainability by 
explicitly raising questions of access and justice. Even as this is now being acknowledged 
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within KVM, organisational resources are disproportionately dedicated to training men 
farmers. Scaling up agro-ecological transformations means facilitating greater organic 
production within farmers’ fields and increasingly creating avenues for selling organic 
produce within Punjabi towns and cities. Yet, greater success has been achieved with 
organising among women. There are a significant number of vegetable gardens in villages 
run largely by women with support from other members of the household (ranging from 50-
200 in a village), in comparison with the number of male farmers shifting toward natural 
farming practices. In fact, senior activists conceptualise mobilisation among women in an 
instrumental fashion, in more than one way. Women are seen as the apt audience for raising 
health concerns as the gatekeepers of food consumed within the family. Further, work among 
them is also perceived as another way of making inroads into households for spreading 
awareness about organic methods.  
 
Women who are involved in vegetable production, however, do not have the sense of being 
part of a larger movement. They often cannot identify KVM by its name, and their primary 
relationship is with the activist who comes by once every few weeks. After the preliminary 
group meetings in villages, the interactions with women are on an individual basis. Activists 
say it is difficult to get women to collectivise in any meaningful way. Issues such as irregular 
water supply jeopardize the sustainability of these kitchen gardens on the one hand, but also 
the dependence on the activists for seeds and information make their future precarious. 
Activists admit that if they do not go to a village for a few months, which is beginning to 
happen because the group is expanding to new villages, many women lose motivation and 
stop growing vegetables. Their recent efforts to devolve responsibility to some women in the 
villages of acting as facilitators, given the shortage of resources and staff within the 
organisation, have been unsuccessful.  
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Nevertheless, it has been relatively easier to engender exchange of seeds and information 
among women than men. As many women in their interviews point out men are often driven 
by competition for higher yields, which is partially responsible for the indiscriminate use of 
fertiliser and pesticides. They observe each other in the fields and spray products based on 
what other people are spraying, not based on the requirements of their own fields. Malkeet 
Kaur who is in her mid-80s and has been associated with the movement for almost 10 years 
growing vegetables organically in her home, says it has been impossible for her to convince 
men in her family to start using organic practices in the fields. "My sons tell me if everyone 
else is using chemicals, why should we change our practices. They condescendingly tell me 
to keep growing my vegetables but they will not shift. They talk to other farmers on the 
phone to check on how much fertiliser they are using or what new product they are spraying 
and then do the same. My farming knowledge means nothing to them."   
 
While not many women are able to convince the men in their families or are even convinced 
themselves about adopting organic methods for growing commercial crops, in some instances 
working on organic kitchen gardens does open up the space for conversation about the 
harmful effects of chemical-intensive agriculture. Amarjeet Kaur who has been growing 
vegetables for three years now, for instance, said she often argued with her husband coaxing 
him to reduce chemicals on their 20-acre farm that he cultivates along with his three brothers.  
Finally, he agreed and visited a large commercial organic farm in a neighbouring village that 
he had heard about, to observe how things worked. Despite initial resistance from his 
brothers, he has now begun to cultivate one acre by drastically reducing the use of chemicals.  
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VI. Conclusion 
 
Not only are farm workers, landless cultivators and women invisible in the institutional 
policy framework that seeks to address the agrarian crisis, but they are marginal within the 
landscape of resistance as well. Inability to access land and lack of decision-making power 
about agrarian practices makes it difficult for women and landless workers to engage with 
agro-ecological politics. Payment of exorbitant rents and movement from one piece of land to 
another prevents tenant cultivators from transforming their cultivation practices. To revive 
material and cultural autonomy, KVM activists argue that fostering cohesiveness within the 
village community is strategically essential. Therefore, addressing gendered and class power 
relations are low in the hierarchy of political battles, despite their framing of a ‘civilizational 
crisis’ where social, economic and ecological degradation is interconnected. While issues 
such as increasing dowry payments resulting in indebtedness, high rates of female feticide 
and other forms of violence against women are linked to the Green Revolution in the 
ideological narrative explaining the crisis; they are not addressed through organising 
practices. Bringing up social power relations explicitly is perceived as divisive politics that 
will further rupture the social ethos in villages.  
 
KVM’s official discourse of ‘cultural autonomy’ valorises a selective ‘past’ that implicitly 
refers to the practices of landowning dominant castes of Sikh Jats when they were powerful. 
The rhetorical deployment of culture in this ontological sense (cf. Mitchell 1995; Abu-
Lughod 1990) or as an essentialized characteristic of peasant proprietors,87 however, has not 
																																								 																				
87 As critical perspectives within subaltern studies historiography have suggested attributions 
of essentialized cultural consciousness to a unified peasant subject excludes marginalised 
caste and gendered subjects on the one hand and is a ‘back-door entry of the liberal humanist 
subject’ on the other (cf. O’ Hanlon 2000; Spivak 1985; Prashad 1999; Illiah 1999; Tharu & 
Niranjana 1999). 
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infiltrated the everyday organising practices that are centred on health, environmental and 
economic distress. Participation by women, particularly from landless households, and 
interactions with the broader coalition of movements nationally, acts as an antidote to the 
conflation of agro-ecological politics with nativist and conservative norms.88 Organising 
experiences of activists among women suggest nascent pathways for more inclusive 
mobilisation. Activists reach out to a large number of landless households, and women from 
landless households are generally more receptive to their efforts. They value the savings that 
come with not having to buy vegetables from the market. The experience of working on their 
own homestead plots with some support from activists is greatly valued by many of them 
because they have control over the decision-making process and the final produce. The 
growing prominence of these practices within the movement is in turn due to the efforts of 
women activists from landless households. Their participation in the movement is expanding 
the agenda beyond repairing the socio-ecological rift in production practices to greater 
attention toward decommodified social reproduction. The revival of subsistence production 
by women, particularly from landless households, is a critical pushback against the 
reactionary traces in the organising discourse of cultural autonomy. It contains the possibility 
for shifting agro-ecological politics away from a conception of a valorised ‘past’ constituted 
by gendered privileges of dominant landowning castes, to creating new just norms of 
sociality.  
 
 
 
																																								 																				
88 The proclivity towards nativist politics has been acknowledged within sustainable agro-
ecological initiatives in other regions in India as well but has not been analysed substantively 
(see Munster 2015; Brown 2013; Khadse et al 2017). Marxist critiques of farmers’ unions led 
by the middle dominant caste farmers also pointed at their conservative nativism (Brass 
2007).  
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this dissertation, I have argued that KVM's agroecological politics has emerged at the 
present conjuncture as a saturation of the process of social, spatial and temporal displacement 
of ecological costs. From the vantage point of the present, that is a manifest crisis of socio-
ecological reproduction facing cultivators, Punjab is a degraded frontier regional ecology 
produced through extractive agricultural modernisation that was critical to postcolonial state 
formation. While the Green Revolution is predominantly understood as a state-led 
development project of agricultural modernisation that benefitted medium and large farmers 
in particular regions like Punjab, the provenance of the agrarian crisis in India are traced to 
the period of neoliberal reforms in the 1990s enabling penetration of corporate capital. The 
trajectory of agrarian transformation in the cotton-belt of Punjab, however, suggests a much 
more complicated picture. It highlights how state support aggressively promoted synthetic 
input-intensive mono-cultural farming since the 1960s until the technological treadmill 
became self-sustaining through a restructuring of the social and the ecological landscape. The 
material basis for alternative and autonomous forms of social reproduction were eroded 
through these decades. Thus, liberalisation reforms of the 1990s, that entailed withdrawal of 
government subsidies on electricity and fertilizer, institutional agricultural credit and un-
remunerative minimum support prices that barely cover the costs of production, are not a 
critical rupture but a deepening of the techno-politics of the development decades (cf. Kumar 
2016). The incentivising mechanisms that enrolled Punjabi farmers in the project of 
agricultural modernisation have transmuted into a pervasive internally disciplining regional 
social ecology. Critically, such a framing recognises the interconnectedness of socio-
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ecological dynamics of the ‘long Green Revolution’ (Patel 2013), and this recognition is 
embodied in and has been made visible through the emergent movement for agro-ecological 
sustainability. To elaborate on this argument, I have employed two approaches.  
 
The first is to privilege subjective oral histories of the Green Revolution that critique the 
technocratic isolation of production from social reproduction practices. This isolation is 
exemplified by Green Revolution practices. Exclusive emphasis on increasing productivity of 
wheat and rice, to provide cheap calories through the public distribution system, was 
underpinned by derailing of the agenda of land redistribution, and neglect of investment in 
rural health and education infrastructure. In focusing on the transformation of relations of 
production, particularly class differentiation, Marxist scholarly accounts of agrarian 
transformation have replicated the separation of production from social reproduction, without 
a critical analysis of the effects of such separation in governmental practices and rural 
resistance. Memories of the early decades of the Green Revolution, articulated by men and 
women from rural households, suggest that reluctance to adopt agrochemicals and new 
hybrid varieties was grounded in concerns for soil and human health. The relationship with 
agrochemicals was shaped by people's position in the social hierarchy. For instance, the 
restrictions prohibiting women from working in the fields in landed households were an 
assertion of status and upward mobility, but they were also partly attributed to the advent of 
pesticides and insecticides. First-generation, highly toxic pesticides were perceived as 
particularly harmful for women and reproductive health. Their impact was visible and 
immediate as is evident in the narratives of farm workers and cultivators, who recalled spells 
of dizziness, burns and even instances of death due to exposure. Many elderly people trace 
the roots of the current widespread opioid addiction, which is attributed in part to the 
prevalence of hopelessness about the future among youth, to the practice of mixing opium 
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with tea that was given to siris, the semi-attached farm workers, by landowners. This was 
said to quell the fatigue of hard work on the farms and ensure they did not quit working for 
particular households. These instances show how changes in labour practices with 
agrochemical intensification and mechanisation, reconfigured social relations, and the forms 
in which exploitation was experienced, contingent on the location in the class, caste and 
gender hierarchy. The foregrounding of these particular instances in memory-making through 
which shows how the current health crisis is shaping the significance and evaluation of past 
events.  
 
These oral histories also highlight another process that has been conspicuously absent from 
the narratives of the Green Revolution – the marginalisation and erosion of the village 
commons. As I have discussed, the lost village commons were not only material – the open 
grazing lands that allowed all classes to keep livestock, native trees that provided 
uncultivated foods, shade and contributed to the sustenance of the ecosystem, but also 
collective work practices such as veedi – the reciprocal exchange of labour during peak 
season, and access for women from landless households to the fields for gleaning post-
harvest. These practices, however, structured through patrimonial caste relations are not 
viewed unambiguously as advantageous. While some men and women from landless 
households point to easier access to healthy food, others particularly young people, highlight 
the indignities of caste oppression during this period of relatively de-commodified social 
reproduction. The growing presence of village-level government institutions through the 
Green Revolution decades enabled collective Dalit struggles against caste and class 
oppression locally. Men who worked as siris, or semi-attached workers, recall both the 
security of subsistence and the impossibility of upward mobility. With the shift to annual 
contracts for farm workers followed by casualisation of farm work, economic insecurity and 
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risk unfolded in conjunction with an assertion of formal equality and the opening up of 
possibilities for upward mobility through non-farm livelihoods.  
 
The reconstructions of changing everyday practices through the early decades of the Green 
Revolution and the articulations of the lived experience of the present crisis show the 
devaluation of agrarian work as a historical process. The unprofitability of agriculture for 
farmers in India is widely accepted. Less attention has been paid to devaluation enacted 
through the loss of control of farmers over the production process through the separation of 
knowledge production from on-farm work. This incremental loss of control is exemplified by 
the vagaries of cotton cultivation in Malwa. Bt hybrids were introduced in 2005 on the 
pretext of fixing the preceding round of crisis emerging from the persistent failure of 
American hybrids and the inability of pesticides to control boll-weevil attacks. After a few 
good seasons, Bt hybrids are now succumbing to other pests like whitefly and mealy bugs. 
The crop failures are enframed by the expert narrative that blames farmers for lack of 
precision in following scientific methods, obscuring the socioeconomic and ecological 
constraints resulting from the preceding rounds of techno-fixes. This loss of control has 
contributed to de-valorisation of occupational identity along with economic unprofitability 
for Sikh-jat cultivators who have a long history of being recognised as ‘progressive farmers’. 
The derogatory expert narrative also invokes conspicuous consumption as an essentialized 
cultural attribute of Sikh jats to explain the crisis, drawing attention to expenditure on 
weddings, motor vehicles, construction of houses, and other non-essential consumer goods as 
examples of lack of financial prudence. Implicit in such essentialization is an epistemological 
superiority, as it is not a universal condemnation of growing consumerism, but only of rural 
consumerism, which ironically is also construed as a marker of ‘development’.  
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In contrast, men and women across social classes in rural Malwa emphasise how 
monocultural agricultural intensification unfolded simultaneously with increasing need for 
disposable cash to provision everyday consumption of food, for education and medical 
expenses. In these narratives, the social pressures with increasing commodification of 
ritualistic and cultural practices are construed as efforts to counter perceptions of downward 
mobility. The assertion of status in this way is in part a reflection of the disillusionment of 
young men from landowning households with farming, and their inability to realise their 
desired future with ‘white collar’ jobs in urban centres. A focus on lived experiences thus 
provides a relational understanding of production and social reproduction in a unified 
analytical field, foregrounding the significance of both political economy of production and 
the cultural politics of consumption, and vice versa (Yeh and Lama 2013; cf. Watts 1994). In 
this dissertation, I have employed this analytic to show the systematic de-valorisation of 
agrarian work and rural places in Punjab, a region ostensibly privileged through post-colonial 
development practices, where all the ills said to be afflicting Indian agriculture – low yield 
productivity, dependence on rainfall, under utilisation of agrochemicals, have been overcome. 
The regional division of labour was not simply a division of nature, but the displacement of 
costs of environmental degradation through extractive agricultural intensification, over time, 
and to marginalised social groups. The surfacing of ecological degradation on the political 
agenda in Punjab reflects the saturation of this process of displacement and masking of 
effects. Economic and ecological precariousness is no longer confined to landless 
households, or small and marginal cultivators, but is being experienced by landowning 
cultivators including medium scale farmers.  
 
The second approach that I have used is an analysis of the unfolding mobilisation for 
enacting agro-ecological sustainability in Malwa led by KVM, in which a small number of 
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medium scale farmers are currently the most active participants. The privileging of 
constructive instead of oppositional politics advocates a community-led transformation of 
everyday practices of food production and consumption. The mobilisation discourse employs 
the idiom of a ‘civilisational crisis’ to emphasise the interconnectedness of the manifest 
social, economic and ecological degradation. The construction of an alternative imaginary of 
indigenous ecological holism challenges the compartmentalising logic of techno-politics 
premised on controlling ‘nature’. It is a critique of the transformation of agrarian work, 
through separation of knowledge production from labour on the farm, and the disembedding 
of production from social reproduction through statist interventions since the 1960s. I argue 
that the discursive invocation of material and cultural autonomy by KVM is premised on a 
simplified western/indigenous binary that mirrors the techno-politics of the Green 
Revolution. In replacing economistic productivism with a valourisation of indigenous culture, 
such a discourse contains the seeds of conservative nativism that reinforce gendered, class 
and caste hierarchies. For instance, landless cultivators are excluded from outreach activities, 
and women are organised to grow food organically for home consumption without 
challenging the gendered hierarchies that structure their labour.  KVM activists explain these 
exclusions, and avoidance of explicit confrontation of caste, class and gendered hierarchies, 
as a ‘strategic essentialism’ necessary for building a sense of community cohesion. The 
predominant focus on organising landowning farmers is predicated on the understanding that 
they are implicated in the structuring of the socioecological degradation. By analysing the 
competing discourses within the movement, the organising activities of activists from varied 
socioeconomic backgrounds, and the varied modes of participation by those associated with 
the movement, I show that the prefigurative mode of organising counteracts conservative and 
exclusionary tendencies contained within a culturalist discourse of autonomy.  
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The shift from a narrow focus on enacting natural farming practices, to a more open-ended 
approach that accommodates a range of practices such as low-input intensive cultivation, 
incremental reduction of agrochemicals in wheat, organic production on some part of the land 
for household consumption, has led to the inclusion of greater number of cultivators who are 
facing severe economic constraints. Organising among women, to grow vegetables 
organically on homestead plots, is moving from the periphery of KVM’s agenda to the centre. 
Through this focus on producing for household consumption, a larger number of landless 
households are becoming involved with the movement. The changing trajectory of KVM’s 
organising practices cannot be dismissed as NGO-isation as argued by some farmers within 
the movement or construed as being a part of the broader trend of disciplining oppositional 
and disruptive politics in India (cf. Gupta and Sivaramakrishnan 2011). Such evaluations are 
premised on conventional understandings of politics in terms of class-based mobilisation. The 
emphasis on constructive programs and prefigurative practical agenda of transformation is 
not simply shaped by ‘neoliberal rationality' but has roots in the Gandhian strand of anti-
colonial politics. The incursion of Gandhian modes of mobilisation in rural Punjab, which 
have historically been prevalent among ‘environmental struggles’ in regions dominated by 
subsistence production, I argue, a radical reshaping of political agency. The contradictory 
experience of techno-political transformation of agrarian practices through the Green 
Revolution decades, combined with structured marginality of the rural as a whole, is 
constitutive of this radical reshaping. Whereas direct dispossession is experienced as an 
exogenous encroachment of moral economy, the slower process of surplus accumulation 
through ecological extraction in which Punjabi cultivators were participants is less visible and 
fragmented. Attention to the unfolding of alterations of everyday practices of work and social 
reproduction is critical for understanding this emergent form of political agency. Organised 
agroecological politics, therefore, cannot be relegated to the sphere NGO-led sustainability 
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projects, distinct from the sphere of agrarian struggles.  In Green Revolution regions, 
analytical attention continues to focus on agrarian populism and more recently has been on 
overt land conflicts. In fact, both anti-dispossession struggles and agroecological politics can 
be conceived as struggles for viable social reproduction, the latter explicitly incorporating 
ecological relations in its ambit.    
 
It is clear that Punjabi cultivators, as dominant agrarian castes do not perceive themselves as 
a part of what Partha Chatterjee (2004) has defined as ‘political society’, inhabited by 
subaltern subjects who negotiate for accessing state welfare resources. Chatterjee argues that 
such governed populations are disenfranchised as citizens, and excluded from civil society as 
surplus populations that are dispensable to the needs of capital accumulation. As Chatterjee 
(2008) and other scholars have pointed out, the state welfare schemes that have proliferated 
in the post-liberalisation era in India, are meant to act as palliatives to increasingly aggressive 
forms of dispossession by preventing the outbreak of more disruptive resistance (cf. Gupta 
2012). These welfare provisions, however, have resulted from grassroots struggles making 
demands for viable social reproduction in the wake of growing unemployment and precarious 
livelihoods (cf. Harriss & Scully 2015; Li 2010; Ferguson 2013; Gupta 2011). Ousted from 
the agrarian economy in large numbers, the struggles by landless are now enacted in the 
domain of accessing government resources. From the standpoint of landowning Sikh jat men 
and women, however, state welfare schemes such as MGNREGA are meant for Dalit 
households in the village. While the MGNREGA provides employment guarantee 
universally, men and women from Sikh jat households even those facing extreme economic 
distress are unlikely to enrol as workers. As political subjects, Punjabi farmers do not fit 
neatly into Chatterjee's binary framework of citizens and governed populations. Just as 
Punjabi peasant struggles in the early twentieth century, spurred by the project of agricultural 
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modernisation against the colonial state, were outside the purview of subaltern historiography 
(Bayly 2000). They did not quite fit in the conceptual framing that bifurcated elite and 
subaltern sphere of politics and exemplified the contradictory process of formation of a 
unified national space (cf. Mukherjee 2005; Fox 1985).  
 
As the majority among Sikh-jat landowners are already engulfed among the precariat or are 
on the precipice of being dispossessed, their struggles have shifted from being aspirational to 
fighting for survival. In Punjab, the various factions of the farmers’ union BKU have been 
mobilising sporadically against attempts at land acquisition. Farmers in Faridkot and 
Bathinda, that are involved with BKU activities either directly or through others in their 
village, argue that protests against land acquisition are largely driven by the agenda of driving 
up rates of compensation as farmers are keen to sell their land given the increasing 
unprofitability of cultivation and debt. In Michael Levien’s (2013) terminology they are 
‘bargainers’ and not ‘barricaders’. Farmers’ unions in Punjab do not offer an emancipatory 
vision but are protesting to mitigate the immediate effects of the crisis in the agrarian 
economy that are threatening the survival of farming households. In the last few years, 
various factions of the BKU have staged protests to demand compensation for crop failures 
(particularly cotton), for families where farmers’ have committed suicides, against delays in 
procurement of wheat and rice by government agencies, and for an increase in minimum 
support prices for crops.  
 
In this context, KVM’s place-based restorative agenda provides an alternative political 
imaginary. The unfolding of KVM’s organising practices, the responses it has evoked from 
participants and the emergence of internal competing discourses are animated by and reflect 
the tensions in the broader landscape of neoliberal resistance. They point at the broadening of 
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the political field from contestations over production to socio-ecological reproduction, as well 
as the beginnings of the displacement of developmentalism that has shaped the terrain for 
grassroots politics. As to whether the articulation of struggle in terms of socio-ecological 
reproduction dislocates class struggle is to pose a question that privileges theory over history 
(McMichael 2013; Smith 2016). The realisation of restorative agroecological production and 
consumption practices, however, is extremely challenging in a materially degraded 
landscape. The difficulties stem from economic compulsions of rural households, fragmented 
and weakened sociality, institutional infrastructure and the absence of ecological resources 
such as living soils, native seed varieties, and biodiversity. KVM activists have been unable 
to foster a collective work ethic, reciprocal knowledge and seed exchanges given the 
pervasiveness of individuated production and social reproduction practices structured through 
the Green Revolution decades. The revalorization of agrarian work privileged by KVM has 
limited resonance with the younger generation as their disillusionment stems from the 
broader devaluation of rural spaces. The politics of agro-ecological sustainability does not 
address the lack of investment in health, education and other kinds of infrastructure and rural 
economy beyond agriculture (cf. Edelman et al 2014).  
 
The progressive possibilities in the agroecological movement are contingent on the more 
substantive inclusion of groups marginalised in the agrarian economy through Green 
Revolution farming. As cultivation by landless tenants is likely to become more prevalent in 
the foreseeable future in Malwa, agroecological politics will only flourish with their 
engagement, and will perhaps be reinvented to more aggressively address social hierarchies 
and issues of access to land. For now, the push within the movement to foreground healthy 
and de-commodified food consumption for rural households is making space for engagement 
by women and landless households, social groups marginalised through labour 
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transformation in the Green revolution decades. The association of a larger number of people, 
particularly those situated lower in the social hierarchy is stretching the agenda of the 
movement beyond enactment of agroecological methods. While perceived by some as 
dilution of their agenda, together, the organising practices in the realm of production and 
social reproduction have created an expanded field of ‘constructive resistance’ (Kumbamu 
2009). ‘Constructive resistance’ that interweaves production and social reproduction ruptures 
the conceptualization of resistance as bifurcated into battles for survival and livelihoods 
versus sustained mobilisation for the achievement of long-term goals (cf. Scott 1979; 
Martinez-Alier 2014). Whether this ‘constructive resistance’ is able to reconcile ecological 
sustainability with agenda of social equity, in-place, is contingent on the ways in which 
alliances with other forms of rural struggles are forged within the region as well as the 
dynamics of engagement with the broader national coalition of agrarian struggles.  
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Figure 1: District Map of Punjab, India (Source: http://www.mapsofindia.com) 
Research Districts: Bathinda and Faridkot in Malwa region 
	
 
 
 
Figure 2: Regions of Punjab  
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